


**JPRS 74854**

**3 January 1980**

# **Near East/North Africa Report**

**No. 2063**



**FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE**

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>	<b>1. REPORT NO.</b> JPRS 74854	<b>2.</b>	<b>3. Recipient's Accession No.</b>
<b>4. Title and Subtitle</b> NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2063			<b>5. Report Date</b> 3 January 1980
<b>7. Author(s)</b>			<b>6.</b>
<b>9. Performing Organization Name and Address</b> Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			<b>8. Performing Organization Rept. No.</b>
<b>12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address</b>  As above			<b>10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.</b>
			<b>11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No.</b> (C) (G)
			<b>13. Type of Report &amp; Period Covered</b>
			<b>14.</b>
<b>15. Supplementary Notes</b>			
<b>16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)</b>  This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.			
<b>17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors</b>			
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-Arab Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Libya	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sultanate of Oman
Sociology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> North African Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mauritania	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Syria
Economics	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Morocco	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tunisia
Culture (Social Sciences)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Algeria	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates
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Military Sciences	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraq	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Spanish North Africa	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Israel	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sudan	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jordan		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kuwait		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lebanon		
<b>b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms</b>			
<b>c. COSATI Field/Group</b> 5D, 5C, 5K, 15			
<b>18. Availability Statement</b> Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		<b>19. Security Class (This Report)</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>21. No. of Pages</b> 135
		<b>20. Security Class (This Page)</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>22. Price</b>



3 January 1980

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No. 2063

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ARABS NERVOUS ABOUT IRANIAN REVOLUTION CONSEQUENCES

Kuwait Al-TALI'AH in Arabic 17 Oct 79 pp 12-15

[Article: "External Security--And the National Front in the Petroleum Gulf"]

[Text] The events through which the Gulf area has passed and is passing during the past few weeks have been the object of commentary and analysis by the Arab and Western press, each handling the subject from the point of view which it favors. Some of these comments are provocative and are connected with events which have not yet happened--and perhaps which they would like to see!! Some of them brought the area to the brink of "a Lebanon," after the pattern of what happened in Lebanon, which will promote a similar struggle in the Gulf in the view of these journalists.

Others have begun to speak in earnest behind the foreign fingers which are kindling fires in the Gulf and the hostile states whose agents in the Gulf have moved and are moving to show discord. In the end, Gulf security of the African continent and the Red Sea passageways had been the foremost concern for everyone a few years ago out of fear for that vital corridor!!

While the Red Sea events ebbed and then fell into silence, the events of the Gulf are still interacting, and our proximity to them here is mixed with many dangers, since writing about a hot topic is exposed to many interpretations.

Core of Events

There are facts which cannot be skipped over or ignored surrounding us in this Gulf. They are our destiny, and therefore we must take pains to understand them and study them.

First: The Gulf, with its small, oil-rich countries, is the subject of the ambitions of world powers, which now have, and in the past, and probably will continue to have in the future oil, commercial or strategic interests.

Naturally, the oil interests are the core of all of these interests. Thus the stability of the Gulf is of great concern to them. Also, they could achieve other goals during a period of instability!!

Second: The countries of the Gulf are small; the two largest Arab countries bordering the Gulf are Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Saudi Arabia, from the standpoint of progress in economic development, is relatively modern, that is, after raising oil prices in the years since 1974, and it is also an important source of Western oil financing. Its military size and structure have not reached full potential, on the best assumptions to date, and it is suffering from extremely complex development problems. As for Iraq, in the past 10 years it has made great strides in development. It is expected to have greater weight than it actually would have attained if the National Front had continued in its coalition while granting more internal participation.

Third: The third basic element is the presence of Iran and the influence of its policy on the region.

Iran under the rule of the Shah, especially in the 10 years prior to his overthrow, was the "bosom buddy" of many Arab regimes. The Shah tried to build his domestic and foreign strength toward one goal, which was to impose his authority on the region. His main interest at first was to weaken "Iraq of the Revolution." Then all of his propaganda weapons were concentrated on saying that the danger in the Gulf came from Iraq, which had connections (so the Shah justified his thesis) with the Soviet Union.

However, the political step and the Iraqi-Iranian accord in recent years before the Shah's overthrow removed this card from his hand, except that the presence of the Shah's Iran was well-known in the Gulf, from his withdrawal of nine ambassadors from Gulf countries as a protest against what he considered to be Arab coordination--without the Shah--in the Gulf, to direct intervention in Oman with the approval or mutual consent of several Arab parties.

The Shah's Iran extended its ambitions to more distant spots. He also had ambitions in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean. Some matters continued to connect the Shah's regime and the Arab regimes bordering the Gulf, including the division of international waters and the question of Gulf security, on which a conference was held in Muscat but failed because of Iraq's position at the time of rejecting any foreign intervention.

Historically, then, and in the era after the official British withdrawal from the Gulf, Iran played a role which could please or displease us. Naturally we were not pleased with the role of the protector or the role of the authority. Therefore, when the Shah's bases in Iran began to

tremble, this tremor found strong sympathy with the Arab people in the Gulf. When the Iranian people finally overthrew the Shah, joy filled the hearts of most Gulf citizens, on the basis that a nightmare had ended, placing the interests of the peoples bordering the Gulf above any other consideration.

Iran's revolution supported this hope by a group of positions, including support of the Palestinian Arab people, uprooting the American presence, and withdrawing Iranian forces from Oman, which were regarded as auspicious.

However, the Iranian revolution quickly entered what any revolution after long oppression enters, that is, aggravation and accumulation of internal incompatibilities, for example, the situation of the Arabs and the situation of the Kurds.

All sincere people on the Arab bank hope that the revolution will achieve satisfactory solutions to these problems, with the certain knowledge that these solutions cannot come about overnight. However, the position of many on the Arab bank of the Gulf was the wish that the Iranian revolution would reach those solutions, and that the Iranian people no doubt will find their final solutions which achieve national goals.

#### And Gulf Goals

The sons of the small Arab Gulf countries believe in their Arabism, and they have longstanding historical positions of rejecting any call to eliminate or wipe out this Arab character. Partition has been imposed on them, and they strive constantly to go beyond this partition to some form of unity. More than once these societies have acclaimed anyone who aims at achieving their unity, whether in the Gulf or outside it.

They participate in demonstrations, send wires, and welcome anyone who calls for unity. Their desire for unity and Arabdom was present even when they were under the direct rule of British imperialism. In 1963, when the events of tripartite Egyptian-Iraqi-Syrian unity took place, the voices of the pan Arabist sons of the Gulf hailed that unity.

Also, the masses of the Gulf moved forward to support each project for unity and Arabdom, for their feeling toward Arabdom and unity is genuine and springs from their own situation. There is no doubt that the Gulf, by its proximity to the Indian subcontinent and the Iranian coast, has received and sent emigrants. Written history is filled with emigrations to the Iranian coast and settlements there. Some of them may have returned to the shores of the Arabian peninsula, and every fair man knows that there are families living in more than one area of the Gulf, since the prominence of the "modern state" as a result of the presence of oil and other political and geographic reasons cannot eliminate human interconnections. Herein lies the truth, that is, in the circumstances of human interconnections. It is the root of the appearance of the force of unity for the people of



the region and adherence to their Arabdom. The emigrations, whether to the shores of Africa or to the Iranian coasts, absorbed the culture of the society, and it assimilated them. Any ancient or modern emigrations in history absorbed the culture of the society to which they emigrated: the Arabs in the United States, or the Italians, for example, or the emigration of Indians to Britain, for another example.

We could go into proof of those examples. However, if we in the Gulf look into the origins of the individuals and families for our type of "national unity," we find that the state accepts citizens under the provisions of the law. These citizens have their ambitions, just as any citizen in any country of the world.

### Bridging the Gulf

If we continue the preceding logic to arrive at the small Gulf state today, its citizens face a group of difficulties. These difficulties are differences in internal points of view about how the country should go about its public affairs. The question which confronts us is: do these difficulties really exist?

We believe that these difficulties exist, and saying that they do not is burying your head in the sand. However, we also believe that while they may differ in level from one Gulf country to the next, the essence is the same.

In some Gulf countries we see that the gap between the haves and have-nots is wide. This was not created suddenly and was not accentuated by a shortage. Rather, it is a result of long-term policies. This gap also has an economic, political and social meaning. This gap may not be visible in other countries because of the presence of huge resources, but it definitely is felt.

What does this gap mean? It means oppression and repression at worst, and fraud and feelings of the inadequacy of the citizen in less dire circumstances. All of the difficulties faced by the societies of the Gulf today are generated by this balance.

### Dangers for the Nation

If all today are agreed that this region is the object of ambitions and all are also agreed that the region is disregarding these dangers, then it is illogical for us to look for a foreign "cause" by which we interpret the situations as "dissatisfaction" on the part of sectors of our people which are "imported from abroad." To point this up, it was clear from the visit of Iranian officials to the Gulf countries that Iran of the Revolution desires the stability of this area, as others have desired this stability. The question remains: how do we all face the dangers which we know surround us?

It is by continued ignorance of the demands of one group or another of our people, and trying to put them on the sidelines--the sidelines of economic and political innovation? Is it by attempting to express the ambitions of our people in the Gulf, which are freedom from the economic subordination, building a strong national economy in the Gulf, and building a federal relationship in areas which still drift with the wind?

Is it in disregarding the question of popular participation and postponing it for real or imaginary reasons and letting opportunities pass for our people to take advantage of their resources, which we all know are dwindling, if not in this generation then in the next?

Is it by uttering slogans of Gulf unity, Gulf dinars, and travel by personal ticket only, with the knowledge that there are legal and moral impediments and limits which we place before the son of the Gulf and the Arab citizen to keep him from what he desires?

These are examples of the questions which we must answer successfully to overcome all of the obstacles before us in the next 10 years, the years of the 80s.

#### The Situation Today

One cannot ignore the laws which restrict freedoms in the Gulf area. You cannot ignore the political prisoners who have spent years in prison without trial in some Gulf countries. You cannot ignore the use of some provisions of laws drawn up earlier in an arbitrary fashion as a result of people expressing their views in a peaceful public meeting. You cannot ignore the fact that people are excluded from participating in the development of their situation and the planning of their future. One also cannot ignore despotic policies to distribute the wealth of the nation to the fortunate few at a time when the majority are not even allowed to express their opinions!!

These are some of the characteristics of the situation today in the Gulf, and a sincere effort to change them is the first way to get out of this sad situation.

#### National Front

Therefore, our demand for building a national front means basically resisting foreign dangers by removing the causes of domestic dangers, and by building the nation as a nation in which all take part under the auspices of the law, which is made by all, with contentment and participation by all. Then the nation does not become dinars, or dirhams, or cars or barrels of oil. It is people, first and last. It becomes a society in which people move as citizens who hold their heads high and believe in defending it, not as chimney chimneys of fear that their fuel of greed for money will destroy the humanity of people. When the interests of the nation are denied, the nation vanishes. God willing, our good Gulf and its people will persevere through all of that.

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### POTENTIAL DANGERS TO GULF SECURITY IDENTIFIED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 27 Oct 79 pp 12-13

[Article by Samir 'Atallah: "Who Threatens Gulf Security?"]

[Text] It was clear to the journalists who were invited to Al-Ta'if last week that the talks which they would follow were of the utmost importance. The location of the meeting alone was enough to indicate that there was an atmosphere of urgency. Al-Ta'if is usually the summer residence of the Saudi state, and consequently the important meetings which have been held there have been very few and very critical.

The meeting of Arab ministers last week was one of them. Although very little leaked out about the conference, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud Al-Faysal left no doubt that they were fearful of dramatic developments when he said that those who met had agreed to try to hold the next Arab summit on its scheduled date. As for the other ministers, especially Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Mubarak, they looked as if they wished the summit would be held tomorrow.

What is the cause of the fear?

The Gulf. The struggle in the Gulf. Revolution in the Gulf. Arrests in the Gulf. Mass deportation in the Gulf. Essence of the Gulf. Fate of the Gulf, and naturally, oil of the Gulf.

However, even if the Gulf had as little oil as it has springs, the situation today would be the same. More important than oil is the Gulf's geographic position, which makes it the borders of the Arab nation and the beginning of other borders.

It is to the remaining quarter of the 20th Century what the Suez Canal was to the first three-quarters: straits, islands, and seas, a stone's throw from the Indian Ocean. In addition to that, it is not only half of the Arab nation but also its richest half, at a time when the energy issue has been raised. The first strategic international dimension naturally



is branching out to other dimensions, such as the money crisis, the ignition of the world stock exchanges, and fear that the stages of economic stagnation might reach the degree of explosions.

At the time when the Al-Ta'if meeting was discussing the political aspect of the Gulf crisis, the Saudi minister of petroleum was warning that the world of producers was approaching a confrontation with the world of consumers, that is, the industrial world, as long as there was no end in sight to the insane speculation in oil prices on the Rotterdam market.

It is most likely that the minister was trying to get ahead as usual of a strange resolution or position toward the producing states of the type of the positions and resolutions which usually blame rising petroleum prices for crises in the economies of the West.

All of these events followed in succession to make the question of the Gulf and the security of the Gulf the Arab topic of the hour. At a time when the Arab rulers were ready to go to the Tunis summit, with the Lebanese situation at the top of the agenda, the southern part of the Gulf appeared as the most immediate question.

The Al-Ta'if conference convened, and the first thought of the conferees was the internal situation in some of the countries of the region. However, the conferees found that the question of "external" security kept resurfacing, this time from the heart of the Gulf and not only from outside it, specifically, the Omani call to establish an alliance requiring summoning Western forces to protect the Strait of Hormuz. From Oman also, Egyptian Vice-President Husni Mubarak stated that his country was ready to send Egyptian forces to the Gulf states which wanted them, in keeping with the Egyptian proposal to send military aid to Morocco to help it in the desert war.

Whether or not these were just attempts to break the Arab boycott which came about in response to "Camp David," the struggle in the Gulf has taken the following form in light of the new movements:

The Iranian situation, split into two parallel lines: one advocates transporting the revolution to the Gulf countries and Islamic unity through this revolution. Another advocates achieving unity by peaceful methods, leaving the situation in the Gulf as it is, and not making the factions of the Gulf choose between denominational loyalty and nationalist loyalty.

The Arab and Arabdom situation is what brought about a genuine meeting between Saudi Arabia and Iraq before and after the Baghdad Summit. This meeting was typified by the security agreement between the two countries and by what high Arab sources describe as complete harmony between President Saddam Husayn and Prince Fahd. This position is summed up in preserving the Arabdom of the Gulf first, and second, removing the area

from the arena of the international struggle. A group of Gulf countries adhere to this position--almost.

The international situation: The American position sees two complementary strategic points in the Gulf: oil and geography. Both are vital militarily, economically and internally. Any possibility of using any Gulf resolution for productive purposes or for influence [is to be exploited.] Most of the Western states and Japan, for whom Arab oil and especially Gulf oil constitutes the backbone of their financial empires, adhere to this position.

The Soviet Union does not need to take the oil dimension into immediate account. It seems content with what it has in the Mediterranean Basin, a military link within the scope of the Indian Ocean, and its ports of entry on the African continent.

In light of these positions, the internal situation in the Gulf seems of the utmost importance. Kuwait and Bahrain have operated on this basis from the beginning. As for the decision to expel 118,000 people from Saudi Arabia, which is an unusual figure in the history of the area, it also is proof that the customary flexibility no longer is found at the current stage.

Some Arab politicians even feel that the death sentences issued for some members of the Iraqi Communist Party some months ago have significance beyond the internal situation, since although the decision was internal some Gulf countries see in it an indication that Iraq does not intend to intervene in any ideological struggle with them and that it is differentiating between its position as a state ruled by an ideological party and its position as a large state on the Gulf.

Such a position is in contrast to the Iranian position of transporting the revolution to the Gulf, represented in the statements of the Ayatollah Rohani who threatened to "lead a revolutionary movement to overthrow the amir of Bahrain, since he does not represent the teachings of Islam." However, Iranian Foreign Minister Dr Ibrahim Yazdi replied to that by saying that Rohani "is an unofficial personality who does not represent the view of the Iranian revolution." On another occasion Dr Yazdi also said that "the basic danger to the Gulf is the struggle between the great powers in the Gulf area and outside it."

Who are these "great powers"? Is there a role for the Soviet Union? The answer again is that if the Soviets have a role it is not yet clear or at worst is not overt, but it is clear from American statements for at least 3 years that there is "some sort of plan" or a group of alternate steps to raise the question. Perhaps the Omani proposal to seek help from "America and West German forces" is one of these steps or rather one of the alternate steps.

In spite of American talk, official and otherwise, about troop-landing operations at unspecified "oil wells," it is unlikely, for purely domestic reasons, that the Americans would offer to send soldiers abroad on military missions. The effects of the Vietnam War have not yet ended, although the American people are prepared mentally to accept any step in the direction of the producing states. I asked Mr George Ball, former undersecretary of state and one of those concerned with conditions in the Gulf, at a luncheon held by the Arab League and attended by Professor Shafiq al-Hut, director of the office of the Liberation Organization in Lebanon, for his view on the American allusions to the troop-landing operation, for I regard it as unlikely that that is mentioned, but he stressed the importance which his country's government gives to the region.

What Mr Ball did not say is that since Vietnam the United States has replaced a policy of direct intervention in the struggle with a policy of destabilizing the target areas. The fact is, the situation in the Gulf today is more a situation of instability than a situation of struggle. For more than a year the area has been in a state of extended and almost daily turmoil, either by foreign threats or by way of internal disputes which have in turn facilitated the impact and effects of foreign threats.

Although the Lloyd's Company recently changed its mind about its decision to raise the amount of insurance on sea transport in the Gulf, the uproar which the decision stirred up at first put the area into a state of instability and left economic effects which cannot be estimated. Instability sometimes has greater effects than actual battle.

Thus it was clear from the Al-Ta'if Conference that the Arab trend at present is to try to end this new condition. There are those who say that while the states of the region are tending to act with firmness at home considering the fact that the question is within their sovereignty and their law, they are tending abroad toward flexibility and trying to avoid confrontation. There are those who say that the foreign minister of Kuwait, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, had traveled to Baghdad first after the Al-Ta'if Conference in order to inform the Iraqi leaders of the results of the conference and also to place them in an atmosphere to end the tension with Tehran.

If it were impossible for Kuwait itself to undertake this sort of mediation, either because of its recent incidents or because of its nature as a direct and basic party in the Gulf situation, then it is most likely that it would entrust the Palestinian resistance with such a mission, because of its position with both parties.

It is probable that the subject of mediation will be raised at the summit in Tunis, viewing it as an Arab and not a Gulf issue. There are those who say that although Saudi diplomacy has always been characterized



by silence, after the situation in the Gulf and especially after the incidents in Kuwait and Bahrain there no longer was any justification for slowness in achieving an immediate resolution to a complex crisis. Removal of a complicated crisis cannot be put off. Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Sultan announced, as did Prince Nayif, minister of the interior, and Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, foreign minister, that the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of the Gulf alone. Note that it is not customary for the minister of the interior to speak on foreign affairs, but all of these situations seem to point up what the question of the Gulf means to Riyadh.

While awaiting the Tunis Summit, the unrest remains. Battle is not the only unfortunate situation which requires a unanimous Arab decision rather than a non-unanimous decision or position.

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HABASH RESTATES PFLP POSITION ON PALESTINIAN STATE

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 24 Oct 79 p 19

[Article: "Dr Habash Opposes Establishing Any Truce in South Lebanon"]

[Text] Dr George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, opposes establishing any truce in the south of Lebanon, since he feels that the Palestinian resistance "has the right to fight the Zionist enemy starting not only from the Lebanese borders, but from all Arab borders."

In an interview which Dr Habash granted to the weekly magazine AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI, he said that a condition for agreeing to send the Lebanese army to the south should be "that its mission is to fight Israel and its agents."

Dr Habash went on to say that "if the mission of the army were to be impeding the Palestinian freedom fighters and the Lebanese nationalists to the north of the Litani River, then we would oppose its spread." He spoke from another aspect about his opposition to making any contact between the Palestinian resistance and the American government.

Dr. Habash said: "There is no complete or almost complete conformity between the strategic goal of the Palestinian revolution, which is represented in the establishment of a democratic state on all the soil of Palestine, and the position of the Soviet Union." Dr Habash feels that Moscow "is still the main supporter of the Arab national liberation movement."

Dr Habash also expressed his belief that establishing a Palestinian state on part of the Palestinian land might represent a basic solution with respect to the Palestinians living in Lebanon and Syria, with the condition that establishment of this state is not linked to recognition of Israel or signing a peace treaty with the Zionist state."

7587

CSO: 4802

**PALESTINIAN EDUCATION EFFORTS DISCUSSED**

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 30 Nov 79 p 12

[Text] Abu Firas, the PLO representative in Turkey, is interviewed in the November issue of EDUCATION STRUGGLE magazine on the subject of "Education in the Palestinian Revolution."

We will try to give a very brief summary of this interesting interview which reflects the education efforts being advanced with an eye to the future by a people who are fighting for their freedom and getting the world to accept them and their argument and who still are unable to live in their own land. Or, more correctly, we are obliged to content ourselves with excerpting those portions of Abu Firas' statements which we felt it necessary to underscore:

"The Palestinians were driven from their land and today live in various countries. One portion of our people have been living under occupation for 30 years. We are forced to start all over again and build as best we can everything that zionism and imperialism have destroyed and distorted. Therefore, it is necessary to consciously inculcate a brand new set of values. The organs of state which we have established and are establishing are taking up the new values as the basic fabric of national unity.

"The Education Department of the PLO-affiliated Palestinian Research Center has determined the basic principles on which educational philosophy for Palestinian Arabs rests, provided for organized education from primary school to high school, prepared text books in light of the principles set down, developed curricula and teaching and training methods, and specified the requirements for training and retraining of teachers while they are active in their professions.

"We have been given permission to open our own schools in the Palestinian refugee camps in certain friendly countries. Here, children are taught from the books prepared by the Palestinian Research Center. However, in the countries where we do not have our own schools, especially in the occupied lands, our own books will be read, that is, Palestinian history, Palestinian geography and so forth. This clandestine education is the responsibility of the PLO.

"The State of Israel, the symbol of zionism, is teaching students a distorted view of history. Should our children, Palestinian children be taught such history? The PLO is trying to ensure that our children who do not attend Palestinian schools receive the same education as the others. This effort, I think, is the only educational experiment of its kind in the world.

"There is a question of pressures applied through different methods in other countries. In particular, measures are taken to prevent development of the Palestinian culture. The PLO has made initiatives to open a Palestinian university in a friendly country, outside the occupied territories. We have adequate staff. There are 24,000 Palestinians who have completed university educations in various countries.

"What are we fighting for? To liberate our occupied lands and establish a Palestinian State. This state will rest not on ignorance, but on a scientific, technical foundation. After the revolution, we will have no need for people who tell us heroic stories, who live with their memories of the past and are content to boast. At that time, the development of the Palestinian State will be ensured through the existence of a well-educated generation which can be used for the good of the society and the people in every scientific and technical field. Every Palestinian youth has an obligation to be the best and the brightest in his own field."

8349

CSO: 4907



**NATION TAKES OVER OIL PRODUCTION FACILITIES**

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 5 Nov 79 p 5

/Article: "Bahrain Has Completed Procedures for National Takeover of Entire Oil Sector"/

/Text/ The Government of Bahrain announced recently that it has completed the legal procedures for attainment of full national dominance over the oil sector. On this occasion AL-SIYASAH is publishing a report carried in the latest issue of the monthly OAPEC publication.

Oil is considered Bahrain's main source of revenue, since it accounts for 60 percent of it. The main oilfields in Bahrain are the Bahrain and Abu Sa'fah fields. Revenues to be derived from the sales of oil from these two fields this year, 1979, are estimated at 161 million Bahraini dinars; they totalled 181 million Bahraini dinars in 1977, 156 million in 1976 and 111 million in 1975.

The Bahrain field lies in the center of the main island, al-Manamah, and the Abu Sa'fah field lies offshore about 50 miles north of Bahrain in an area situated between Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The two countries divide the income accruing from the field.

On 30 June 1975, a participation agreement was approved by the Bahrain government and the Bahrain Oil Company Ltd, by virtue of which the government took possession of 61 percent of production and exploration facilities and 100 percent of the gas resources subsequently to be developed; the agreement was to be effective as of 1 January 1974.

The government assigned to the Bahrain National Oil Company (Banoco) established in 1976 supervision of the share which it had obtained through the participation agreement. It was announced recently that agreement had been reached that the government would take control over all oil and gas production and would take over the marketing of products in Bahrain, effective 1 January 1978. Although oil production started in 1934, annual production volume is small. Production of the Jabal al Dukhan Field does not exceed 3.7 million tons per year. However, there is a major refinery in

Sitrah whose output totals 12 million tons per year. Most of the oil it refines comes from Saudi Arabia; therefore Bahrain's role as a source of refined petroleum products is more important than its role as a crude producer.

Production reached its peak in 1971 and has since begun to decline. The following table gives the volumes of production from the Bahrain and Abu Sa'fah fields from 1966 to 1977:

**Crude Oil Production, 1966-1977 (In Thousands of US Barrels per Year)**

Year	Bahrain Field	Abu Sa'fah Field
1966	22,521	11,488
1967	25,370	14,874
1968	27,598	22,733
1969	27,74 /digit missing/	24,351
1970	27,973	27,310
1971	27,347	32,121
1972	25,508	34,178
1973	24,948	39,411
1974	24,597	45,000
1975	22,342	21,000
1976	21,288	39,000
1977	21,237	45,000

At the present time much effort is being made to increase production while preserving maximum recovery potential. The oil production rate reached about 56,000 barrels a day in 1977 while asphalt output came to 2,100 barrels a day. Efforts are also being made to implement secondary and tertiary recovery.

The term primary oil recovery means the production of oil from the reservoir under its own pressure, that is, by flowing. Wells are said to be flowing under deficient pressure when there is need to use pumps to lift the oil to the surface of the ground. When the flowing well dries up a large portion of the original oil remains, contained within the producing reservoir around it, but pressure is too weak to bring the oil to the surface. It has become possible at the present time, thanks to improved means for additional recovery, to lift a large portion of the remaining oil after the primary recovery stage. The acquisition of this remaining oil is called secondary recovery, which is usually attained by injecting water or gas into the reservoir. Attempts made to recover what might still be left after the second stage are called tertiary recovery.

**Oil Reserves:** The most recent estimates point out that reserves will last beyond the beginning of the coming century. There are continuous attempts to discover new oil deposits in various locations, on land or offshore (north of the island). However, the chances of finding major new discoveries remain limited.

In 1977, 35 percent of natural gas production was consumed in power generation by the Alba Company (the aluminum smelter), 26 percent in maintaining the necessary pressure level in the oil fields, and 21 percent in operating the refinery, while the remainder was used for electricity generation, local consumption and field uses.

#### Electric Power Generation and Consumption

Except in the case of the major industries, which generate the electricity they need, the State of Bahrain Electricity Department is the body which generates electric power throughout Bahrain. This department operates four generating stations. The table of the capacities of these stations and their fuel requirements is as follows:

##### al-Khuff Gas Requirements (Million Cubic Feet per Day)

	Power in Megawatts	Value	Rate
Sitrah	120.0	33	19
al-Rifa'	200.0	(55)	23 (estimate)
al-Muharraq	38.8	nil	nil
al-Jufayr	133.1	35	26

Construction of the al-Rifa' station will be completed in 1980. This station generated 100 megawatts in August 1978 and a further 50 megawatts in mid-1979. It will be supplemented with an additional 50 megawatts in mid-1980.

The al-Muharraq station runs on diesel.

It is anticipated that electricity demand will rise to about 978 megawatts in 1990, as compared with 308 megawatts this year.

#### Associated Gas Exploitation

A project is currently being carried out in Bahrain to exploit associated gas; in the first stage of operation it will be possible to treat 100 million cubic feet of associated gas a day.

#### Solar Energy

Baghrain National Oil Company is studying a report on the feasibility of using solar energy in the country, since it is a potential alternate source to oil, whose output is constantly declining. Bahrain's climate is considered exemplary for solar energy exploitation, since the ground derives most of its power from the sun in the form of electromagnetic rays, of which 3 percent consists of ultraviolet rays, 42 percent of visible rays and 55 percent of infrared rays. The study is concentrating on the

possibility of using solar energy in Bahrain for air conditioning, farming, and desalination, since the percentage of salinity in artesian well water has started to rise, meaning that there is a need to distill seawater.

Bahrain National Oil Company's proposed program in the field of solar energy includes:

Construction of stations to measure solar rays in all areas of Bahrain.

Establishment of an experimental house to be heated and cooled by solar energy.

Performance of numerous other experiments related to solar energy.

Establishment of a specialized solar energy library.

#### Atomic Power

The National Paper emphasizes that nuclear power generation is to be considered more expensive than other forms of power; thus one cannot justify using it in a limited economy such as Bahrain's. However, there is the possibility of establishing central nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia to serve the Gulf region.

11887

CSO: 4802



EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION LEADER VIEWS POLITICAL, SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS

LD171211 London 23 JULY in Arabic 10 Dec 79 pp 3-6, 26, 27 LD

[Interview with Khalid Muhyi Al-Din, leader of the Egyptian Nationalist Progressive Unionist Grouping (NPUG) Party, to 23 JULY correspondent in London; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] Mr Khalid Muhyi Al-Din, what is the reason for your presence in London?

[Answer] We have been invited by the general secretary of the Labor Party to come to London to hold discussions with the party's executive committee, the committee on Middle East affairs, the foreign relations committee and the parliamentary foreign relations group.

[Question] We would like to ask you about the NPUG's present role, the role of the other opposition forces and the role the NPUG has played so far in rallying these forces.

[Answer] Until 1979, that is until the signing of the [peace] treaty, the party played a major role in rallying the nationalist forces against the treaty. We also contributed to the issuing of the statement by 13 people's assembly members representing the religious group, the national front, the independent Marxists, the NPUG and the independent elements. Afterward all the nationalist forces issued statements condemning the treaty, including the Al-Wafd party and the [former] revolution command council. There appeared to be a nucleus of a broad national front movement. I believe that the dissolution of the people's assembly then was because of the opposition's stand. Despite the small number in opposition, the stand was an expression of rejection. The opposition's voice during the assembly debate was very strong despite the small number of those in opposition. It is not a question of number but of a strong argument. Our strength and influence lay in the fact that what we said was true. Nobody believed us when we said that the Arab countries would boycott Egypt and that the Arab League would pull out. They thought that the Baghdad resolutions were mere "bluster." Although we called on them [the government] not to sign the treaty and to find a way out of it, nobody heeded us and the treaty was signed. One of the fundamental things we clarified was that prime minister and foreign

minister Mustafa Khalil's memorandum objecting to the U.S.-Israeli memorandum of understanding contained 16 objections each of which is sufficient for rejection of the treaty. We told them that three foreign ministers had already resigned and that the fourth foreign minister has 16 objections to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. In my opinion the measures that were adopted afterward represented a radical change in the government's stand with regard to future political action.

[Question] How?

[Answer] First, the dissolution of the people's assembly. This was unconstitutional because the people's assembly is dissolved only after a constitutional collapse or a constitutional crisis or as a result of a real clash between the president of the republic and the assembly because of the assembly's repeated rejection of a bill proposed by the president. In which case the president of the republic is forced to go back to the people with a public referendum.

But even the ruling National Democratic Party [NDP] was not consulted about the decision to dissolve the people's assembly. This means that the president did not even consult his own institutions to seek their views on a grave decision such as this.

Briefly, what happened was a constitutional coup, the way to which was paved by a host of freedom-restricting laws, which was not surprising.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because the signing of the treaty and the normalization of relations with Israel consequent upon it, the ensuing political alliance against the Arab world between Egypt and Israel, the Egyptian Government's attitude toward what is happening in the Arab world, its encouragement of the U.S. stand on freezing Iranian assets in U.S. banks as well as its encouragement for it to adopt certain attitudes toward the oil countries—all this goes to show that the government's policy is part of a U.S.-Israeli plan. This entails suppressing and gagging the opposition. It is no longer a question of Egypt's ending the war and turning its attention to its internal problem. The issue is much graver: it is a question of an Egyptian-Israeli alliance to confront the Arab liberation movement.

This question has forced many of those who supported the peace treaty inside and outside the ruling party to reconsider their stands following the continuing concessions on Egypt's part.

The seriousness of the matter lies in the fact that Israel's reaction to such concessions has been to build more settlements, to expel [Nabulus mayor] Al-Shak'ah and to threaten other mayors who object to the Israeli policy. [LD171213] This undermines the basis of self-rule. All this goes to show that Israel craves and is seeking further concessions. It wants the Nile waters to irrigate the Negev. This generated a strong reaction in Egypt,

particularly since the dream of affluence has not been achieved and the cutting off of Arab aid and trade with us has directly affected our economic resources.

The government has paved the way for dealing with all these conditions with a host of laws.

But on the other hand, this favored our party. The violations committed during the recent elections were the best propaganda for the NPUG because what matters was not our failure to win in the elections but the fact that we have emerged from the elections much closer to the masses and with a substantial increase in party membership. We emerged from the elections defeated by the government but not by the Egyptian public. Even had we spent large sums of money we would not have been able to prove the government's false claims about democracy, and we would not have had such an impact on the masses which have seen through the government's false and illegal actions that convinced the man in the street that what was taking place was mere dictating to the people and not a free election.

What we are concerned about is not the question of opposition, nor the NPUG nor even the treaty; it is the question of Egypt's independence which is being squandered, the Egyptian will which is being suppressed, and the question of opening the door to Israeli culture, trade and tourism. This demands that all citizens close ranks to thwart this danger which is threatening the future of their children and will strengthen Israeli Zionism inside Egypt.

Therefore, a front action has become the top priority in our activities.

[Question] What do you mean by front action? Is it coordination with other opposition factions?

[Answer] Exactly. We are coordinating with the other nonparty forces, such as all the nationalist forces that have not joined the NPUG, whether these be Nasirite, Marxist, nationalist or religious, as well as the national front party, the independent nationalist forces, the Wafdist forces and the Egyptian nationalist capital forces that see the open-door policy as a danger to them. For this reason we urge cooperation to save Egypt on the basis of a program which our party has already published concerning what is happening now. What is at issue is no longer the treaty but the future of Egypt.

[Question] Let us move on to the question of democracy.

[Answer] Those who accepted the treaty imagined that it would free us of the martial law and of the problem of the battle [with Israel]. But although we now see that no foreign danger exists, every day we see more freedom-restricting exceptional measures and laws, the latest of which being the socialist attorney law giving the socialist attorney the power to conduct political investigation.

[Question] What is the difference between political investigation and judiciary investigation?

[Answer] Judiciary investigation means that you are interrogated about incidents and your answer deals with incidents. But political investigation means discussing your ideas and cross-examining your political views. A report is then written about your views on the basis of which of your views are considered to be hostile to the state and, consequently, you will be isolated politically. If you appeal you are referred to the court of values. It is a special court consisting of some judges and lay citizens in the same line of business. Appeal against the court of values' decisions takes place before the people's assembly which is selected by the government.

[Question] Is this measure aimed against the NPUG in particular or against all the opposition factions?

[Answer] It is directed against all the nationalist forces but because the NPUG is the existing legitimate party most of the blows are directed against it.

[Question] Can you give an example of such measures?

[Answer] First, the law prohibiting parties publishing their own newspapers. Previously every party had a right to publish a newspaper expressing its views, but we have lost this right because a party must be represented by 10 members in the people's assembly [to have the right to publish a paper].

Second, the press law and the interference in the journalists union with the aim of excluding progressive journalists.

Third, the new law on parties. Supposing that a party member in Naj'hammad, for example, committed a violation, the whole party would be dissolved. If a party member travelled abroad and committed a violation the whole party would be punished and dissolved instead of action being taken against the member who committed the offense.

In other words, the law places the existing parties at the mercy of the authorities and thus paralyzes their activity. Of course, the NPUG can only go on struggling to expose the truth to the masses.

[LD171309] [Question] The NPUG is constantly accused of the fact that most of its leadership is communist. How true is this?

[Answer] This is not a new accusation. Strong accusations were made to this effect when steps to form the party were taken.

What is strange is that, despite the reiteration of such accusation, the party membership is increasing steadily, which goes to show that the masses do not believe the accusation. If we take a look at the party general secretariat's



structure we find that the Marxist members number no more than 10 percent. In fact, there are exactly 4 Marxist members out of the secretariat's 44 members. The NPUG members generally represent the left without any specific categorization. In other words, a Nasirite active member of the NPUG is naturally socialist and religious. Generally they are leftists but without any specific categorization. Categorization is noticeable only among a number of the older leadership, that is, those who belonged to previously existing organizations. But an ordinary member can be called an NPUG member who generally believes in the NPUG program; he is generally leftist.

The secretariat decisions are handed down on the basis of a majority vote. So far we have issued statements only on the basis of a large majority or unanimity whenever major party issues are involved. How can there be Marxist domination and on what basis do they claim that the party is Marxist inclined? What decision has the party taken that indicates Marxist control?

There is another point. We have been accused of being agents of the Soviet Union. I would like to see one party statement lauding the Soviet Union. The only statement issued by the party and mentioning the Soviet Union was one criticizing it for attacking President Al-Sadat. We said that criticism of Al-Sadat or the Egyptian leadership is the sole prerogative of the Egyptian people. We said that our attitude toward the treaty or toward Al-Sadat is a different matter and that we allow nobody to criticize our leadership.

I wonder if there is a single decision taken by the party betraying communist domination. Today, for example, they say that we are agents of the rejectionist states because our attitude toward the treaty is the same as theirs. Can we, by the same token say that Saudi Arabia is an agent of the Soviet Union because it has condemned the treaty in the same way the Soviet Union condemned it?

[Question] Let us move on to the economic situation and its effect on the political situation in Egypt.

[Answer] What is happening in Egypt is the result of the problem of shifting the Egyptian economy from being an independent economy to subservient economy. The economic policy applied since 1971 and to this day has harmed the Egyptian economy and caused it to deviate from the course of independent development to that of a subservient economy. In other words, allowing the entry of foreign capital and its participation in the public sector while renouncing planning and encouraging certain Egyptian social factions to operate in the Egyptian market has led to crises that will continue to afflict the Egyptian society--shortages of cigarettes, soap, public transport deficiencies and so on and so forth.

It is not surprising that the term "development" has disappeared from the vocabulary of daily life and has been replaced by "profit"--that is, the road is paved for people to make profits or to become affluent. Affluence

in a backward country in which the people do not find their daily livelihood is different from affluence in English. What is needed in Egypt is to eliminate hardship and end the ever-intensifying crises resulting from the slump in Egyptian industry which is suffering not only from foreign competition but also because the purchasing power of the Egyptian citizen has declined and, therefore, his ability to purchase manufactured goods has diminished. For this reason we see millions of pounds worth of manufactured goods stockpiled in depots.

Meanwhile, foreign products are being imported in order to do away with what is left of Egyptian industry. Foreign cigarettes, for example, are being imported, while production of local cigarettes is being reduced.

Take the telephone system, for example. From 1952 through 1965 telephone exchanges were being built with Egyptian expertise and labor. Why should we now pay 1.8 billion pounds to have a telephone network built. Where is the Egyptian worker and Egyptian expertise? Why have they been forsaken?

The answer is simple: we have no will to develop, for if we had such a will we would have nurtured the Egyptian workers and paid them sufficient wages to participate in development plans instead of paying high wages to the foreign expertise we are now importing.

[LD171613] [Question] What about prosperity?

[Answer] In my opinion prosperity can be achieved if the crises can be eased, in which case the government would make a significant advance. But the opposite is true. With every passing day the Egyptian people are suffering more hardships and difficulties in their daily life. This goes to prove that the myth of postwar prosperity is mere talk.

In the past they said that all Egypt's difficulties stem from its military debts. We stopped payment of our military debts 2 years ago. Has the Egyptian economy improved? They said prosperity will come after the peace treaty is signed. Now they have signed it. What have they achieved? Nothing. Where will prosperity come from? We must also take into consideration the fact that we have lost the Arab market and Arab aid. In my opinion the hopes on which prosperity is being conceived are false hopes.

Moreover, there is no serious intention for development. Development requires a spirit, a will, sacrifices. Who is going to make sacrifices now? Are the poor who are tightening their belts ready to make sacrifices, or are the rich, whose bellies are growing bigger? This is a political decision; development is a political decision. As long as we are afraid to take decisions that would force certain classes of people to make sacrifices--afraid because their voice is louder--then there will be no development in Egypt. Development is a social and political problem more than an economic problem.

[Question] As an opposition political party do you have an alternative policy?

[Answer] The alternative is to be found in our program. But we also propose practical solutions within the government's capitalist program. In other words, we are proposing two alternatives: the first is our party policy that basically disagrees with the government's general line, and the second is our view of what the government should do in accordance with its general life. But this is falling on deaf ears.

We have told them: Let us call your economists and our economists to a joint meeting to agree on an alternative program for the rationalization of the government's policy and the rescuing of Egypt's economy. But they insist on their program; they insist on furthering the open-door policy, the entry of foreign capital, the freedom of foreign capital and economic laissez-faire. But the practical result is that the price for this is paid by the low-income groups comprising 90 percent of the Egyptian people.

[Question] How do you view the political map of the Arab area following the Camp David agreement?

[Answer] Camp David marked the peak in the retreat of the Arab liberation movement because, thanks to it, U.S. imperialism achieved the first real victory in the area. But on the other hand developments opposed to U.S. imperialism have occurred as well.

The Iranian revolution has altered the balance of power and changed Iran from an imperialist reserve to a reserve of the liberation movement.

The second event was the Baghdad summit. The aim was for the Camp David policy to extend to all the Arab countries and for all the Arab countries to submit one after another to the U.S.-Israeli peace plans. But what happened in Baghdad halted this march, despite what has been said--that the Baghdad summit did not offer an alternative. The Arab countries, despite their disagreements and different regimes, have been able to agree on one thing--to oppose Camp David and to resist its extension to the rest of the Arab world.

Another event was the victory achieved by the Palestinian revolution and the widening recognition of the PLO, such as Kreisky's invitation to 'Arafat and the rapprochement with the socialist international. All these events are regarded as a victory for the line opposing U.S. policy and strategy in the area.

It is unfortunate, however, that some Egyptians believe that by signing the Camp David agreements Egypt will end the state of war and will build itself up. Instead, we find that we have entered into an alliance with the biggest enemy of our nation, namely Zionism. In other words, Egypt has entered another battle and has become a party to a conflict with the rest of the Arab nation.

The result has been that Egypt has become isolated in the nonaligned group. It is also isolated on the African, Arab and Islamic levels. It is also isolated internationally at the UN General Assembly.



What is happening in the Arab world at present is the result of a U.S. policy which has tried to embrace Camp David. The conflict has extended beyond the Arab world. The thin veneer which the United States created in Iran in order to deepen hostility between Islam and socialism and the socialist orientation has been exposed. The situation has backfired on the United States and the truth has surfaced. It was merely a thin veneer designed to dull the citizen's mind. All the false propaganda has fallen apart and it has emerged that the greatest enemy of imperialism is the Islamic revolution and the religious trends within the nationalist sentiments. [LD171637] In other words, the U.S. plan is now being opposed by an Arab movement that is daily proving its insistence on security its rights. We are glad that the NPUG party has foreseen all this. All that has happened now is that the United States has been trying to solve the Middle East crisis within the framework of cold war and by excluding the other parties--even the Arab parties--and isolating Egypt from them. The Egyptian Government is now reaping the fruits of this policy in the problems it is facing at present.

[Question] What about the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel? So far we have no idea about the exact form of such relations. What is your view on this?

[Answer] I have noticed that all the aid Egypt will receive will go to the Sinai region to build farming communities and implement joint projects there with the aim of linking the Egyptian and Israeli economies. I believe that this will have far-reaching and very serious effects which the Egyptians will not feel right away. The Israeli presence comes at a time when the Egyptian people find themselves completely disarmed; that is, the Israeli presence comes at a time when our economy is open and we can do nothing to avert any future risks. This is because the treaty bans the erection of any barriers. Moreover, the Egyptian citizen's awareness of the Zionist danger is being blunted. There is a difference between ending the state of war with Israel and maintaining one's sense of the danger of the Zionist movement. You may establish relations with the United States as a state, but there exists the U.S. imperialist interests. You must always teach your people about the dangers of U.S. imperialism and its existence. But to remove from your people's books and their schools any reference to the Zionist danger while Zionism has changed nothing of its objectives nor its indoctrination of its people that Israel is the country of all world Jewry and that all Jews must come to Israel to dominate the peoples of the area--this means that you are taking away from your people their most important nationalist weapons. Therefore the upcoming stage is a grave one. For this reason the NPUG raises the slogan of opposing the Israeli presence in Egypt, boycotting it and suppressing it because this presence will be serious.

[Question] We have spoken about everything but we have not discussed the Egyptian public. Does the man on the street agree with what is going on now and with the normalization of relations?



[Answer] The Egyptian public is being specifically manipulated. Day and night the media try to brainwash the Egyptian man in the street. He is being led to believe that there is no alternative and that there is no use in cooperating with the Arabs. When the Egyptian man in the street discovers the truth the situation will be in his hands. There will be a reaction. Don't forget the question of dignity.

There is another important point: the majority of Egyptian youth feels that it can no longer live in this country and has to accept one of two alternatives: emigrate or resist. Society cannot offer youth the hope of setting up a happy and stable home. Whatever brainwashing is carried out, in the final analysis youth must think of the future.

[Question] A final question: There are outside Egypt many societies of partisans and friends of the NPUG. Do these groups officially represent the NPUG?

[Answer] The NPUG has no branches abroad; it has no spokesman abroad. We have given nobody the authority to speak on our behalf. These people establish what are known as societies of supporters and friends of the NPUG, and during their activities they adopt and expound NPUG views. We are not against this, but we are not responsible for them. This is merely an effort on their part and a means to make the NPUG's voice heard. The party has not yet begun planning to organize the activities of Egyptians abroad.

CSO: 4802

EGYPT

DEFENSE FOR COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS BEGINS

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 5 Nov 79 p 10

[Article by Ahmad Al-Aswani: "Defense of Communists and Inciting Disorder Suit"]

[Text] Yesterday the defense began its endeavor concerning communist organizations and incitement to violence which occurred on January 18 and 19, 1977 and which involves 176 defendants.

The court held its session which lasted 3 hours with Judge Hakim Munir Salib presiding, and the membership of 'Ali 'Abd-al-Hakim and Ahmad Bakkari as members. Consultant Raga' al-'Arabi, the General Attorney for State Security prosecution, Yusif Darraz, Chief of prosecution, Ahmad Ramadan and Ramadan Nasr secretaries were present.

Attorney Adil Amin defended six of the defendants. He reviewed legally and historically, decisions of The Court of Cessation related to similar cases and referred to the previous brief submitted on 11 February concerning the inadmissability of reviewing the appeal before the State Security Court. He said acceptance of the brief does not mean this case is out of the court's jurisdiction but let a criminal court decide. This means submission of its decision to the court of cessation.

The defense pointed out that criticizing the present regime is not a crime as long as good intentions for the general welfare exists. Also, criticizing the economic liberalism and American-Egyptian relations do not apply to Article 98 "A" of the penal code because it specifies the change of the basic organization of the social system by force.

The defense also said that the 25 November march from the university to the People's Assembly was not intended to clash with State authority.

After that, the court decided to continue the defense for today's session.

**MORE RESTRICTIONS ON USING TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM**

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 3 Nov 79 p 8

[Article by Sami Mintwalli: "A Proposed Law To Be Discussed by Transportation and Communication Committee in the People's National Assembly, Prohibition To Operate Radio Systems or Telex Without Permission From the Minister. An Annual Fee of 300 Pounds To Be Paid for License To Operate a Radio Transmitter."]

[Text] This week the Transportation and Communications Committee in the People's Assembly, under the chairmanship of Engineer Muhyi-ad-Din' Abd-El-Latif, will discuss a proposed law which specifies that it is impermissible to assemble or operate any radio apparatus for transmitting telephone calls, telex or telegraphic messages or photos without a license from the Minister of Communications. This law would be applicable to fixed or mobile apparatuses inside Egypt and to radio stations prepared for transmitting and receiving aboard planes or ships registered in the Republic; also radio apparatuses prepared for transmitting in technical experiments and scientific tests or in radio communications institutes.

Exempted from this are only radio apparatuses for transmitting and receiving whose power does not exceed 100 milli-watts and function on frequencies less than 30 mega-hertz.

The minister of communications issued a decision on regulating the necessary subscriptions for licensing in administering educational institutes for radio communications which qualifies their graduates to earn qualification certificates, the conditions which must be met by teachers who teach in the institutes for radio communications as well as their curricula, the system of examinations and granting certificates, and how the General Egyptian Organization for Telecommunications would supervise these institutions and the progress of study in them.

The Board of Egyptian Telecommunications Organization will fix the required fees for radio services not to exceed the following categories:

--Three hundred pounds paid annually for licensing to operate a radio transmitting system;

--When operating the primary apparatuses to contact mobile or stationary points an extra fee is levied on the dues which are determined according to the previous provision, and renting the communication line according to the schedule used by the Organization at the time of licensing for each kilometer of the telecommunication line. The collected rent, in any case, should not be less than the rent for a distance of 20 kilometers;

--Fifty pounds per annum for each extra channel in relation to multichannel apparatuses. This is in addition to collecting the rent of the telecommunication line for each channel--according to the previous provision;

--One hundred pounds for licensing to operate any of the aforementioned institutes;

--Two pounds as a fee to apply to enter the examination of one of the qualification certificates in telegraph and radio telephone, or granting the successful student a license to practice his job.

The proposed law stipulates that exempted from the provisions of this law are the General Organization for Meteorology, the Civil Aviation Organization, the Ports and Lighthouses Administration, Radio and Television Union, the Central Agency for Mobilization in the Presidency of the Republic, the Armed Forces, the Intelligence Agency, the Ministry of Interior, Public Appertenances of Traffic, fire-Brigades and Rescue, Middle East News Agency, and foreign Embassies with the condition of reciprocal treatment, and other areas which are specified by a decree from the Minister of Communications.

Anyone violating the provisions of the law will be punished by not more than 6 months in prison and a fine not to exceed 500 pounds or one of either.

9528

CSO: 4802



# SADAT MEETS WITH UNIVERSITIES PERSONNEL

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 15 Oct 79 pp 52-53

[Article by Labib al-Siba'i: "President Sadat Meets With Universities' Personnel: The Beginning of New Phase of Students' Action"]

[Text] President Anwar al-Sadat discussed a number of important university and national issues with the presidents of universities and their faculties for 3 consecutive days. The discussion focused on the responsibility and the role of universities in up-grading the society, the accomplishment of the Green Revolution, tax policy, and economy. Moreover, he discussed aspects of students care and the form and responsibilities of students' action in the forthcoming phase. It has been ascertained that the universities' concern with student activities during the forthcoming phase need vision as well as a new philosophy within the framework of the amendments which were included in the Executive Ordinance for the reorganization of universities and by which universities will start their new year for the first time with a new approach for student action whose ultimate goal is the realization of student care as well as the direction of effective student activities.

In a dialog with Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, Asyut University president and acting secretary of the Higher Council of Universities, concerning the content of the new by-laws in the sphere of students' action, he says that these laws emphasize the organization of scientific leadership policy in such a way that each group of students in a department or college or an institute should have a faculty leader assisted by an assistant professor or a graduate assistant who meets with his student group regularly in order to know their academic problems, guiding them, and work to solve these problems as well as facilitating printing and publishing books and academic articles in addition to encouraging the formation of scientific associations by increasing the number of the faculty, organizing scientific activities which are suitable for the students as well as the projects rendering service to the community in as much as it is related to their specialties. Moreover, he adds that it has been decided to establish funds for social equality which aims at student's social security in all its different forms such as insurance, social care or loans as well as participating in providing services for the students to solve their problems which hinder quiet

continuity in their studies as well as add to their financial difficulties. He also decided to establish a central fund for social equality among university students sponsored by the higher council of universities. Such a trust would have an independent status and an administrative council chaired by the president of the Higher Council of universities. It would also include representatives of university presidents for academic affairs, students, a secretary for the council, and nine representatives from the organizations whose function is related to the aims of the funds. The sources of the funds would come from government subsidies which the state would provide annually, from allocations provided by the Ministry of Endowment, financial allocations which are available to equalize ministries, provinces, and students' organizations. Other sources are the earned interest from students' insurance contracts, income from parties, donations, festivals, and the revenue from investing the funds.

Then Dr Hasan Hamdi said that in addition to all that, a branch fund will be established in every university for social equality. Its administrative will be formed under the chairmanship of the vice president for academic and student affairs. Moreover, in each college there will be another fund which will take care of social equality between students. Its sources come from donations and gifts and 20 percent of the revenue earmarked for the students' union of that college.

As for student unions, Asyut University president and general secretary for the Higher Council of Universities says that the new organization of student unions demands that such unions be formed entirely from regular students who are seniors in their colleges. New students who pay the union fee will have the right to vote or be nominated. These unions are in charge of promoting spiritual, moral, and educational awareness, providing the opportunity for responsible expression of opinions, implanting the proper university spirit among students, discovering students' talents and abilities, disseminating and encouraging the formation of fraternities and students' cooperative associations, organizing social, psychological and educational scout activities, and organizing the use of students' energies to serve the society. The college or institutions' union councils would work to realize all that through five committees: the fraternity committee which encourages the formation of fraternities in the college and coordinating fraternity activities with the committee of athletic activities in the college; then the cultural and artistic committee and the scout and general services committee which is in charge of executing environmental programs approved by the college as well as participating in social development and allowing student participation in executing such programs, and participating in public and national projects; finally, the social and travel activity committee.

Dr Hasan Hamdi adds that by the beginning of the present academic year, these committees will be formed under the leadership of one faculty member and two students as members representing each academic group which the students elect every year. The formation of a college council union will

be completed under the leadership of the college dean or whoever he selects to represent him. A council will be formed for each university to coordinate student activities under the leadership of the vice president for academic and activity affairs.

According to the new by-laws and Dr Hasan Hamdi's discussion, it would be impossible to form any organization on racial, political or religious basis in all universities or their branches. It is also impossible to organize any activity for the union councils or their committees or in their name on the same bases. Every student without exception in the colleges or the universities and their affiliate institutes must pay one pound and a half as annual dues. These dues are collected during the first month of the academic year. However, the university council, by decree can allocate not more than 20 percent of these dues to finance competitions and projects. Regarding nomination procedures for union council committees, the secretary of the universities' higher council says that the nominee must be an Egyptian citizen who is morally upright and must be a new regular student in his group but should not stand for re-nomination for any reason. He must pay union dues and be known as an active member in the committee's activities to which he nominates himself. He also must not have been convicted or sentenced which would limit his freedom or decide to drop or suspend his membership in any student union.

The elections of Union Councils and their committees will take place before next November. For valid elections of the Student Union Committees, 50 percent of the students who have the right to vote must vote. If the number is insufficient, elections should be postponed to another date within 3 days. In such a case, at least 20 percent must vote to validate the elections. If 20 percent do not vote this time, all student groups must be eliminated from representation. Dr Abd Al Magid Uthman, president of the Suez Canal University says that each by-law has come out in order to face the separation which has occurred between the students' base and their unions which resulted in the deterioration of student activities. For this reason, these by-laws, before anything else aim at the fact that the universities must bear more responsibility to care and lead. Moreover, they should provide a meeting of minds for more intellectual and scientific interplay in addition to the fact that the university must cooperate equally with the students on the basis of academic leadership by caring for their academic affairs, the formation of fraternities, academic associations, and follow-up their activities in serving the environment.

Indeed we have lost all that in the past years. That is why the new academic year will witness the true image of the university, faculty, and students.

Dr Subhi Abd Al-Hakim, vice president of Cairo University says that the position of student action with its forms in the past years created a call for separating the student and the professor, which, in turn, has resulted in certain phenomena, namely, the professor's avoidance to participate and

offer any service beyond the lecture hall. This was dictated by the sensitivity which has been created by such situations, including the monopoly of a minority of students in students' action. This kept the wide base of students away from participation. For this reason it was imperative to search for a new system for student unions and actions. The success of these systems depends on two things: first the participation of the faculty with their efforts and giving for the sake of creating a fatherly image, educational, and fraternal spirit inside the university family; second student participation and the realization of how important such student participation is in student activities and the nature of the fraternal relationship between the student and the professor inside the university.

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CSO: 4802



## IRAN

### SURGE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM GRIPS TEHRAN

Paris NAMEH-E RUZ in Persian 6 Nov 79 pp 10-11

[Text] Eric Rouleau, commentator of LE MONDE, who, last year, during the Iranian Revolution, made many trips to Tehran, and who is the first reporter to have gone to Tehran during that upheaval, writes:

"Does Sunday, 4 November mark a turning point in Iran's domestic affairs and foreign policy? Last February, for the first time after the overthrow of the shah, millions of Iranians took part in demonstrations humiliating U.S. imperialist forces. The occupation of the U.S. embassy by students and the seizure of its employees as hostages are viewed as justified acts by most Iranians because the first moves in that incident have been carried out with the support and encouragement of Emam Khomeyni.

Actually, the anti-Americanism which has gripped Iran over past weeks reflects Iranians' anger towards a strong country hosting a man Iranians despise. Indeed, in Iran, the shah is equated with Hitler as a blood-thirsty tyrant who is responsible for the deaths of scores of thousands people. That is why neither his illness nor "the exclusively humanitarian reasons" which induced his old U.S. supporters to host him has been able to mollify the masses of Iranians who are still traumatized by the slaughters of last fall and winter. Iranians' feelings towards their previous monarch was expressed in the gallows tree carried by demonstrators on Sunday.

#### A Forseeable Outburst

But the hatred Iranians kindle towards the U.S. government cannot be underestimated.

Nobody in Iran has forgotten that the deposed shah had been reinstalled on the throne by a CIA-engineered coup d'etat in 1953, nor that the United

States had strengthened the Pahlavi rule through various forms of support, especially by providing tactical assistance for the establishment of the dreaded SAVAK organization. The slogans of hundred thousand demonstrators (over a million according to the French news agency) were moving like continuous waves on Tehran streets and included the following:

"Yankees, go home," "Death to Carter and his guest," "America is enemy number one."

The outburst of Iranians was not unforeseeable: some three weeks prior to it, Ayatollah Khomeini lashed at western imperialism in general and the United States in particular.

Such acrimonious statements were astonishingly reminiscent of Nasser's fervent speeches in 1950's and 1960's. Many senior religious leaders, some of whom, like Ayatollah Beheshti have been known to date as uncompromising conservatives, have now adopted a "rebellious Marxist-like" rhetoric. In addition to Ayatollah Khomeini, some members of the clergy now constantly use terms such as "the working class" which, in the past, was considered anti-Islamic.

On 20 October 1979 Mr Banisadr who naturally is not a supporter of the USSR wrote in his newspaper ENQELAB-E ESLAMI ("Islamic Revolution") an article purporting that the Iranian Islamic Revolution caused more harm to the USSR than to the United States.

Hence he is attacking the Bazargan government. In the past Mr Banisadr has often accused the Bazargan government of wishing to reestablish the same shah regime, but without the shah. This view is shared by many senior religious leaders, and especially lower echelon clerics, as well as leftist parties.

It is in the context of this polluted anti-American atmosphere that the meeting, last week, of Engineer Bazargan with Brzezinski in Algiers, has been considered as a provocative act by the general public. In that meeting, Prime Minister Bazargan was accompanied by Ebrahim Yazdi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mostafa Chamran, Defense Minister. Whether true or false, these two individuals have been labeled as pro-Americans. An added lack of precaution on their part was that not only Mr Bazargan had not demanded the return of the shah, but had tacitly acquiesced, without any comment, President Carter's report according to which the deposed shah had no desire to engage in political activity on U.S. soil. Moreover, after his talks with Brzezinski, Mr Bazargan, without hesitation or any reservations, termed his talks as "cordial." Instead, Mr Brzezinski labeled the talks merely as "constructive."

### Exemplar of Satanic Power

Thus Mr Bazargan unwittingly exposed himself to crushing charges. For 2-3 weeks prior to that his enemies had been conniving to topple him. On Sunday KEYHAN wrote: "As you can see, Mr Bazargan, who is sitting in front of one of the most hated staff members of the White House, expresses sadness."

That same day, the organ of the Islamic Republic party, which considers itself an affiliate of Eham Khomeyni, published the announcement of that party wherein it demanded Mr Bazargan to "provide the Revolutionary Council with a report on his talks with the representative of the Satanic Power."

By noon of that same day, 400 students shouting "Iaelaha ellallah" ["There is no God but Allah"] stormed the U.S. embassy. Male students wore pictures of Ayatollah Khomeyni on their chests; female students wore headdresses, and all wielded clubs. They climbed the high walls surrounding the embassy, occupied the lawns inside the embassy compound, and confronted U.S. Marines. Subsequently negotiations, polite but uncompromising, lasted 2 hours. At this very time a thick smoke billowed through one of the embassy windows and one of the students shouted: "They are burning documents." Another student shouted: "Let's occupy that nest of spies right away!" U.S. Marines used tear gas. The Iranian students, holding handkerchiefs next to the nose, raided the embassy compound. After breaking closed doors and windows they entered the building and arrested staff members of the embassy, except Mr Bruce Laingen, embassy charge d'affaires. Nobody knew how Mr Laingen had managed to escape.

As soon as the radio broadcast the news of the U.S. embassy seizure, messages supporting the move started to deluge the occupied embassy. The Office of Eham Khomeyni, Ayatollah Montazeri, the Council of Experts, the People's Mojaheddin, and numerous political and cultural organizations all have viewed the seizure of the U.S. embassy as reflecting the will of the people and have congratulated the students. MARDOM, the organ of the Tudeh party, has joined in the clergy's jubilation.

8291

CSO: 4906

## IRAN

### KHOMAYNI CALLS FOR PURGE OF ALL WESTERN ELEMENTS

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 30 Oct 79 p 12

[Text] During a meeting of Islamic students which was held at the Mofidi University in Qom, Enam Khomeyni strongly attacked the West and "Westophiles," pointing out that all the East's problems have been caused by the West, particularly the United States.

The text of Enam Khomeyni's message is being reproduced below:

"In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

For at least the past 50 years all Iranian social classes have connived with traitors to keep Iran as a "patient" in a hospital. That patient has just now been released. But he is still very weak and ill: you cannot expect such a patient, after so many years, to immediately recover upon release from the hospital.

The Iranian society had contracted its illness from the West which plundered our wealth. So don't expect this western illness to abate in 8 months, 8 years, or 25 years. For 50 years the West has brainwashed many Iranian educators to, in turn, brainwash their Iranian students with sick western ideas. Thus, to expect such patients to recover immediately is unreasonable. I am aware that all Iranian social strata and groups, especially educators, have been influenced by Westerners to follow a definite path or to deflect from the path they should follow. Under such circumstances you should not expect that such educators and their students will right away swerve from that path and follow the path of the people. However, don't despair: the people has found its own path and you, young people, have found yours. If Iran is not purged today, it will be so tomorrow. Such a purge is inevitable when a people has pinpointed its illness. At the start of any campaign the important thing is to ascertain the nature of the problem. For the past 50 years we have been led astray as to the real nature of our problem. We considered those



corrupt microbes as our cure. We regarded our corrupters as our doctors. Through mass propaganda, our corrupters had brainwashed us to believe that we should acquire all our supplies, our culture, and our civilization from the West, because, allegedly, we were devoid of all that.

Such rotten ideas which they instilled through corrupt films and deviant statements had brainwashed us, especially our youth, to regard poison as medicine for Iran's illness. Today these corrupters are still found everywhere, in all sections of Iran, and in schools. You simply cannot expect patients suffering for 50 years to be cured within several hours, days, or years. As you know, even someone with a simple cold sometimes needs up to a month's medical care. Iran which has suffered 2,500 years of rule by self-styled gods and tyrannical despots, has particularly suffered over the past 50 years. These have been the worst years in Iranian history: we had been attacked from all sides, all Iranian social strata had been manipulated, and we had been completely divested of our own culture, i.e., of ourselves. Not only Iran, but the East in general, which had been equally divested of its culture, must rediscover and revive its culture. Through their propaganda corrupters in our midst had swerved us so much to the West and westernized us that we had forgotten all Iran's heritage and glories. We had lost any faith in ourselves.

Just a few days ago a stranger visited with me and tried to persuade me that: "After all Iran needs the West, we buy everything from the West." I immediately cut my conversation with that person. Iranians must realize that we do not need the West, but that it needs us. The East has everything; its culture is superior to Western culture (Western culture was derived from Eastern culture); the East is superior to the West in all regards. However, and unfortunately, Eastern culture has been divested of all its components through mass propaganda carried out by the West's lackeys who continue to operate, even today, under different guises in Iran. Such elements have divested us of our culture, deluding us to believe that all good stems from the West. Unless we revive our culture and rediscover ourselves, unless the East rediscovers its heritage, we will be unable to stand on our feet. We must wipe out from our brains the word "West."

In the past, whenever Iranians wished to make an avenue, an apartment building, a drug, or a fabric popular, fashionable, or prestigious, they would give them foreign names (such as Roosevelt Avenue, etc...). We had lost our individuality and identity. Now we have thrown out the thieves, but in order to rediscover ourselves the East must shut off the door to the West. So long as the West has access to the East, you will not be independent, and so long as these Iranian "Westophiles" who are everywhere, are not thrown out of Iran, or are not re-educated, you will not

attain independence. Iranian "Westophiles" will prevent us from achieving that independence. We must rediscover ourselves so that we may be able to stand on our feet. The West has not and will not give us what we really need, but only its rejects, irrespective of the fact that they might be injurious to Iranians. As an example, I would like to, I cannot help repeating a fact which I have recounted on numerous occasions because it has impressed me vividly: I read in a periodical that the sale of certain drugs is banned in the United States, but that it is O.K. to export them to the Third World. Can you imagine the devious way the United States has been treating us? They most likely consider us to be inferior even to animals: they would not give such injurious drugs even to their animals. Can you imagine the vile characters we have been dealing with in the United States? (I don't mean the American people). Look how we are still subjugated to them. May the pens and tongues which write and speak in favor of the West and wish to corrupt and delude the Iranian nation be crushed. Just imagine, they don't give a damn about the effects of such drugs on Iranians: they are solely interested in selling them and collecting money. And it has been so from the very outset: the West has refrained from giving us items we truly need. Believe me, all of the East's problems stem from this unfortunate state of affairs, from this West, from these United States. Right now all of our problems have been caused by the United States. All of the problems of the Moslems have been brought about by these United States which has been sharply strengthening Zionism and massacring our Arab brethren. Until we are fully aware of our prominence, heritage, what we had been in history, what we have now become, and what we now possess, we will not achieve independence. Unless we think independently, Iran cannot be independent.

Make sure to always strive to think independently. Schools must strive to re-educate our youth to think independently so that young people realize they are endowed with their own culture, a culture which had been exported from Iran abroad, that we, too, are part of this world, and that we wish to manage our own affairs. That's how young people must be trained from now on. Rotten brains enamored of America and the West, the "Westophiles," must be purged. Iranian government offices must be purged of those traitors who, even now, are either not doing enough against the interests of the previous regime or are not doing anything at all. Iran is in dire need of a purge. But, naturally, a purge takes time. It must take place, but it cannot be done all at once. Then what should we do? The task of each and every Iranian is to excel at whatever job he is holding. Before ascertaining how your supervisor or colleague is doing, you should strive to do an excellent job yourselves. Any criticism should start with ourselves. Each of us, especially our farmers, must work hard. We must not be duped by those who wish to swerve us to our previous situation purporting that our general well-being and fate

are contingent upon the West. We must not be duped by the propaganda of such elements. Our task lies first of all in doing a good job out of whatever has been entrusted to us. If you are a student, you must study well; if you are a teacher, you must teach well; if you are a college professor, you must lecture well; if you are a farmer, you must farm well; if you are a mullah, you must be a good mullah. Whoever you are, whatever task has been entrusted to you, strive to do a good job. If such an attempt is made on a national basis society as a whole is improved and the entire nation will benefit from it. Whereas if some of you are idle, don't expect others to work for you. In the past we expected the United States to feel sorry for us and to supply us with weapons. Iran did not need American arms: they had been detrimental to Iran. All or most U.S. agreements with us were deleterious to us. Don't sit idly and expect others to labor for you. You ought to labor yourselves. The Iranian nation itself ought to work. It can then implement programs it really needs.

All of us must be responsible both vis-a-vis the nation and ourselves. We must be responsible in re-educating ourselves and others. Every little bit of effort and exhortation counts. Whatever job you have do it well and exhort your associates to do a good job, too. Such a commitment, carried out on a national basis, will lead to rapid improvement of the country as a whole.

To sum up:

We must not sit idly and have other countries work for us.  
We must not sit idly and have supplies imported from the West.  
We must toil ourselves, manage our own affairs, and forget the West.

May God protect all of you and help you to triumph in all your endeavors!

8291

CSO: 4906

**KHOMEYNI'S SON ALSO WANTS CLERGY PURGED**

Tehran **BAMDAD** in Persian 30 Sep 79 p 1, 2

[Interview with Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni]

[Excerpt] The first part of Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni's interview with **BAMDAD** was published in yesterday's issue and was carried around the world. Meanwhile within the country, the official news agency and the mass media have also reported it.

In the second part of this interview the issues relating to the revolution were propounded and discussed as was the role of the various social groups in the present interval of the revolution.

Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni asked intellectuals not to measure all the clergy with the same scale. Moreover, if the intellectuals believe that some of the clergy are opportunists, they should introduce them to society--and that is the duty of all the people in the society.

The interview follows:

**BAMDAD:** You have talked about the classification of the clergy. This is an opportunity for you to clarify this classification more clearly.

**Ahmad Khomeyni:** First let us discuss classification which I pointed out in the beginning. Now, it is fashionable, by some who attack the clergy to say that they are exposing religious despotism. They say the clergy do what they wish to do. Here, it is necessary for me to give some explanation about myself. Those who know me know that I always try to discuss only what I have seen and that I am not intolerant. About the classification, as I said before, a group of the clergy is in the religious schools; they are students like the students in a university. During all the Imam's struggles, these people came forward and took the Imam's thoughts to the villages, hamlets, districts, towns, and cities. They were paid two or three hundred toman. They went to the villages and talked with people in their language.



They are themselves from these villages and they knew where they must go. They never finished their words with "ism or ist." Like the people, wherever they went, they went bare footed and said, Mr Khomeyni issued a statement and they discussed the text.

These people went to jail, they were beaten, tortured, and were pushed around. Many times their schools were attacked. Because attacks on the universities did not have good international reputes, they attacked the religious schools. But the attacks on these schools were not allowed to be published and nobody cared about it. In those days, there was not a single week that Feyziyeh School was not attacked. There was not a single week where there were no injuries among the students of religion. There was not a week that some of these students were not arrested. These are our religious students, in a way you could compare them to university students, but with one difference. A university student would not go to a village, but the religious student has traveled through villages. The struggle of a university student is limited to the universities and to some extent to the cities, of course he was beaten, he went to jail, but he was not involved in villages. Let us examine the main difference between a teacher of religion and a university professor. Of course some university professors resisted and did not bend under the weight of injustice and tyranny, however we have not forgotten that the majority of university professors, always bowed to the Shah and there are plenty of photographs showing these gentlemen kissing the hand of the Shah or Farah. Although the teachers of religious schools in Qom and other areas were placed under tremendous pressure to meet with the Shah in order to attract public attention, they did not meet with him, let alone greet or, God forbid, bow to him. Show me one teacher of a religious school who throughout the duration of the struggle met with the Shah, the Prime Minister or a Minister. This is the difference between a teacher of a religious school and a university professor. In those days, if you told a university professor that the Shah wants to meet with you, and you must be at a certain place at a certain time, he would not dare to refuse and he would go. However, all the pressures, threats, entreats, and requests put on this group (religious school teachers) were not able to make them meet with the Shah for even a minute, let alone, bow in front of him or listen to him. Therefore, in the first group, there are students and teachers of religious schools who were previously mentioned. In the second group there were those who had finished their studies and were getting out of schools with the right to practice, or because of certain necessities in the villages or cities interrupted their education and were not able to practice. They were scattered among the society in the Mosques, religious centers, and villages. They themselves are divided into three groups. The first group were the strugglers, meaning the ones who believed in the nation's struggle. They struggled, were imprisoned, were beaten, and were exiled. There are many examples of them. The second group consists of those who were obedient to the Shah, obedient to the Shah's family. I believe this group must be punished very severely. Their punishment must be more severe than the punishment for the ordinary people, because they changed the thoughts and beliefs of the people. In my opinion, this group must be punished very severely. The third group, which consists of a large number

of clergy, is the silent one, they were not happy with the Shah, or the administration. But their disappointment was not because the Shah acted as a stranger, because the Shah sold to the United States, because the Shah connected Iran militarily, politically, culturally and economically to the West, or because the United States was taking Iran's oil, but because in their alleys, streets, or cities there was insolence, and the Shah or the government did not stop these irregularities.

### Purge of Clergy

BAMDAD: Do you believe in the purge of the clergy's?

Ahmad Khomeyni: God willing, the purge of the clergy will be done in the future. There is no doubt about it because this is what the Imam thinks also. The era of the monarchy will be set aside and the people will recognize the opportunists and God willing will gradually know all these elements. However, the main problem is with those who are propounding clericalism. They actually are unhappy with only ten or twenty. If you take religion and Islam from the people with what could you replace it, in order to unite the people? Let us take Mr Taleqani, whom I really liked like my father and and I actually loved him, when he died, the people solidly came out and again said the same things which they said before the revolution [sic]. The people are massive and we must not break the composition of these solid, hand-in-hand people. Why? Because in Mr Taleqani's death the people showed the strength of their solidarity and what bright results we could earn from this unity.

If we destroy this political and religious consciousness, we will cause the biggest blow to this nation and this country. Of course, do not think that I cannot understand why some people say do not touch the bad clergy because they will demolish by themselves, but demolish the group of clergy who is good, is working and has something beneficial to say, because they are protecting a certain class, and whether willing or not they will not benefit the poor. Is this a proper way of thinking?

You, who want to propound clericalism, think about it at night, you will find that you are unhappy with only seven, eight, or ten people and not the rest. So come and name the people whom you do not like. Do not denounce all, come and say this Ahmad Khomeyni is a bad man, he is trying to establish clericalism, he is putting a great deal of pressure on us. Why are you afraid to name them? Come and name them. Otherwise that same clergyman, who suffered torture, who struggled, and now in the most difficult situations, accompanies other brothers and sisters, and works in the villages and cities. If you do not name the opportunists and the clergymen who are harming Islam's roots, if you do not name the people who you believe betrayed us, you are causing the biggest blow to the structure of the religion of the nation whose solidarity, whether you agree or not, comes from the clergy. Come and with great courage say that I do not like so and so and give the reasons why. Say this man who has never been to jail, never been beaten, and never been slapped, now is sitting uptown and making plans for downtown.

You name this man, then he also, will come and say that Mr intellectual, whose hand till yesterday, was in the hand of the Shah, and is still enjoying a good standard of living, is now talking about the people. He also must come and submit names. Why are you attacking each other indirectly? That could in the end be harmful to the good people on both sides. That group must also come and say that it does not like this specific "Mr intellectual," who is making noise and talking about the people. When you name that certain intellectual, a responsible intellectual who put all his possibilities to serve the people will know that he is not the target of attacks. But when the attack is indirect, the people in the streets think that the target of attacks are all intellectuals and in this way the rest of the noble people will suffer.

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## IRAN

### CONDITIONS FOR IMPOSING MARTIAL LAW APPROVED

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 30 Sep 79 pp 1, 2

[Text] According to Article 65, international treaties, protocols, and agreements must be approved by the National Assembly.

The Assembly for final study of the Constitution in its open session yesterday afternoon approved another 5 articles of those related to legislation in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic and one article related to the circumstances of interpellation of the government in cases of non-agreement among legislators, was sent to the commission for further study.

In yesterday afternoon's session chaired by Dr Beheshti, the articles related to the conditions for establishing martial law and the terms of transferring valuable national buildings and property, the terms for concluding international treaties, protocols and agreements, and the minister's duties toward the National Assembly for answering its questions, as well as the article about employing foreign experts were discussed and studied by the legislators. After presentation of the opinions of the opposing and supporting legislators on revision of the proposals, each article was approved by ballot. The article regarding the conditions for employing foreign experts, which had been mistakenly previously as approved by the Assembly on Thursday, was approved yesterday, after brief consideration. Since this article did not have enough favorable votes in the Thursday session, it was sent to the Commission for revision and the revised text was approved in yesterday's session. The articles approved in yesterday's session of the assembly are as follows:

Article 64-with 56 votes in favor, none opposing, and 6 abstentions, "Government buildings and properties which are national assets cannot be transferred to others unless approved by the National Assembly. However, government buildings and properties of limited value are transferable."

Article 65-with 50 votes in favor, 6 against and 8 abstentions, "Imposing martial law is prohibited. In event of war and similar emergency conditions, the Government may impose the necessary restrictions with the approval of the National Assembly, but in any event the duration of this restriction



may not exceed 30 days. If the need were to remain, the government must get further approval of the National Assembly".

Article 68-with 55 votes in favor, 1 against and 6 abstentions. "The employment of foreign experts by the government is prohibited unless, in case of necessity, with approval of the National Assembly".

Article 69-with 60 votes in favor, 1 against and 2 abstentions. "In any case when a legislator puts a question to a cabinet minister about one of his duties the said minister should be present in the National Assembly and answer the legislator's question, and the answer must not be delayed more than 10 days, unless by excuse acceptable to the National Assembly".

#### Returned to the Committee

Article 70 of the draft Constitution which was rejected in its entirety yesterday because of the legislators' failure to agree, was sent to the joint committee of the legislature for revision. It reads as follows:

Article 70--Legislators may interpellate the government or one of the ministers. The interpellation may be submitted when 10 legislators have signed it, the interpellation must be answered in 10 days from the date it was presented. After receiving the government or minister's reply the assembly will give it's vote of confidence or no confidence. In the latter case, the government or the minister who interpellated is dismissed and the prime minister or that minister may not participate in the cabinet which is formed immediately thereafter.

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# NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN REFINING PLANTS REVIEWED

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 23 Nov 79 p 6

/Article by Mu'ayyad 'Abd-al-Zahrah: "AL-JUMHURIYAH on a Field Trip to Oil Installations at the Bayji and al-Qayyarah Refineries: Men challenging Problems"/

/Text/ We are with men who know no sleep to sweeten their race against time; men who are proud in their struggle and challenge of all obstacles in the oil fields--workers, engineers and managers.

We made a field tour of the construction and production sites. On the occasion of the completion of construction of the production units added to the al-Qayyarah and Bayji refineries and /concerning/ the importance of these units and the role of our national possessions, AL-JUMHURIYAH conducted a number of meetings and discussions on this experiment and its lofty import for our beloved Iraq.

## al-Qayyarah and Asphalt

The first stop on our tour was the al-Qayyarah refinery. It seems as if its name comes from its product; it is well known for producing high-grade asphalt as a raw material as well as its other products, such as gas oil, which is used as fuel in stationary motors, light gasoil, and gasoline (white oil). As we know, asphalt is a material which enters the heart of the development process our country is witnessing, specifically the context of the network of roads connecting various sections of the country.

However, the refinery, which began producing 50,000 tons a year in 1955, still suffered from severe neglect from the standpoint both of its services and workers, and indeed even of production, since many of its byproducts went to waste through flaring. In addition to that, the process of shutting it down for the period 1958-63 played a role of significance in the phenomenon of its neglect, as a result of the policy of the monopolistic companies.

## The Revolution and the Achievement

"With the dawning of the new light of the 17-30 July revolution, as a result of the party and revolutionary leaders' interest following the immortal act of nationalization, the oil sector witnessed great rapid developments qualitatively and quantitatively, from the standpoint of management and project implementation. A comprehensive review was started in this field through development processes, specifically the development of the oil industries. Therefore the wheel of life in this vital sector resumed turning." With these words Mr Jasim Da'bul Jasim, manager of the al-Qayyarah refinery, began his talk to AL-JUMHURIYAH, which he continued by stating "How I would have wished you to see the real state in the past as compared with today, and how great the difference has become! It is the revolution of accomplishment, the revolution of change, the revolution of serious unremitting labor always aimed at progress. This refinery received no attention until after the revolution, during which work and expansion began with an increase in productive capacity as well as such other services as transportation and housing. The refinery expansion was completed in May 1978 with the addition of the second distillation unit, which has a capacity of 120,000 tons a year. The organization's staffs implemented it directly and its productive capacity then reached 180,000 tons per year. The productive capacity of the third unit in the refinery expansion, which was completed a month before the specified date, is also 120,000 tons per year; thus the total capacity will be 300,000 tons of asphalt per year besides other byproducts.

"In this regard one can state that the project, whose costs come to 3.05 million dinars, also includes a group of tanks, a platform for loading and filling tank trucks, a tower for cooling process water and a boiler. Domestic personnel participated in it by taking over the civil engineering work, specification and standards examination, and direct supervision of construction in all stages, and the experience there had many positive features which took the form of great efforts and constant zeal to perform on the part of our workers and engineers.

"Besides all that, the al-Qayyarah refinery has witnessed other expansions which are considered a source of pride for the democratic relations between management and workers. The workers have taken the implementation of a number of projects inside the refinery on their shoulders in the place of contractors, and have thereby achieved a success unmatched in terms of time and costs. Among the matters accomplished were:

"Construction of a modern storehouse building to which 200,000 dinars had been allocated and which was constructed for 50,000 dinars; construction of a maintenance shop which had been appraised at 50,000 dinars, which was constructed for 36,000; expansion of the garage and construction of a safety and fire department with a garage for fire trucks which had been appraised at 15,000 dinars but was built for 7,000 in just 52 days; the laying of cables to supply all projects with electricity, including

lighting for the outer wall, which was estimated to take a year and was built in a week; and construction of a shelter to which 170,000 dinars were allocated and which was constructed for 25,000 dinars."

#### Meeting Challenges

After that we met with Eng Azad Nuri Mahmud, project manager, who talked to us about the challenges, the expertise acquired and the role of domestic entities in construction, saying "The fact is that the process of expanding the al-Qayyarah Refinery in a year or two in addition to new production units is not an easy one, from the standpoint of the staffs involved or such other matters as the remoteness of the area for workers, means of transportation, housing, building materials, and equipment. However, we have been able to transcend all this with the will and determination to achieve, so that there will be no pretexts for the company to delay the work, specifically civil engineering work, which always comes first--work related to concrete facilities, tank foundations, streets, various buildings, tower platforms, equipment, bridges, furnace platforms, the control room and settlement ponds.

"We embarked on construction and actual production began in October, that is, before the stipulated time--a positive matter and object of pride to us. The inspection during preliminary operation was a success, and 2 days after startup we were selling products, which is an exemplary matter as far as projects go, since performance was higher than the design rate, or 108 percent, which is considered rare as far as al-Qayyarah crude oil goes.

"The fact is that success in this job may be attributed to the challenges. We gained experience from the first challenge which faced us in Project Two last year, when the project was carried out but did not operate as desired, working rather at 90 percent due to some errors. Therefore our experience with the third unit began with precise formulation of specifications, changes in design and sizes, and application of these changes to the project. In reality, it was a big success."

In addition to that, said Eng Azad Nuri, "The distinctive characteristic of the achievement is that not the Projects Implementation Department but rather a small number of domestic staffs in the Technical Department carried it out. The benefits realized are:

"First, the Technical Department acquired rare expertise in negotiation, operation, maintenance, coordination among departments and installation of mechanical work.

"Second, for the first time we have acquired expertise in treating heavy oil and al-Qayyarah can become a school in this subject from the refining standpoint.



"Third, benefiting from gas pollution treatment."

#### The Workers on the Project

We held a meeting with some of the workers, men who exerted exceptional efforts, worked even outside their specialized fields in the zeal to accomplish the job and continue the progress of the revolution, and, expressing their joy at its unlimited generosity, gave without limit.

Salih Muhammad Salman, a worker in the Pipeline and Welding Section:

He began his talk by saying, "We undertook to perform the job as soon as possible, whatever the difficulties might be, to express our love of the revolution and the care it has taken of us and to underline the climate of democratic relations which prevails among our ranks. We managed to save specific sums as far as doors and windows go, since we manufactured those. We also demolished and erected (jamilunat) and did construction work."

His colleague the worker Nayif Barjas Muhammad:

He began by stating, "We did not know the sweetness of sleep. Although the work we performed, like workshops and storehouses, were not our field of specialization, we continued the job nonetheless because we did not want the contractors to take it--rather, we had the capacity and had only to exert efforts. Indeed, through effort, cooperation and insistence, our work was good and /done/ in record time. This is the duty we, the workers, have toward our revolution."

The worker Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, Project Electric Maintenance Department, commenting on the project, stated:

"Project implementation represents the progress of the course of the revolution and its commanding party. This is one of the revolution's accomplishments and benefits for the whole people, because our country is in constant growth and every worker must take part in the process of construction, in a race with time, at the lowest cost. Our support and response from officials is constant and the manager of the installation is constantly present, which has made us compete greatly over the job. This is what the leaders and our party, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, want of us."

The worker Khusabu Qasim commented by saying,

"As far as electrical maintenance work goes, this takes numerous forms and includes the erection of all new shops and warehouses. The new department made a commitment to the contractor, but he was not able to carry it out in a proper manner, whereas our working group was able to do so, and in less time, saving large amounts of money. We also laid a cable line which can cover the residential town and the refinery as well. As far as the

project goes, that is a source of pride to us and all the sons of our nation. We are soldiers of the revolution and what we have done is nothing new to any one of us but is just a little loyalty to our revolution.

### **The Services Sector**

Services play an extremely important role in increasing and improving production and increasing worker productivity. In the light of that, the 17-30 July revolution has struggled tirelessly since its first day to provide all services for workers in every sector. It was natural that services in the oil sector should enjoy great attention from officials, in a manner harmonious with the aspirations of the party and the revolution to create an advanced oil industry.

In the course of the oil sector plan to provide housing units for workers on oil projects, work started on the al-Qayyarah refinery residential town with the construction of 68 homes to be built in 22 months. It should be mentioned that these houses are broken down into 18 for white collar workers and 50 laborers, specifically those on duty in the refinery; when they are built, many problems will be solved, including transportation.

Finally, we must realize that the residential town now has 104 houses. In addition to that, there is a club for workers in the refinery, in addition to a movie house, while work is now underway at full pitch to light the streets of the residential town and repair houses which are in need of repair.

In addition to all that, the refinery's vehicles provide transport for the workers and meet their foodstuff requirements twice a week.

From al-Qayyarah to Bayji, our second stop.

### **The Bayji Refinery Expansion Project**

With most confidence and pride, this project is to be considered a splendid achievement in the forward march of the revolution, since domestic labor constructed it directly 100 percent.

The refinery was built in July 1978 with a capacity of 10,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Work started on the new unit in July of last year and that was put into production in July 1979.

The project, whose costs come to 1.5 million dinars, consists of a refining unit with a capacity of 10,000 barrels per day; thus the refinery's total capacity will be 20,000 barrels a day.

The project also includes a group of tanks, relying on the old refinery for supply, storage, steam and air services and safety and maintenance units.

As for the sections, these are:

The crude oil distillation unit.

The white oil sweetening unit and the gasoline reactor unit.

Production, 107 percent of design capacity, consists of white oil, black oil, and "heavy naphtha" or boiler fuel.

Finally, we should realize that four other tanks are being constructed to increase the storage capacity in the refinery, as the refinery manager, Eng Hilal 'Abd-al-Razzaq Hashim, says.

This work, the second production unit, was completed in record time--9 months.

Domestic staffs operations in the Bayji refinery are performing and they will be considered the core of the giant Salah-al-Din Refinery.

#### The Project and Domestic Staffs

The General Oil Projects Organization, an organization which is responsible for the construction of all oil sector projects, implemented this project; in addition, it is responsible for design, construction or construction supervision, as well as making contracts and delivery. It delivers completed projects to the oil organizations. The Ministry of Oil, being concerned with the system of direct project implementation by domestic staffs, established a general organization within the organization which specialized in implementing projects domestically and it provided this organization with the most modern material, equipment, laboratories and personnel. It was successful with its projects by this method, saving money and time and acquiring additional expertise. Among the projects it implemented, or whose implementations it supervised, were the projects to develop the Nahran 'Umar, al-Luqays /sic/, Jabal Fakkah, Buzurgan and Abu Ghurab fields, to lay a pipeline from Maysan to Basrah, the Mina'al-Bakr project in the Arab Gulf with a capacity of 60 million tons, the Iraq-Turkey pipeline project, the oil products pipeline project between Baghdad and Basrah, and many others.

In the light of this increasing experience of our domestic staffs, we find that most of the projects are now being carried out directly in record time and at minimum cost. Visiting those of our engineers who participated in implementation of the project, we met with the assistant project manager, senior engineer Tha'ir Taha al-Shaykh Ahmad, who spoke, saying:

"In reality, this project is not the only one we have carried out and supervised in full, but is to be considered the sixth. The direct implementation process is to be considered very good because it saves large amounts of money in addition to training Iraqi staffs to implement further projects in

the future. On this occasion, no recourse was made to any foreign experts at any stage of implementation in this project, since we followed up on all activities starting from the procurement of equipment and ending with erection and construction activities.

"In this context I would like to point out that construction staff workers played a big role. We completed the project in a period of just 9 months, 3 months of which were for mechanical installation activities and six for civil and other work."

The engineer supervising the project, Mr Mahmud 'Ali Husayn, commented by saying:

"Contributing to the success was the expertise of the participants, workers and engineers. Thanks to their cooperation, we managed to eliminate all the difficulties which we faced, among which I might mention the remoteness of the area, site preparation, housing, and transportation, since most workers are from outside the area. The help of officials and the attention of the workers played the major role in reducing obstacles and shortening time."

Finally, we should realize that the two projects were inaugurated on Monday 12 November 1979 under the aegis of Mr Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and minister of oil, who praised the great efforts made and commended the capability of all those taking part in the two projects.

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## GOVERNMENT MUST RENEW PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 5 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial by M. H.: "A Test of Confidence"]

[Text] Everyone agrees that the present government needs strengthening. The confidence that it achieved when it began is being steadily wasted. Indeed, it hops from crisis to crisis, and the internal crises obscure the crises in foreign policy. The economic failure obscures the political achievements abroad, but most worrisome of all is the disintegration of internal discipline. A coalition that cannot keep its word cannot demand the confidence that it needs so much, and not only in parliamentary vote.

The proposals that were crystallized into a reorganization of the government through changes in assignments came as a result of internal demands. The quarrels in the Liberal Party weaken the position and the authority of the government. There is no longer any confidence that personnel changes in the Ministry of Finance will solve or heal the country's economic ills. Mr Erlikh, who accepted the "party's decision," is willing to accept the post of deputy prime minister as a way out from under the crisis that had befallen him. Few are ready to accept the "way out" as an inescapable necessity. The government's weakness in economic matters is further expressed by the internal conflicts; the ministers make one another fail.

The proposal to appoint Mr Erlikh deputy prime minister appears to be an honorable personal way out, but not a way out of the complications into which the government has been thrown against its will. There were other proposals for reorganizing the government, but some of the members defeated them for considerations that do not originate in the needs of the state. Mr Dayan's resignation created new possibilities that do not require legislative changes. The government preferred to take the easiest way. But this is not the way by which the government can strengthen its position and authority to receive far-reaching proposals by which it might rescue the economy from the crisis. To achieve that goal the government must renew public confidence.

This confidence depends on the extent to which the government can honor the obligations that it assumed. Once it shows such weakness, it loses the support of public confidence. The coalition was founded on fundamental principles to which all its members agreed. Agudat Yisra'el considers the progress that has been achieved so far as a realization of the coalition agreements. It has relinquished positions and has not demanded important status for itself. But its agreement to support the government was given conditionally. The agreements are all of a piece, and it is impossible to loosen a single one of the layers of support on which this coalition has arisen.

The reform of the abortion law was known as one of the foundations on which the coalition rested. For 2 years it has repeatedly demanded implementation of the obligations that were assumed when the government was established. The evasion of the implementation has created a deep depression. The demand for annulment of the "social" section unites wide circles in Israeli society and is not limited exclusively to religious circles. Much has already been said and written on this subject. The proposed reform is minimal. It does not annul the entire law; this is not acceptable to anyone who is concerned about the future of the nation. Israel cannot be inferior to other nations. In its present form the law undermines the foundations of the nation's existence. It contains no economic or material argument to answer the fundamental question. The Jewish people cannot live with the possibility that any woman can demand public assistance in killing her embryo. It has been said that in its present proportions the law permits the murder of a fetus for the sake of convenience. This is a struggle over the image of Israeli society. Jewish morality is not to be tested only by the criteria by which the Kneset grants approval for the murder of a fetus.

If the government wants to strengthen its moral power and authority in the eyes of the people, it is not enough for it to demonstrate its tenacity by implementing an unpopular economic policy. It must first and foremost strengthen the moral foundations of the society. It must turn the battle toward a reform of society, to root out permissiveness everywhere, and undoubtedly much depends on its ability to halt the spread of the atmosphere of irresponsibility. We see in the subject of abortion an important preventive measure, a basis for the restoration of the image of the society. No demagogic complaint can withstand this need.

Agudat Yisra'el has shown great patience, and overall consideration for the government's distress. But there is a limit to this patience. When Agudat Yisra'el is asked to support the government, it is entitled to make its support conditional on a test of confidence on a subject that it sees as supremely important to the nation. If the government cannot withstand the foul stream of people who would destroy the nation completely, it cannot demand that its credit be restored. This is a serious test. Those who pull the strings have to be aware of this obligation. If the coalition's discipline has become so weak that it cannot fulfill an obligation that is assumed when it was established, it cannot ask Agudat Yisra'el to help it save others.

## WRITER LOOKS AT U.S. PROPOSALS ON SOUTHERN LEBANON

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Nov 79 p 9

[Article by Z'ev Shif: The Habib Program; Along With a Desire to Achieve an Arrangement among All Sides in Southern Lebanon the U.S. Is Trying to Create a New Channel, Outside the Camp David Agreements, for Contacts with Syria and the PLO"]

[Text] Philip Habib, the American assistant secretary of state, has concluded his Middle East tour without having achieved anything practical in his dealing with the complications in Lebanon. However, let us not deduce that the U.S. efforts to organize a "package deal" in Lebanon have ceased. Certainly contacts with all the parties will continue. For us in Israel, it is appropriate to pay attention to this American effort, in which Washington is seeking to create an additional channel of contact and negotiation outside that of Camp David.

From what Habib reported in Israel and in the neighboring countries it is clear that the Americans have not yet crystallized their program. They have brought up various ideas and proposals, which when collected will tell us Washington's line of thought and planning. The interesting thing is that the program contains no attempt to find a settlement for the whole Lebanese problem. Probably it contains no more than what the reporters wrote about convening a conference in which all the concerned parties would take part. Apparently Washington has understood that the time for such a proposal has not yet arrived, and has therefore decided to concentrate at this stage on the problem of southern Lebanon only. And this is correct, because it is from that area that the danger of an outbreak of war seems most likely.

What are the basic principles of the Americans' ideas concerning southern Lebanon? To each of the participants they offer limited "compensation" in exchange for participating in a settlement. Syria would have to support the settlement and compel the saboteurs to withdraw from southern Lebanon. The compensation: Israel would stop its incursions into Lebanon and would refrain from flights over Lebanon. In the second stage the Lebanese government would take control of the enclaves, which would fall under full Lebanese sovereignty. But the greatest and most practical compensation would be that Washington would grant indirect recognition to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, and to the function that the Syrians fulfill there.

The saboteurs would withdraw from southern Lebanon and would refrain from infiltrating into that area, or into Israel from there. The compensation: In the course of time Haddad's enclaves would be abolished. Israel would stop attacking the saboteurs. The great compensation would be that thereby the dialog between Washington and the PLO would be strengthened.

#### All the Participants Are Fearful

To Israel, the U.S. proposes to pressure Haddad to agree to the entrance of the Lebanese army into the enclaves. It demands that Israel stop its attacks on the saboteurs, and limit its overflights to the necessary minimum. The compensation: The saboteurs would withdraw from southern Lebanon and stop attacking the enclaves. Along with the inducement there is also a local threat against Israel; if it does not participate, the attack on Israel's image in the U.S. will continue.

The Americans also have proposals with respect to the Lebanese authorities and UNIFIL. The two latter deserve compensation. The Lebanese Government would achieve practical sovereignty in southern Lebanon by means of this program, and would achieve more respect for this sovereignty from the PLO and Israel. UNIFIL (i.e., the UN) would also achieve more respect; the UN, and not the U.S., would oversee the settlement.

There is no doubt that the American objective, beyond just a ceasefire, is clear to all the important participants. Therefore they have become most apprehensive, and have refrained from giving immediate binding answers to the American emissary.

From the way in which Philip Habib was received in Damascus, it appears that the Syrians have not yet decided which way to go. They are not rejecting the Americans, but they are seeking to learn how the proposal would take shape. The Syrians are worried; to accept the American proposal would improve their prospect of political maneuvering in the Middle East and also with respect to the USSR. And this would be in addition to American recognition of their military presence in Lebanon. On the other hand they fear that the whole plan is only an "American-Israeli plot" aimed at dragging them deviously into the Camp David agreements, and creating a split between them and the PLO. Their conclusion for the present is not to break contact, and to find out for certain how the American proposals are developing.

The saboteurs are even more seriously worried. To relinquish their grip on Lebanon, or even only on southern Lebanon, would seriously hurt them. By means of the presence that they have created in the area (the Tyre enclave and inside the UNIFIL areas), they win attention and achieve something. The presence is a card in their hand both in the Arab world (Saudi support) and against the U.S. It is therefore hard to assume that they will be ready to clear out of the Tyre enclave. At most they will be ready to play the card of their presence in the UNIFIL area; i.e., a limitation of the number of saboteurs and an announcement that they will observe the cease-fire.



But even in this matter things are not so simple. Fatah has indeed ordered a cease-fire in southern Lebanon, but some of the rejectionist organizations are not obeying the order and are attacking the positions of Haddad's men. Furthermore, it appears that Fatah interprets the cease-fire in its own way. It sees it as a cease-fire between itself and Israel. It is exploiting the fact that the IDF has nearly stopped its activity, and only from time to time hits positions and settlements in the enclaves with artillery fire. These are to be sure controlled incidents, but they are evidence that the saboteurs do not take Israel's repeated warnings very seriously.

#### Haddad's Direction

The Lebanese Government also faces problems. Its proposals to reduce the forces in southern Lebanon have met with opposition. The leftists in the villages are not happy at the thought, nor is the PLO accepting the idea unconditionally. The Lebanese army, which to be sure numbers close to 15,000 men, is being built up very slowly. It has many loose formations, but only one complete brigade. The Beirut government, especially, does not want to throw that brigade into combat in the south, where the Moslems among the soldiers may outnumber the Christians. At the moment the Lebanese army has one brigade in Ka'ukba (the eastern part of southern Lebanon). In addition an under-manned battalion is spread out next to the UNIFIL units. Under such conditions the Lebanese government has no prospect of achieving anything more than symbolism in southern Lebanon; e.g., establishing an additional force in the Tyre enclave or even in a buffer operation. The Americans have not asked Haddad what he thinks. They are maintaining contact with him through Israel, just as they are maintaining contact with the PLO through the Syrians and the Lebanese Government. But clearly Haddad does not intend to sacrifice himself on the altar of this program. Lately he has spoken of his readiness to receive a unit of the Lebanese army at Maraj 'Iyun, but he does not mean a force like the one that tried to descend on the enclave last year by way of Ka'ukba. When he speaks of a Lebanese force, he intends to scrutinize every officer and soldier in it before they will be permitted to take up a position in the enclaves.

Israel also faces complex problems. She does not want the American ideas to develop into a program that will mean perpetuation of the Syrian presence in Lebanon and abolition of the enclaves. It is clear that Israel will not lightly relinquish its position in southern Lebanon. In whatever arrangement is reached in Lebanon she will demand that her interests also be taken into consideration.

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CSO: 4805

RABBINIC COUNCIL THREATENS COALITION FUTURE

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Nov 79 p 17

[Article by Avraham Tirosh: "The Council of Torah Greats: The 16 Rabbis Who Will Determine the Fate of the Coalition; Unlike Any Other Party, Agudat Yisra'el Is Not Free to Make Decisions on Matters of Principle; Such Matters Are Decided by the Torah Greats and Cannot Be Appealed; The Failure to Amend the Abortion Law Requires in the Opinion of the 16 Rabbis Quitting the Coalition"]

[Text] The future of the government coalition is now to a large extent in the hands of 16 rabbis, known as Torah Greats, who make up the "Council of Torah Greats" of Agudat Yisra'el.

They had decided some time ago that if the abortion law is not amended the "Aguda" will quit the government. They are now expected to make the final decision as to the date of leaving the government—should they grant another extension for another attempt to amend the law, or should the "Aguda" quit immediately?

This is what makes the way Agudat Yisra'el is run as a party unique. Unlike any other political party, the institutions of Agudat Yisra'el are not free to make decisions on matters of principle and on crucial issues. All such matters are referred to the Torah Greats, whose decision cannot be questioned or appealed. The political bodies of the "Aguda" only decide on on-going, nonessential matters, while the Council of Torah Greats seldom goes into anything other than matters of principle. This happened, for example, in the previous term of the Keneset, when the council was asked to intervene in the dispute between Members of Keneset Rabbi Menahem Porush and Jacob Gross, when the former refused to yield his seat in the house to the latter, according to the agreement [as published].

## Yeshivah Heads and Hassidic Rabbis

Who are the members of the Council of Torah Greats? How are they chosen? How does this institution operate?

The Council of Torah Greats has been in existence since the inception of Agudat Yisra'el. It constitutes the supreme body of the ultra-orthodox party. It does not have a fixed number of members, and at present it has 16 members. Those are yeshivah heads and hassidic rabbis (the rabbis of the hassidic dynasties). When a seat on the council is vacated, the council adds a new member. If a seat is vacated by a deceased hassidic rabbi, his heir automatically takes his place in the council.

The Council of Torah Greats does not choose a chairman, but its oldest active members who have the highest status in the orthodox and hassidic world are generally considered the heads of the council. Thus, for instance, Rabbi Eliezer Menahem Schach, the head of the Ponibezh Yeshivah, and the Gerer rebbe, Rabbi Simcha Bonim Alter, are considered the heads of the Council of Torah Greats, having a decisive influence over its members.

In the present council there is also a four-member committee, acting as a "secretariat" which administers the council, prepares its agenda, and takes care of technical matters. Its members are Rabbi Pinhas Menahem Alter (the brother of the Gerer rebbe and the chairman of the Center of Agudat Yisra'el), Rabbi Shalom Noah Brozovski, Rabbi Barukh Shim'on Schneersohn, and Rabbi Moshe Shapira.

### These Are the Members of the Council

The present 16 members of the council are:

Yeshivah heads: Rabbi Eliezer Menahem Schach, head of the Ponibezh Yeshivah; Rabbi Pinhas Menahem Alter, head of the S'fat Emet Yeshivah; Rabbi Simcha Zissel Broida, head of the Hebron Yeshivah; Rabbi Shalom Noah Brozovski, head of the Slonim Yeshivah; Rabbi Moshe Shapira, head of the B'er Ya'akov Yeshivah; Rabbi Yohanan Sofer, head of the Erloy Yeshivah; Rabbi Barukh Shim'on Schneersohn, head of the Tchebin Yeshivah; Rabbi Avraham Ya'akov Zelnik, head of the Etz Hayim Yeshivah; Rabbi Nisim Karlitz, head of the Hazon Ish Community.

Hassidic Rabbis: Rabbi Simcha Bonim Alter, the Gerer rebbe; Rabbi Moshe Y'hoshua Hager, the Vizhnitzer rebbe; Rabbi Sh'muel Eliyahu Taub, the Modzhitzer rebbe; Rabbi Avraham Y'hoshua Twersky, the Mahnovker rebbe; Rabbi Avraham Weinberg, the Slonimer rebbe; Rabbi Y'hizel Y'hoshua Rabinovitz, the Bialer rebbe; Rabbi Avraham Ya'akov Friedmann, the Sadgorer rebbe.

## A Conference in Israel—Soon

The Council of Torah Greats of Agudat Yisra'el also operates in the United States, headed by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, and is considered an important body, but it does not interfere in the affairs of Agudat Yisra'el in Israel. A similar institution also exists in Europe, but is much less active.

In about 2 months the Great Assembly of Agudat Yisra'el (the world conference of the movement) will convene in Israel, and it will include the Torah Greats from the United States and Europe. Among other things it will discuss the expanding of the Council of Torah Greats in Israel. For a long time Rabbi Solomon Zalman Auerbach has been heavily pressured to join (he is considered the greatest rabbinic legal authority and is one of the two heads of the yeshivah board) but has refused. Also the attempts to bring the Belzer rebbe into the council have failed thus far.

The Council of Torah Greats convenes as the need arises, at the decision of its senior members, following a consultation among them. The council secretary, Shalom Hayim Porush, convenes the members, who usually come accompanied by their hassidim and assistants, who wait outside the assembly hall.

Some of the elders of the council rarely show up because of poor health. Those include the Bialer rebbe, the Slonimer rebbe, and the Mahanovker rebbe.

Generally the meeting opens with the interested parties—members of the Keneset, members of the institutions of the movement, and others—presenting the issue, while the Torah Greats ask to hear their opinions—the opinions of the "bosses." Afterwards the politicians leave the room and the council members discuss the issue among themselves. At the end of the discussion the members of the Keneset are called back in to hear the decision.

## Kept Up-to-Date

Although the council members are renowned rabbis who spend their lives in the world of Torah and hassidism, it is incorrect to assume that they are out of touch with the world at large and with current public issues. They all have aides and confidants, which include the Agudat Yisra'el members of the Keneset and the leaders of the movement, who regularly keep them up-to-date and seek their advice on matters other than those dealt with by the Council of Torah Greats.

Thus, for instance, MK Shlomo Lorentz is a follower of Rabbi Schach; MK Rabbi Y'hudah Meir Abramowitz is a Gerer hassid, MK Jacob Gross is a Vizhnitzer hassid, and MK Rabbi Menahem Porush is close to the heads of the yeshivot from Jerusalem (Hebron, Etz Hayim), who are members of the council.



When they deal with the current public issues which are brought before them, the members of the Council of Torah Greats are quite well informed, and when they are about to determine the "Torah stand" on the issue, they often consider the public and political aspects as well, albeit as secondary to the halakha [religious law].

#### There Is No Controversy

A distorted picture of the issue of amending the abortion law was created in public. There were no substantive differences of opinion in the council on this issue, and in the opinion of all its members, failing to amend the law will make it mandatory for Agudat Yisra'el to quit the government. The only differences of opinion had to do with the question of when to quit. The Gerre rebbe had originally demanded that the amendment be passed at the last summer session of the Kenesset, while Rabbi Schach was willing to wait until the winter session. Finally the Gerre rebbe relented but insisted that the law be amended within a month after the start of the winter session.

Now that the amendment was voted down by the Kenesset, if it does not pass in the days ahead, there is no doubt that the Council of Torah Greats will order the Aguda MK's to quit the coalition.

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CSO: 4805

RELIGIOUS PARTY REPUDIATES ABORTION VOTE

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 14 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "The Vote and Its Significance"]

[Text] It is difficult to go back to our daily affairs after the shameful vote in the Keneset on the abortion law. This vote has many implications which were hard to discern during the sorry state of affairs produced by the shocking blow. Still, this vote deserves to be analysed in terms of its significance, at least as an odifying lesson for the future. We are writing these lines on the assumption and the hope, that indeed the amendment will be discussed again soon, since the coalition cannot shun the commitment it has made if it does not want to commit suicide, and if it wants to retain whatever public and political credit it has left according to public opinion.

We must express our respect for the effort the coalition has made in this regard. Gathering 54 votes, most of whom are non-religious, is no small matter. First and foremost we must give credit to the four members of the Agudat Yisra'el faction. They have done their utmost to persuade the members of the coalition to vote for the amendment. This effort bore fruit. What hurts all the more is that the effort failed because of one vote.

We shall not belabor the question of the dissidents and those who shun their coalitional responsibility. They will have to account for their actions, and, undoubtedly, they have forfeited their public trust. We assume that the vote of the justice minister in opposition to the opinion of the government requires a strong reaction. A government which does not react to such disloyalty loses the little prestige it may still have. Expecting the government to do all this does not exempt it from fulfilling its coalitional commitment. It cannot rely on negative precedents. It may be true that the Alignment had maneuvered coalitional agreements into a blind alley until election time. The late Levi Eshkol had coined the infelicitous phrase: "Who says you are not allowed to make promises, but who says you have to keep your promises." We had innocently assumed, that with the change of government there was also a change in the methods of public deception which had characterized several previous governments.

Close to 25 years Agudat Yisra'el sat in the opposition desert, so long as the possibility of joining the coalition did not exist. There were those who did not accept its demands in religious matters, and there were those who were willing to meet only certain demands. Not so the coalition which the Likud had formed. It had made an explicit commitment. Agudat Yisra'el had given it enough time to amend those laws. We do not withhold credit where credit is due. Some of the commitments were met in full. The Likud needed a great deal of courage to make those amendments, going against the wishes of the opposition. But the Likud knew from the beginning that this issue is closest to the heart of those who abide by religious laws.

There is no question here of outside pressures. This is purely a matter of conscience. The abortion law as a whole and the social article in particular allow the murder of embryos in their mother's womb. It is not possible to keep silent in the face of such a law which exists in the Jewish state. Certainly we cannot be partners in a government which permits such a horrible pitfall, and which, better yet, is required to assist the embryos' murderers. The expectation for a coalition initiative to amend the law is natural and very simple, perhaps too innocent in the eyes of shrewd politicians, but it emanates from the pure heart of Jews who believe in the existence of the Creator of the Universe, and of a pristine Jewish ethic inspired by the giving of the Law at Mount Sinai.

The expectation of seeing this matter rectified stems precisely from the overall attitude of appreciation for the effort which the coalition had expended. The task of disciplining a few rebels and responsibility-dodgers is not too great and it cannot be shunned. The Likud cannot escape making this effort even if it has to do it several times. It is not possible to condone such a disgrace which casts a dark shadow on the Jewish people. We as believers are afraid that much of the moral decadence in our land is the result of this law which contradicts one of the commandments which we had received at Sinai, namely, Thou shalt not kill! Let us not enter into any arguments with those who preach the defilement of the land with all the abominations of the nations.

There is another implication which should be mentioned on this occasion. This is an internal rebuke, against those who were indifferent during the elections to the Kenesset, those who refrained from voting for Agudat Yisra'el, those who were caught up in the mistaken notion that a small party cannot influence the life of the state. The vote proved how totally mistaken this notion is. If Agudat Yisra'el had more mandates, in this case only one mandate, it would have tipped the scale. After all, we have learned the rule concerning the weight of one commandment as well as, heaven forbid, one sin, which can make the entire world either guilty or innocent. This rule was vindicated here in its fullest sense, and it calls upon us to take stock now and certainly in the future.

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CSO: 4805

EFFECT OF NABLUS MAYOR'S ACTIONS VIEWED

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 9 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "The Rebellious Mayor"]

[Text] The expressions of the mayor of Shkhem [Nablus] were so sharp as to require an immediate reaction by the authorities. They contained all the elements of incitement and provocation for the murder of civilians. It takes a good deal of brutal cynicism to express such an extreme opinion, that one may throw a baby into a burning autobus in order to free one's brothers from prison. It is doubtful whether any important Arab personality holding an official position has hitherto gone so far. That this man should continue to hold his position in local government is impossible, and the first thing that had to be done was to discharge him from his post as mayor.

It is still too early to say how the supreme court will decide on the request submitted yesterday, which is intended to seek revocation of the decree of expulsion. Going to law has an additional purpose, namely to exploit the court for propagandizing against continuation of the Israeli presence in Judea and Samaria. The mayor, who never concealed his identification with the PLO, apparently wants to achieve the halo of a "national hero," which would elevate his status at home and abroad. It is no secret that most of the population in the occupied areas, to put it discreetly, supports the PLO and its actions. There is pent up hatred, which is expressed at various opportunities in extreme form, as happened at Tul Karem, where young people danced around the corpse of a Jew who had been killed in a road accident, and there are also more cautious expressions of this feeling.

The prospect of creating an orderly network of relations with the population of the occupied areas melted away some time ago. No kind of effort will succeed in changing their opinion. The support that the PLO is winning in the world is encouraging the population to aggravate relations with the authorities. The fact that some Israeli circles are preaching recognition of the PLO only strengthens the fanatics to take extreme action. Whether the mayor is expelled from Israel, or whether other measures are taken against him, it will be impossible to silence the man.



Possibly there is no way to avoid bringing him to trial for incitement to murder. But in that case the administration would award him a free platform to proclaim his opinions and to win a wide international response. In such a case Israel could not lock the doors of the military court, which makes the situation far more difficult. Yet there is nothing to prevent the government from taking energetic measures, if only because any silence in this case is likely to encourage other persons to imitate him. The Jews always used to blame the mandatory government for doing nothing in the face of open incitement. Incitement such as this creates disaster. Shaq'ah did not talk about ideology, about his wish to expel the Israeli rule from the occupied areas. He talked about actual deeds, about the need to kill men, women, and children in order to obtain the liberation of prisoners, even though he knows that the "Palestinian revolution for rebuilding" cannot succeed in this way.

So the Israeli authorities face a difficult dilemma. It must also listen to the unavoidable reactions in the world capitals. The PLO is liable to exploit the case in order to make converts to support the creation of a Palestinian entity, and to use the incident to prove that the population is indeed rebelling. Expulsion is liable to arouse new agitation. Already yesterday it was reported that the mayors in Judea and Samaria are preparing to take steps in support of the position of the mayor of Nablus. It is therefore well to weigh carefully and prudently the steps that we intend to take against him.

There is also room to reflect on whether the person who had the conversation with the mayor of Nablus had to publicize words that were spoken privately. We do not know who did the publicizing, but in any case, he certainly did not contribute to improving the troubled relations. Sharp words have been heard before in conversations with important people in the West Bank or the Gaza strip. The opinions are not new. Upon reconsideration, perhaps it would have been better to leave them inside the house where they were heard.

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CSO: 4805

## ISRAEL

### BACKGROUND OF POLICE INSPECTOR GENERAL DETAILED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Nov 79 p 17

[Article by Avi Dan: "Brigadier General (Reserves) Herzl Shapir--The Man Who Wanted To Be Chief of Staff Will Be Inspector General; For the First Time the Police Will Be Headed by Someone Who Was 'Parachuted' in from the Outside"]

[Text] Brigadier General (Res) Herzl Shapir, the man who wanted to be chief of the general staff--and almost became the Number One Soldier of the IDF--will become the Number One policeman of the Israeli Police.

Shapir's two most outstanding characteristics are his distinguished talent as an organizer, the ability to "enter" quickly into matters where he has no experience; and his tendency to centralize affairs--a centralist who is not at ease in delegating authority.

Possessed of an analytical mind, stubborn, suspicious, introverted--these are the characteristics that his intimates ascribe to him. They say: He's not easy, but he's good to work with.

Herzl Shapir was a candidate for chief of the general staff, after Mote Gur. According to his intimates, Minister of Defense Weizmann chose "Rafal" because he feared that Shapir would insist on maintaining his own "authority" as chief of staff, and would not let Weizmann mix into matters that were not in his jurisdiction.

Herzl Shapir was born 50 years ago as a "son of old age" to the Shekhterman family. (His oldest brother, Avraham Shekhterman, his senior by 19 years, is chairman of the center of the Herut movement and was a member of the Knesset). He grew up in a traditional and nationalist home.

Herzl studied at the Tahkemoni school in Miqveh Yisra'el, and at the Maritime school in Haifa near the Technion. Those who knew him in his youth say that he was unruly.

In 1947, when the studies of Herzl and his friends were interrupted, the group joined Palmah. As a member of the third battalion he took part in a long series of operations. "The battle for 'Ein Zeitun was especially difficult," Shapir related subsequently. "As soon as the battle started, a report came that Arab women were throwing grenades at our men from the windows of their houses. The men wanted to open fire, but I prevented them. We succeeded in breaking through to the house, and we found women and children on the second floor. Had we opened fire, we would have caused unnecessary killing. Even in time of battle we did not disgrace our weapons.

In 1950, when he was an instructor in Officers' school, he decided to leave the armed forces ("At that time there was a general desire to go back home," he explains). He was appointed company commander in the reserves, and was called up for the reserves in the same year. In the field he was visited by Major General Yiga'el Allon (then Chief of the General Staff) and District Commander Tzadoq. They were impressed by the young officer and influenced him to join the regular army. As an "inducement" they sent him to a regimental commanders' course.

"The business took hold of me," Shapir related. He returned to the IDF and was appointed brigade officer in the Operations Branch, operations officer in the southern command, and commander of a reconnaissance company. When he became a major he attended a course for officers of armored units--the force that he learned to see as decisive in battle--and after that he was appointed to establish the third tank company of IDF and to command it. Then, perhaps for the first time, he became directly acquainted with men, many of whose kind he would meet as inspector general of police: "Among my trainees were problem youths, products of the 'second Israel,' many with a criminal past. I trained them in the spirit of Palmah, and succeeded in making them into a choice company crew." Shapir was different in his approach to discipline, and it is doubtful whether what has long been clear in IDF is understood in the police today: "Discipline must be based on understanding, the understanding of the orders and of the soldier's rights."

In 1955 he was appointed Operations officer at armor HQ (under the command of Brigadier Generals Pundak, Lasqov, and Zorea). In the Qadesh campaign he was operations officer at the group headquarters of General Lasqov. His duties were command of an armored infantry corps that was converted to a tank battalion, and command of a course for officers of armored companies.

In 1959 he was sent to a British Army school for command and staff in (Kimberley) and when he returned a year later, he was appointed commanding officer of a school for armored warfare. He showed himself to be both a leader and a manager when he commanded a regular armored brigade in 1963-64. After that he became second in command of the armored corps, and some years passed before he returned to command responsibility.

Shapir went to study at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has a bachelor's degree in economics and geography. On the eve of the Six Day War he was called by Brigadier General Tal to serve as his second in command and as chief of his group staff.

The officer who spent so much time during combat days in coordinating and improvising, was--and remains--blunt in "public relations." Shapir took no part in the "festivals" around the senior officers.

In April 1969, when his studies were finished, he was appointed chief of staff of the central command. He concentrated on organizing the line of command posts that was being built. After 4 months he became assistant head of the operations branch of the general staff, most of the time under Brigadier General Ezer Weizmann.

In September 1972 he was appointed head of the manpower branch of the general staff. Shapir, who lacked experience in adjutancy and in manpower, was considered one of the outstanding heads of the manpower branch.

After he had dealt a great deal with the subject of soldiers missing in action, in April 1974 he was appointed to head the staff branch of the operations branch. He served at this post for almost 2 years and inter alia headed a military working group for the talks with Egypt in Geneva (he was one of the two Israeli signers of the interim agreement). In February 1976 he was appointed Regional Commander of the southern region, and it seemed then that this command function was intended to train him to serve as chief of the general staff.

Meantime calamities befell Shapir. His son (he also has two daughters), an officer in an armored unit, was wounded in the Yom Kippur war and lost a hand. In May 1977 his wife died of a malignant disease.

In January of last year, when it was decided that Refa'el Eitan would succeed Mote Gur as chief of staff, Shapir decided to resign. He enrolled in Stanford University. When he came back to Israel for a vacation a few months ago, the proposal that he become inspector general of the police was first made to him.

When he returned from his studies at the end of July, he did not hurry to be free of IDF, but waited to see "what would happen." Evidently he found that his prospects for becoming chief of staff had disappeared. Now that he has accepted the offer of the Minister of the Interior, the police are headed for the first time by a man who was "parachuted in" from the outside.

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CSO: 4805



SABBATH OBSERVANCE--FIRST STEP FOR AIRLINE RECOVERY

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 14 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "El Al Needs Urgent Recovery"]

[Text] The national airline of the State of Israel needs an overhauling and an urgent recovery. The personnel changes at the top are not the only means of saving the company from collapse. The reason why the company has not yet declared bankruptcy stems from the fact that someone pays for its losses, namely, the Israeli taxpayer. But the government will not be able to go on supporting indefinitely a bankrupt company which acts like a rich one and squanders the resources of others.

The chairman of the board, Mordakhay Ben Ari, who resigned after he had been asked to do so, had served previously as the director general; Moti Hod, former commander of the Israeli Air Force, failed in his attempt to change the condition of the company and had to quit [as published]. Now, it is the turn of Buma Shavit, the industrialists' president. But we doubt whether he will succeed where others have failed.

El Al's deficit has now reached three billion pounds. Such a deficit can startle even a country which has a galloping inflation of 100 percent a year. A deficit in the billions demands full investigation. A national airline which cannot manage its affairs has no right to exist. Its directors have obviously been extremely spendthrift, the assumption being that there is a "rich uncle," a bottomless treasury box.

Lately it became known that the management knows that there is an excess of 1500 workers, including 100 pilots. A pilot's salary is 200 thousand pounds a month and more according to a conservative estimate. It is sufficient to calculate the workers' salary to see where the problem begins. If the company continues to squander money the way it has, the deficit will reach the level of the national budget.

We have to point out that the heads of the company have always tried to justify the flights on the Sabbath on economic grounds. Needless to say, this reasoning has never been acceptable to those who believe in the sanctity of the Sabbath and the blessing it brings to its keepers. At the same time, we believe that work on the Sabbath does not enrich, quite to the contrary. But a company which allows itself such a deficit forfeits the economical argument.

It is necessary to heal the company, make it more efficient, regain the trust of the passenger who does not wish to be grounded because of the whim of worker groups who take turns sabotaging the company. But first and foremost, we advise the management of El Al to stop flying on the Sabbath. This will naturally reduce the deficit and we believe that Sabbath observance will bestow its blessing upon the six workdays, and the name of the holy Sabbath and of the Jewish people will be exalted and sanctified.

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CSO: 4805

GOVERNMENT'S WORKING PAPER TO ARAB SUMMIT SCRUTINIZED

Bairut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 26 Nov 79 pp 30, 31

/Article by H. Hawrani: "Jordanian Working Paper for Tunis Summit: A Peace Offensive or a Call To Sanctify Camp David?"/

/Text/ The official Jordanian working paper presented to the Tunis summit is one manifestation of the current Arab reactionary presumptuousness against the most prominent concentrations of Arab national perseverance vis-a-vis the hostile front, the Camp David front.

This Jordanian working paper is distinguished by no objective obstinacy which might underline this arrogance as a force for control or the establishment of control, for example; rather, like other reactionary working papers (such as the official Lebanese working paper), this one is backed up by the general torpor dominating the parties to the steadfastness and confrontation forces following the Baghdad summit--forces which are shackled to the policy of an Arab solidarity based on a minimum of opposition to the Camp David policy, on the pretext of preserving the solidarity.

The phenomenon of official Jordanian arrogance in the paper presented to the Tunis summit is not conspicuous for confronting the main parties to the steadfastness forces /alone/ but is also conspicuous for confronting the required steadfastness and confrontation platform of opposition to the Camp David policy.

The official Jordanian working paper, in brief, calls, as Jordanian authorities have expressed it, for consolidation of the pillars of Arab solidarity in the context of the Baghdad resolutions and for the evolution of this solidarity into a basis for Arab political and diplomatic activity in the international scene so that a new resolution may be attained which will comprise the principles necessary for settling the dispute in the area.

Objectives of the Jordanian Working Paper

The first objective in the official Jordanian plan is to preserve the current form of Arab solidarity, which has stopped at boycotting al-Sadat and

has stayed within the existing limits of the boycott. It is an Arab solidarity which is content to draw Jordan away from immediate enrollment in implementation of the Camp David agreements but does not call upon Jordan to battle the agreements in effective fashion. It is an Arab solidarity which will provide Jordan with the Arab political cover suitable firstly for slowing down the process of the development and explosion of the domestic crisis, giving close attention to shackling the masses and restricting their freedoms, secondly for imposing cooperation and coordination between itself and the Palestine Liberation Organization on bases which will guarantee further opportunities for political gains in the domestic context and the context of the occupied territories, and thirdly for guaranteeing its continued acquisition of the subsidy monies stipulated at Baghdad and its acquisition of more such subsidy monies.

The second objective of the official Jordanian plan presented to the Tunis summit blatantly exposes the nature of the solidarity whose pillars it is demanding be consolidated on the one hand and the fraudulent means for confronting Camp David on the other. More than a year ago the most conspicuous slogan of Jordanian policy was to distract citizens, forces and governments through the slogan of "building internal strength." In the current working paper for the Tunis summit, this slogan has retreated and withdrawn far from sight. Even when it by chance appears, in talk about "Building strength," confrontation of the pressing question is avoided--the question of what is new in Jordanian "internal strength" a year after the Baghdad summit and the acquisition of more than \$1.2 billion for the sake of building that strength.

#### The Peace Offensive!

The most prominent face, the one which corresponds to the nature of actual Jordanian orientations, is not the "building of internal strength" but the sheer diplomatic, political and media nature of the Jordanian plan. No embarrassment appears among Jordanian officials in reviewing their fundamental policy, to which they like to give the appellation "the peace offensive." The old and new Jordanian plan, in brief, is, as official Jordanian circles have expressed it, "drawing up a foreign policy which has the stage by stage objective of embracing a new international resolution on the Middle East" and setting forth a diplomatic and political action program for reviewing the "necessary principles for settling the struggle in order to get the Security Council to adopt a new resolution on the Middle East."

Jordanian officials and the official media like to extol King Husayn's speech before the United Nations on grounds that it is a model of the "peace offensive" and a suitable campaign for explaining the Arab position and government, making official Arab policy appear not negative and based on "rejection" but in the guise rather of a "positive" policy based on "Acceptance" of the grounds of a just settlement.



## Modification of the Camp David Agreements Is the Goal

In order to preserve the brilliant facade of this proposed "practical and positive" policy, those who call for the policy ignore a group of essential considerations and conditions. Like a military offensive, a peace offensive needs points of emphasis and balances of forces which are appropriate for success, and, more important than that, for survival, in order for it to succeed! In the context of the current disruption in the balance of forces, with the Camp David alliance, the area is not prepared for the imposition of the bases of a "just honorable political settlement," not even a minimal one. What is required therefore is that the disruptions be rectified and an internal strength be built in reality, not words, on the military and economic levels and in the context of political life inside each country.

Besides diverting attention from the direct danger represented in the Camp David agreement which is to be fought against and brought down, the political and diplomatic activity proposed in the official Jordanian working paper is oriented in the practical and fundamental sense, directly and indirectly, toward the United States, in the desire to persuade that country of the need to modify its existing policy of embracing and implementing the Camp David agreements. In spite of official Jordanian talk about a diplomatic orientation toward Asian, African, European and American countries, the intent is to furnish a suitable context for putting pressure on the United States in order to convince it of the need to modify the Camp David agreements--specifically the second agreement concerning administrative autonomy in the occupied Palestinian territories, since, as is well known, there is no essential Jordanian opposition to the agreement on Sinai.

Ultimately, even if the diplomatic and political activity required on the international level is a success, it will be hard to proceed to line all Arab parties alongside one another behind the Camp David alliance, on an unequal basis, to end the isolation surrounding this hostile alliance, and to have the state of affairs arising from al-Sadat's capitulation acquire the character of legitimacy and acceptance.

These, in brief, are the results of the political campaign, labelled "the peace offensive," which is contained in the Jordanian working paper. The campaign does not mean and does not intend to achieve any of its declared goals; in the practical sense it aims at following up on the process which started at Camp David, and improving the conditions and benefits of official Jordanian participation in implementation of these agreements after they are modified.

The Jordanian working paper is a call for gradual step by step entry into the Camp David maelstrom, ending up with al-Sadat's positions.

## Background of the Presumption

The official Jordanian presumption in the working paper presented to the Tunis conference appears not in the nature of the paper, which is hostile to and in contradiction with the bases of effective opposition to the Camp David policies, but rather in the fact that the paper concentrates on a group of fraudulent acts which have been carried out on basic perseverant forces and parties in order to weaken them further and follow up on the practical scheme of those policies, which is based on improving the conditions for participation in implementation of the Camp David agreements.

The concessions offered by the Palestinian party in successive rounds of negotiation, and in the joint committee to support the perseverance, have encouraged and are encouraging the Jordanian government to help weaken the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and to exploit the perseverance subsidies to revive its shattered influence in the occupied territories. It ignores, indeed encourages the Moslem Brothers and other reactionary groups opposed to Syria and uses them as cards to exert pressure on the Syrian position. The obvious resuscitation of Jordanian relations and contacts with the Lebanese Front and the authorities in Lebanon correspond to the submission of an official Lebanese working paper which is in direct conflict with Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization and the bases of a balanced national resolution to the Lebanese problem. This explains the all-inclusiveness of the Syrian media campaign against Jordan's Arab reaction, though not in a direct form, after a long period of silence regarding the official Jordanian presumption.

The Tunis summit must respond to the presumption of Arab reaction, including Jordanian reaction, of slaughtering its proponents, and the parties to the steadfastness front must demand that Jordan be ordered to provide an accounting of the funds for "building an internal strength" and supporting its perseverance. The facade of bombastic Arab solidarity with which it cloaks its real policy, which is aimed at following up on the platform of Camp David after its conditions are improved, in order to carry out the capitulationist agreements, must be pulled away.

The Jordanian working paper must be rejected, its goals must be revealed on grounds that they are among the phenomena of Arab reactionary presumptuousness as contained in the Camp David alliance's reserves within the Tunis summit, and the struggle with American imperialism, and with the platform which calls for conciliation with it, must be intensified.

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CSO: 4802

VARIOUS MEASURES TO COMPENSATE FOR DROUGHT REVIEWED

Amman AL-BUSTUR in Arabic 17 Nov 79 p 5

/Article: "Adoption of the Measures Necessary To Cope with the Consequences of the Drought: Formation of Committees To Study Borrowers' Conditions"/

/Text/ In the past 5 years Jordan has been faced with a wave of drought which was at its most severe in the 1979 season. Preliminary estimates have shown that agricultural production by dry farming will drop by no less than 60 percent from the level in previous years: the output of wheat has totalled about 16,000 tons, and that of barley 5,000 tons, while Jordan's level of wheat production in normal years is 160,000 tons and that of barley 35,000 tons. One should bear in mind that the kingdom's requirements for wheat this year are about 350,000 tons and for barley 150,000 tons.

The effect of the drought has extended to encompass olives and fruit which are also being influenced by khamsin winds. It is anticipated that the production volume will not exceed 50 percent of last year's production, and it is also expected that olive output will decline to 3,000 tons instead of 6,000 tons, which was the kingdom's output last year.

To overcome the deficit resulting from grain and crop production as a consequence of the drought, the competent authorities have adopted the following necessary measures:

The government has contacted the International Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Food Program to inform them of the drought condition in Jordan. The government has managed to obtain wheat aid of 14,400 tons for a 3-month period, and the competent authorities are now discussing final procedures for distributing it. Concerning the provision of seeds for farmers, the government has managed to obtain aid from the World Food Program valued at \$100,000 to buy quantities of seeds and distribute these to farmers and the government is conducting a study on the possibility of buying 8,000 tons of wheat and barley seeds to sell at cost or lend to farmers.

As regards the provision of free fodder to protect livestock, the government is able to furnish barley, having disbursed a loan for the purchase of 50,000 tons of barley and assigned the Ministry of Supply to take charge of the purchase operation.

The Agricultural Lending Institute and the Cooperative Organization will form committees to study the conditions of borrowers and will accordingly defer the debts of farmers who cannot pay the instalments for which they are liable this year because of the drought.

Vegetable growers in the Ghawr areas and other regions are being protected by the provision of agricultural accessories at reasonable prices and production guidance and marketing; the Farmers' Federation in the Ghawrs has begun providing fertilizer at reasonable prices.

The process of marketing of agricultural products is being carried out by intermediaries. The measures the government has taken to maintain agricultural product prices at a profitable level are as follows:

Prevention of importation of any locally-produced commodity unless local production is inadequate for consumption.

The marketing by the Marketing Institute of certain agricultural products through contract with farmers directly if the suitable conditions for this exist.

Contribution by the tomato factory to absorbing surplus production when prices drop locally by entering as a competitor into purchasing operations.

The government will establish refrigerators through a loan obtained from the government of Denmark on behalf of the Supply Ministry, the Agricultural Marketing Institute and the Farmers' Federation. One goal of this project will be to store fruit and vegetables when there is a production surplus and prices drop and to supply them to the markets again when production is low.

11887

CSO: 4802



## BRIEFS

**MUNICIPALITY, VILLAGE LOANS**--Mr Hashim al-Tall, general manager of the Municipality and Village Loan Fund, pointed out that the sum of 114,420 dinars had been disbursed to municipal and village councils last week. Of this, the sum of 72,000 dinars is from the fund's deposits which are derived from fuel, road transport and income taxes, fines and other revenues. These are the municipal and village councils involved: the Municipality of North al-Shunah, 15,000 dinars; the Municipality of Sabha and Sabhiyyah, 10,000 dinars; the Municipality of Zahr, 9,000 dinars; the Municipality of 'Anjarah, 5,000 dinars; the Municipality of Ma'ab, 5,000 dinars; the Mumiya Village Council, 8,000 dinars; the Basta Village Council, 4,500 dinars; the Jarinah Village Council, 3,500 dinars; the Kafr Jayiz Village Council, 3,500 dinars; the Umm al-Simaq Village Council, 3,000 dinars; the Hawfa al-Wastiyah Village Council, 1,000 dinars. In addition the sum of 42,420 dinars, which will be paid back to the fund, has been disbursed in the form of loans to the following municipal and village councils: the Municipality of Sabha and Sabhiyya, 12,500 dinars; the Municipality of al-Rabbah, 6,370 dinars; the Municipality of Madabba, 6,000 dinars; the Municipality of Manshiyat Bani Hasan, 6,000 dinars; the Municipality of al-Samakiyah, 4,700 dinars; the Municipality of Malka, 2,200 dinars; the Municipality of 'Ayn al-Basha, 1,000 dinars; the al-Mughayyir Village Council, 2,650 dinars. In another area, Mr al-Tall pointed out that the loans the fund provided to municipal and village councils in the month of October 1979 totalled 926,500 dinars for implementation of vital development projects in these municipalities, broken down as follows: electrical projects, 65,500 dinars; school projects, 282,000 dinars; the water project, 10,000 dinars; street projects, 21,000 dinars; sewer projects, 563,000 dinars; building projects, 21,000 dinars. Out of these loans which were set aside, and had previously been set aside for the municipal and village councils, the fund has disbursed 241,634 dinars to be spent on development projects in them, broken down as follows: electric projects, 19,400 dinars; school projects, 57,480 dinars; water projects, 26,868 dinars; street projects, 45,212 dinars; sewer projects, 36,820 dinars; public building projects, 2,900 dinars; public utility projects, 52,954 dinars. In addition, from its deposits derived from fuel, road transport and income taxes, fines and other revenues,

the fund has disbursed the sum of 910,632 dinars to municipal and village councils, broken down as follows: municipal councils, 772,472 dinars, and village councils, 138,160 dinars. /Text/ /Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 14 Nov 79 p 3/

**ELECTRONIC SERVICE CENTER**--Yesterday a delegation of the Royal Scientific Society returned to Amman following a visit to Tokyo in which it signed an agreement in implementation of the agreement signed between the Jordanian and Japanese governments last June, stipulating that an electronic services center to be outfitted with the necessary electronic equipment and facilities be erected in the society. The implementation agreement signed by the delegation of a Japanese company stipulated that implementation is to start next 1 December and that the construction and equipping of the center, costing a total of \$3 million, is to be completed by March 1981. It also stipulated that the construction of the center will include maintenance and repair units, a specifications and measurement unit for the electronic equipment, a unit for training specialists in operation, and intensified programs for groups of technicians and engineers working in public and private organizations. Included in the delegation, headed by Dr Albert Butrus, director general of the society, were Dr Fakhr-al-Din al-Daghistani, deputy director general, Jamal al-Badur, manager of the Administrative Department, Dr Hakub Baltikian, chief of the Electronic Services Center, and Dr Dawud al-Jabji, head of the Building Technology Department of the Royal Scientific Society. /Text/ /Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 14 Nov 79 p 2/ 11887

CSO: 4802

'AL-WATAN' WEIGHS U.S. MOTIVES IN IRAN, SEES YOUNG ROLE

LD281131 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 23 Nov 79 pp 1, 11 LD

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "A Mistake Once Again"]

[Text] Once again, President Carter's administration has committed a mistake vis-a-vis its current war with Iran, even though the new mistake could have eased somewhat the complexity of the worsening situation and consequently more or less kept the administration from deciding on military intervention.

Instead of encouraging the idea of dispatching former U.S. UN representative Andrew Young to Tehran for consultations with the Iranian officials, the administration moved an aircraft carrier and beat the war drums more and more with the onset of the month of Muharram which, to Iranians, means preparation for martyrdom.

It could be asked: What could Andrew Young do now that things have reached such a pass? The answer is that Young can do something, because of the high opinion the Iranian revolution had of him for being the first American official to ask President Carter's administration to conduct a dialog with Imam Khomeyni when he was living in exile in France. Young's view at the time was that Khomeyni would eventually become a saint and that it would then be difficult to have a dialog with him.

Young's request, however, was not heeded because the U.S. administration's security advisers had been advising the shah in bad faith to leave the country, believing that Khomeyni's role would end with the downfall of the shah and that matters would be left in the hands of the people--something which could be easily dealt with.

It has now become apparent that Young's request was based on discernment and farsightedness.

When we say that encouraging the idea of sending Young to Tehran could have prevented the hither-to cold war between Iran and America from turning into a war in which a lot of blood would flow, we do so on the basis that

Imam Khomeyni remembers that there is an American official who understands him, whereas the other officials refused to understand his revolution and its aspirations. We believe that Khomeyni would talk with a man of this kind and, therefore, we come to the following conclusions:

1--Whether intervention takes place, is delayed, or does not take place, the American hostages have been considered spies and Khomeyni's authorities, instead of putting American on trial through the shah, will try the shah through the hostages. At all events, the charges are identical and the responsibility is a joint one. Intervention might not be for the sake of prestige but to preclude the unveiling of things that could torpedo the policy of American-Soviet detente.

2--Whether intervention takes place, is delayed, or does not take place, the chances of Carter's winning the presidential election are diminishing. It seems, therefore, that intervention might not be for the sake of prestige but for vengeance.

3--Whether intervention takes place, is delayed, or does not take place, the United States faces a tough test. So far, it appears that Imam Khomeyni's authority is putting America's might to the test.

We repeat that Andrew Young could have done something, but President Carter, who has disdained the overwhelming majority of the Arab world for the sake of the peace organized between Anwar al-Sadat and Menahem Begin, is now again being disdainful with regard to what is happening in Iran.

CSO: 4802



'AL-WATAN' DENOUNCES THREAT OF U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN GULF

LD301505 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 27 Nov 79 p 10 LD

[Article by Ibrahim al-Barghuti: "The United States and Gulf Security"]

[Text] The successive U.S. statements regarding the Carter administration's intention to use military force in order to solve the problem of the U.S. hostages held in the American Embassy in Tehran remind us of the threats by U.S. officials to invade the Arab Gulf if the Arab oil countries used oil as a weapon in the national battle against the Zionist enemy.

While these statements truly reflect the U.S. administration's hostile intentions toward the peoples of the area they also involve great risks that do not stop at threats to the security and stability of our Arab peoples but also threaten the peace and security of the whole world and flout all international laws and conventions for the following reasons:

First, because they represent a blatant violation of the sovereignty of the countries of the area and overt interference in the internal affairs of independent and sovereign states.

Second, because they represent serious political blackmail against the countries of the area with the aim of preventing them from devoting their economic resources to the battle for social progress and national liberation.

Third, because they constitute a serious precedent in dealing with the financial wealth of the people of the area by subordinating trade relations to political stands in favor of U.S. interests and consequently lend colonialist overtones to U.S.-Arab friendship in that it becomes a means to preserve imperialist interests at the expense of the basic interests of the Arab peoples.

Fourth, because, finally, they undermine international concepts and pacts that provide for the nonuse of force in solving political problems between states of different social systems.

In the light of these risks we see Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad's statement on extending a helping hand to the Iranian revolution and on the intention of Kuwait and its people to stand firm in the face of the American aggressor, if the U.S. invasion plan is put into action, as a true and sincere expression of the Gulf stand on what is known as Gulf security. This stand reflects the real interests of the people of the area and of their views with regard to Gulf security as primarily a national cause facing a real threat from aggressive U.S. hostile tendencies which pose a direct danger to the independence of the countries of the area and their peoples.

We also believe that the Security Council is the appropriate place for the settlement of political disputes among states in a manner serving the real interests of the peoples.

CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

'AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM' DOUBTS COMPROMISE IN IRANIAN-U.S. CRISIS

LD010938 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0900 GMT 1 Dec 79 LD

[Text] Kuwait--A local paper today thought it unlikely that a compromise solution would be found to the American-Iranian crisis. In its editorial today AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM likened the United States to a dinosaur which is becoming extinct.

It said that the firm leadership of Iran has exposed the American dinosaur, which was defeated by the street masses who wore shrouds. It pointed out that a determined people with equally determined leadership can bend any giant committing aggression against them. It recalled the words of a British spokesman that the great powers must get used to humiliation.

The paper asked: When will the Arabs come out in their shrouds? It was referring to the U.S. disregard of Arab rights and its assertion that it would not recognize the PLO or agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state, saying that yet it is seeking the friendship, understanding and, indeed, the mediation of the Arabs.

CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

**'KUWAIT TIMES': IRAN SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER RELEASING HOSTAGES**

LDO31406 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0745 GMT 3 Dec 79 LD

[Text] Kuwait, 3 Dec--The KUWAIT TIMES today warns against an escalation of the Iranian-American crisis in a manner that would exhaust all diplomatic efforts for the release of the detainees and leave no alternative for the U.S. administration but to resort to military action under the growing pressure that it is being exposed to, and in order to preserve President Carter's assets particularly as his election popularity has begun to waver.

The paper calls on the Iranian revolution to seriously consider releasing the hostages amid the tangible signs of concerted diplomatic activity by the U.S. Government in the Western world aimed at denouncing the action of the Iranian students and their support by the spiritual leader of the Iranian revolution, Imam Ayatollah Khomeyni, so as to use this world support as a justification for any military action on which it might embark.

This English-language newspaper proposes the release of the American hostages in Tehran in return for the formation of an international legal committee with full powers to adopt decisions in regard to the shah's malpractices.

The paper does not discount the likelihood of an American-Soviet understanding to rearrange conditions in Iran in a manner which would safeguard the interests of both of them, which have been shaken by the Iranian revolution, under the pretext of military intervention to secure the release of the detainees.

CSO: 4820



'AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM' ASSAILS U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD THIRD WORLD

LD061141 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 3 Dec 79 p 1 LD

[Editorial: "The Spreading Fire"]

[Excerpt] It is no longer possible to predict what is going to happen in the area from one moment to the next. There is yet another blow delt to the ugly American's face in Tripoli, Libya. There are more blows on the horizon, just as there is so much pent up feeling against Washington's policies.

The American state definitely has many means for revenge. This state, which has flouted all laws, has also definitely lost much of its prestige and its pride has been injured.

But if Washington, prompted by such pride, wants to trample on the pride of the small nations then it has been and still is following the wrong road. These hungry and persecuted peoples whose pride has been injured are now learning from their own tormentors how to avenge their injured pride.

Unless Washington realizes now and in these days in particular how it should deal with the peoples appropriately it will lose a great deal, although it may possess every savage means of assault. In other words, Washington can destroy any of these angry countries but it can win nothing in the longer term, either economically, strategically or ethically. The mutiny against this American hegemony is spreading vertically and horizontally and at the same speed as technology is expanding. In fact, the mutiny is using this very technology in its enveloping spread.

Therefore, it is time for the United States to search for reasonable and creative alternatives by which it can adapt to the new facts rather than search for new means of subjugation through the use of force or blockade.

If Washington presumes that it can treat the Third World and the Middle East in particular as its "Eastern Europe" then it is once again committing a mortal mistake. This is because the Third World, including the Middle East, has come of age.

## PROBLEMS SEEN FOR NON-CITIZEN STUDENT POPULATION

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 17 Oct 79 p 42

[Article: "National Federation of Students of Kuwait and Problem of Students Without Citizenship"]

[Tex The National Federation of Students of Kuwait is considered the legitimate representative of all Kuwaiti students at home and abroad, with its executive board and administrative boards for each branch. There are several problems which have concerned and still concern students in general, and there are problems which concern a group of them on which the federation must stand with the students and help them to arrive at solutions to those problems. Among the most important of the problems facing some students is the problem of citizenship. Many of the students of the university and outside the university are Kuwaitis with a stay of execution. They have lived here and have been educated in this land, but for reasons of poor application of the law or because of their own ignorance, they have not obtained citizenship. The National Federation of Students of Kuwait has gone out of its way to find solutions to help this group. It adopted a resolution at one of the conferences stating that Kuwaiti students without citizenship who are working members of the federation have the right to vote and be a candidate. This is acknowledged in the federation's bylaws. Thus, under the bylaws they are members of the National Federation of Students of Kuwait, which must help them to obtain their legitimate demands for membership and education.

We know that the National Federation of Students of Kuwait, Kuwait Branch, had submitted a note to the amir and another to the crown prince previously to explain the problem of this group of students. They were promised good things, but no signs or inclinations to solve this problem have yet appeared.

These students are now in a very critical situation. No matter how much the secondary student has exceeded his percentage, even if it was higher than 90 percent, he is not accepted by the university, nor even by the other institutes such as the teachers institute, the institute of technology, etc. This step which appeared recently to prevent them from completing their studies in the university or the other institutes is

considered by the members of the federation to be a dangerous development against this group. The government officials do not accept them, even if they have their university diplomas. They have public secondary diplomas, and thus the federation with its new leadership must raise this problem on many levels and take the necessary steps, whether on the level of the university or on the level of society, and stir up serious discussion about it to arrive at radical solutions to this problem and give each person what is owed him. It is necessary to contact other popular societies such as the teachers society, the alumni and the lawyers. All of these societies have members who have suffered from the same problem, and silence toward this problem is selling this group into ignorance.

7587

CSO: 4802

AMERICAN ATTENDANCE AT ALGERIAN INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION ANALYZED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 4 Nov 79 p 16

/Article by Fathi Sharif: "Once Again--What Does America want?"

/Text/ American attendance at the 25th anniversary of the Algerian revolution, at the level of President Carter's representative National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has more than one meaning and importable among political observers in the region.

The basic declared objective, that of conducting consultations with Algerian officials to lessen the United States' decision to supply Morocco with weapons, was not the whole story.

Nor was the United States' commitment to continue and maintain its economic relations, which it had to maintain, on the one hand, and the probability of providing some investment loans and aid to the Algerian economy on the other, the whole story either!

It appears, rather, that Brzezinski's visit to Algeria and his appropriate timing struck at more than one target and achieved more than one idea. It also appears that the passing meetings or encounters were not, in my estimation, a mere coincidence!

First, America wants to assert that it can deal with, and achieve an understanding with, countries in the third world group which have a radical orientation and differ with it and that it is truly oriented toward this non-traditional political platform in the context of mutual interests.

America wants to tell Algeria that at the same time it is in agreement on selling arms, airplanes and military equipment to Morocco it may support the holding of a referendum on the Polisario people's right to determine their destiny in the Western Sahara region.

America wants to declare its participation in any Arab or African issues or disputes and that without American mediation or intervention resolutions or peace will not be achieved in the region.



By attending the celebrations of one of the progressive revolutions in the Arab region, America also wants to open the door to a dialogue with all the progressive countries in the Arab region in order to place them in a framework for dealing with current Arab issues, in particular the Palestine issue, which is remote from extremism.

Observers cannot ignore the important, intensified contacts which Brzezinski made with a number of the guests at the celebrations, in particular the Iranian prime minister, /with/ whom it was said discussions would be continued shortly afterward.

If the exchange of greetings made between Brzezinski and 'Arafat stirred up interest and commotion in political and journalistic circles--at which point Brzezinski was obligated to state that he had no intention of repeating former American secretary of state John Foster Dulles' refusal to shake hands with his international rivals--and Jody Powell, the American journalists' press secretary, said in effect that this meeting was part of the government representatives' concern for social graces:

Nonetheless, there are commentators who provide other explanations for these meetings which might lie within the realm of predictions that this meeting is probably the beginning of secret sessions the United States will hold with the Palestinians, similar to its political discussions with the Vietnamese before the American withdrawal from Vietnam.

Here a new form of American movement might be appearing before us, endowed with a dynamic character changing with developments: the extent to which the American administration uses them--here I mean the issue of the Western Sahara and the struggle between Morocco and Algeria--to stress that it is not alien to any game of war or peace in the region. If in our description of this American movement we are once again warning of the nature of the continuing new game, we want Arab politicians to move at the same speed and realistically reevaluate the phenomenon we are now experiencing but not understanding!

11887

CSO: 4802

## KUWAIT

### SUPREME OIL COUNCIL DISCUSSES PRICES, ORGANIZATION

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 10 Nov 79 pp 1, 18

/Article: "Supreme Oil Council Will Finish with Oil Organization and Kuwait Oil Price Increases Today"/

/Text/ It is expected that the Supreme Oil Council will discuss two matters at its meeting today:

1. The first is completion of the discussion on the matter of the General Oil Organization, the organization which will take charge of reorganizing the oil sector, including the merger of the three oil companies (Kuwait Oil Company, National Oil Company, and the Petrochemical Company) into one organization headed by the minister. This organization will comprise six departments: production, processing, refining, marketing, transportation and finance.

In the event the Supreme Council completes the discussion of the matter of the organization, the Council of Ministers will discuss the matter tomorrow, Sunday, and it is likely that the organization will be proclaimed officially after that.

2. The second matter is the rectification of Kuwaiti crude oil prices in the framework of a commitment to OPEC resolutions. With the recent rises which have occurred in prices for Iranian and Iraqi oil--which by their nature are similar to Kuwaiti crudes--it has become necessary to raise Kuwaiti crude prices in response to the regional and international market conditions. It is worth pointing out that even if Kuwait raised its current prices by \$2, it would remain within the limits the recent OPEC conference laid out, setting the price ceiling at \$23.50 per barrel.

### World Prices Are Also Rising

In another area, all evidence from the field confirms that world oil prices are on their way up or, more precisely, that they will "leapfrog" before 20 December, the date of the OPEC ministers' periodic meeting. Even before the crisis in Iranian-American relations, the episode of the

Tehran embassy, and the discussion that has generated on stopping Iranian shipments to America, crude oil prices on the world market had experienced repeated increases, spot sales prices in Europe reaching \$34 a barrel. Yesterday spot prices reached \$45 and there are signs that they may go up to \$50 this week. The likelihood of a cutoff of Iranian oil to America has had the effect of raising the temperature of the world oil market, since oil market circles consider that official OPEC prices will rise to \$30 a barrel in the middle of next month.

While the market will accept prices of this sort, in practice they will continue to be rejected by certain OPEC countries and there is the obvious likelihood that the coming OPEC conference will be faced with considerable internal turmoil which might end with a re-establishment of the dual pricing system or a system where various prices hold during the first quarter of next year.

11887

CSO: 4802

NORTH KOREA CHARGED WITH ABDUCTING WOMEN

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 17 Nov 79 pp 16-17

[Article: "Korean Ring to Kidnap Young Women!"]

[Text] Four months ago, the Lebanese Security Organization discovered the threads of the most serious plant aimed at Lebanon since the war. This plot involves the exploitation of young Lebanese men and women.

A Lebanese family notified the General Security Organization that a young woman family member and her female companion had disappeared in North Korea under mysterious circumstances 8 months before.

Through investigations, and on the basis of information which reached the Security Organization, many important threads were put together which revealed the reasons behind the disappearance of the two women, the main one being the existence of an international ring which seeks to export young women from a number of countries to work in a field closely resembling espionage. First of all, educated young women are seized under the cloak of a visit to North Korea. After a month's detention which includes "clever brainwashing operations," the women sign a contract to work as hostesses in first-class hotels in return for a nonreturnable gift of \$3,000 in cash and a monthly salary of \$1,500, as well as guaranteed residence and clothing from the hotel.

The hotels are Japanese, located in Tokyo and Hong Kong. The young women work as guides and hostesses for specified politicians or businessmen who are guests at the hotels, and obtain secrets and specified information from them about their movements, activities and assignments. In some cases, one of the women may be ordered to accompany a certain guest to another capital.

The young women working in this field include Lebanese, Dutch, Germans, French and Mexicans.

One woman working in this field arrived in Beirut last week with a female Lebanese companion and provided important information about this international network. The two women had escaped with the help of Lebanese passports sent to them by a Lebanese embassy in one of the East European capitals.

The aforementioned young women said that their passports were confiscated 1 month after they arrived in North Korea. They were then given Korean passports and paid \$3,000 apiece, and began working in this operation with other companions in the countries mentioned previously.

Security organizations in a number of countries are cooperating at the present time in an effort to uncover more information about this network in order to reveal the identities of other young women of several different nationalities. The fate of the two young Lebanese women was discovered by chance when the family of one of them furnished the General Security Organization with specific information about the woman's fate and the identity of the persons who arranged contact with her.

8591

CSO: 4802



# DEUXIEME BUREAU CRITICIZED AS TERRORIST ARM OF THE AUTHORITIES

## Revival of Secret Agencies

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 26 Nov 79 pp 12-13

[Text] The newest development of the past few weeks is the entrance of the Lebanese authorities as a party to the Second Branch's terrorist operations against the nationalist regions. The name of the Second Branch has once again become prominent, because all the fingers of suspicion, from the Islamic Grouping to the Nationalist Movement, have pointed to it as being behind the al-Bustah massacre, the setting-off of the al-Shiyah clashes, and the destruction of the statue of the late leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir at Qabb Ilyas--not to mention scores of small eruptive outbreaks blamed on "unknown persons."

The entry of the official authorities as a party to the "secret war" against the nationalist regions was an operational translation of an entire political trend which needed to be firmly grounded. This explains why these operations encompassed the south, the Biqa' and Beirut instead of the north. The political developments witnessed by the country during the past few weeks all came under the heading of an attempt to further the imposition of the army on the south once this army became ready to spread out to any part of Lebanese territory, as Army Commander Victor Khuri said. Therefore, the failure of the attempt to impose the army on the south forced the Lebanese authorities to turn towards Beirut, or its nationalist areas to be exact, and this explains the zeal with which the Deuxieme Bureau agents in the capital's nationalist areas and the southern al-Matn coast acted.

The Lebanese authorities' desire to bring down the army on the nationalist regions was originally channeled in a planned course outlined by the "American plan," preparatory to bringing up the issue of the Arab deterrent forces, which amounted to nothing more than the isolationist forces' desire to ensure the penetration of the nationalist regions by Victor Khuri's army after having failed to do so for more than 4 1/2 years.

Inasmuch as the Lebanese authorities' plan intersects with the isolationist plan, it is self-evident to say that this intersection came about under the umbrella of the American plan, which leaves plenty of room for the role of the "legitimate" army. In the prepared American plans there was a special addendum about the part which the army could play. And since the

operation to impose the army on the south had been temporarily thwarted, the system of alternates lost no time in replacing it with sending the army to the nationalist areas of the capital, as part of an effort to change "Greater Beirut" into a city isolated by nature from the nationalist forces. This is what American Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Morris Draper subsequently announced. The militia's approval of this role for the army did not arise just from this army's political plan, but from the huge price which it might again have to pay if it again decided to enter into a military venture, as happened throughout 1978.

This intersection of the two plans found its actual expression when the nationalist regions began witnessing a series of explosive actions following in the footsteps of the development of the country's political situation. This series began in the south, while the authorities were submitting their plan for imposing the army, and included Sidon, Tyre, al-Nabatiyah, Dayr Qanun al-Nahr, and other places. The purpose behind implementing this series of operations, which varied from calling strikes, agitation against the nationalist presence, and destroying and burning military vehicles belonging to the Nationalist Movement, to organizing massacres, was to ensure the proper climate for bringing in the army as a lifesaver in this explosive situation.

But the failure of the authorities' plan to ensure the army's infiltration of the south forced it and the militias to head north, in order to safeguard the northern flank of the militias' front by means of the army. The climax of this northern activity was the inflammatory operations directed at the Islamic Group's positions in Tripoli (the Negresco Cafe, the cinema, vehicles, and so forth). However, these operations failed to ensure the proper political climate for the imposition of the army, because of the revival experienced by the north. This led to the plot's being shifted to a more advanced stage, in the siege of 'Aynata al-Arz, the siege led by Phalangist Samir Ja'ja' who, it was later proven, was working for the intelligence agency in addition to being militarily responsible for the Phalangist militias in the north. With the shift of political weight in the authorities' activities towards penetrating the nationalist areas of the capital and the southern al-Matan coast, the above-mentioned agency's agents in the nationalist regions acted. The first introduction in this arena was the al-Bustah outbreak, which was tantamount to a gift from Johnny 'Abduh, the secret member of the Phalangist War Council and the leader of the Tall al-Za'tar attack, to his commander, Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the murder of Officer Samir al-Ashqar. The second blow was the explosion of the situation in Al-Shiyah, in an attempt aimed at ensuring that the army would be brought in; this outbreak spread from Saint Michael's Church to the airport.

Just as the era of President Fu'ad Shihab (1958 to 1964) was described as an era of "democratization" of the military and the intelligence agencies, it is possible to describe the era of President Ilyas Sarkis as being the way he wants it or plans it. However, the difference between the two eras does not lie in the liberation of the Second Branch to rule the country, for this matter was agreed upon by the "professor and the student." Rather, in the political plan launched by the former and abandoned by the latter, the former launched it in the context of a regional equilibrium, while

the latter abandoned it in the context of the disturbance of this equilibrium in the Camp David era. Thus his "political plan" was made a subsidiary of a general plan which made American Ambassador to Beirut John Gunther Dean and his predecessor Richard Parker similar to the high commissioner during the mandate.

It is true that as soon as President Ilyas Sarkis took over the government he began reviving the "secret agencies." In political circles it is said that the president's coming to power was merely an indication of the return of "ghosts" to rule the country, inasmuch as Sarkis belongs to the same school which laid down the guidelines for building these agencies. Circles close to the Republican Palace say that precisely this issue was President Sarkis' first concern when he came to power. In order to put the guidelines for rebuilding the security agencies into practice, many meetings were held under a cloak of secrecy. The viewpoint which President Sarkis expressed in the presence of many persons close to him indicated, on more than one occasion, the need to create security agencies which would give him all the information needed to rule in light of his perception of the extent of powers, their distribution, and their true stands on various levels. When Sarkis commissioned Maj Johnny 'Abduh to head to Second Branch, inasmuch as it was the "nerve" of the agencies he wanted to build, he gave him explicit instructions to take in all the agencies of the Deuxieme Bureau without exception, provided that this transaction be done with the required secrecy and very skillfully, especially with some of the big names whose return to the public scene might lead to revulsion among political circles previously "tormented" by the activity of those persons during the governments of late President Fu'ad Shihab and Former President Charles Hlu. Thus Johnny, surrounded by many leaders experienced in this field, began carrying out the mission assigned to him by concentrating on two pivotal issues:

1. Reassembling all the regular personnel of the Deuxieme Bureau who were previously known by various names such as "gunmen," "strongmen," and "coffeehouse highwaymen," in addition to scores of persons chosen by them and whose sole loyalty to the Deuxieme Bureau was proven without exception.
2. Reestablishing contact with political networks, beginning with the ministers and deputies and going on to senior employees such as general directors and the like, and senior reporters considered high-level report writers in view of their being important political keys because of the positions they occupy. This group also includes employees of the Deuxieme Bureau, tribal chiefs, and some journalists who get huge salaries in return for the news they spread or the commentaries they write. The Deuxieme Bureau reestablished contact with them after a period of "breaking contact" because of this agency's decline in 1976. Through the above-mentioned journalists, two types of work are ensured--first, leaking news favorable to the regime, and second, distributing statements attributed to politicians who did not utter them. This is what Lebanese political personalities call the typewriter which prints these statements fabricated by the well-known agencies.

## The Old Agency and Counterintelligence

The rebuilding the Deuxieme Bureau or the Second Branch, the old structure with all its minute details was retained--that structure which placed a chief at the apex of the pyramid, assisted in principle by a deputy. Three officials were added to the chief and his deputy--a military security official, a national security official, and a counterintelligence official, Officer Suhayl Khuri. The first two officials were known in the old agency, while the counterintelligence division was newly created. It has more personnel than a battalion, and is especially trained. Suhayl Khuri, commander of this force, is directly connected to Johnny 'Abduh. This is the first time a battalion has been detached from the army to serve the Second Branch, and this situation is unprecedented except in military dictatorships, especially in Latin America, where the intelligence agencies are forces of political repression having, just like the security agencies, military divisions trained in pursuit, attack and liquidation. Connected to the three agencies (military security, national security and counter-intelligence) are regional officers directly linked to the chief, each of whom builds his own private networks. In addition to his basic salary, each receives 1,500 Lebanese pounds a month as compensation for special missions, as well as a chauffeur and a guard. Also, every month each officer receives 10,000 pounds which he can spend as he likes, without having to submit a monthly expense account. The Second Branch works through legal channels to prevent the spread of political action to the army and to combat enemy espionage agencies, although these two tasks are in fact unrelated. The biggest innovation in this respect is the work of the national security agency, which is concerned with all political issues. This agency has played an outstanding role in previous periods, and by the nature of its work was one of the pivots about which concentrated the political attack on the Deuxieme Bureau during the time of President Sulayman Franjiyah. This agency, as well as other agencies, was reorganized at an earlier time. The Second Branch has extensive powers in information collection, strengthened by an almost complete financial independence; none of this agency's expenses are subject to any financial auditing.

The Deuxieme Bureau, which played a major role in setting off and kindling the civil war, is now raising its head in an attempt to ensure security services for the plot to Zionize Lebanon from within and impose surrender on it from abroad. This is what the majority has rejected; it has demonstrated and called more than one strike to confirm that this shall not come to pass. The nationalist forces which have fought the plot in its most vicious forms are capable of resisting the handfuls of hirelings operating under the name of legitimacy.

### Israeli Monetary Support

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 26 Nov 79 p 12

[Text] During the Israeli Knesset debates on Israeli intelligence agency activities in the Arab world, it was revealed that Israeli intelligence pays 40 million pounds a year to the Deuxieme Bureau, which is supervised



by Maj Johnny 'Abduh, in return for what some delegates loyal to the Menachim Begin government described as "the need to combat Palestinian terrorism allied with the left." The above-mentioned debates were reported by the Israeli press, along with the growing enthusiasm for the need to develop the relation, especially since Lebanon has become the main center for resistance activity.

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## ROLE OF BASIC CONFERENCES IN BUILDING ISLAMIC SOCIETY EXTOLLED

Tripoli AL-USBU' AL-SIYASI in Arabic 19 Oct 79 pp 9, 10

/Article by 'Ali Yahya Mu'amar: "The Basic Conferences Are a Practical Application of Consensus"/

/Text/ It has become firmly established in the minds of all Moslems in this era that consensus is the third source of Islamic law. The opinions of scholars have differed greatly in the consensus which is to be authoritative. Without addressing myself to the technical aspects of it, without participating in the boisterous debate which has revolved around it, and without discussing views or giving more weight to some views by reviewing the evidence (all theoretical), and before entering into details, I would like to point to simple observations which one must take into consideration in carrying out this investigation. These are:

1. The legislation which has been set down in /the holy/ texts does not need consensus, in spite of jurists' insistence on their familiar expression "the evidence for it is in the Book, the sayings and doings of the prophet, and consensus." This is a meaningless exercise in one-upmanship. What has been established in the Koran does not need further confirmation. Everything that has been mentioned since the Koran is meddling and none of the firm precepts of the Koran will be detracted by its absence.
2. Consensus must not enter into precepts on worship. The nation, as a whole or otherwise, has no right to legislate a means for worshiping God other than that which has been established by revelation, and God will be worshipped only in the manner in which he ordered himself to be worshipped.
3. All issues related to politics, economics and society are fields for consensus as long as provisions have not been set down on any of them in /the holy/ texts.

These observations must be taken into consideration in any investigation which the precept of consensus deals with. In reality, religious jurists have stipulated many conditions for consensus and have requested many qualifications for it. The truth of the matter is that none of them has been

founded on a sound basis beyond the viewpoint of the person holding the opinion himself. Jurists have put forth many conceptions of consensus. Among them are those who have been satisfied with the consensus of a specific town, region, clan or number of clans, considering the consensus they see fit in one of these preceding forms to be valid for the entire Islamic nation. Among them are people who consider that consensus is not proper and is not authoritative in Islamic law unless agreement has been reached on it among all the members of the nation. Among all these views two stand out which we have chosen because we believe that they are closest to making reality of the notion of consensus which is meant to be authoritative in Islamic law because it is the view of the nation or the precept of the nation concerning something on which no precept had previously been revealed by God. These two views are:

1. Consensus can be consensus only if the entire nation--its wise and ignorant men, its pious men and its profligate--agree on it. al-Shawkani in his book "Guidance of the Masters" has summarized it in the following lines: "The statements of ordinary people are to be taken into consideration in reaching consensus because all in all they are the nation. Although the statement of the nation must be authoritative, in order to preserve it from wrong, there is nothing to prohibit protection from encompassing the entire nation, its wise and ignorant men both."

2. What is respected in consensus is firstly the opinion of men of specialization or "weight" then the agreement of the others to these men; if men of specialization are unanimously agreed on a precept, and the rest of the people agree to it, then a legally accepted consensus has come about and the word of the men of specialization, or men of weight, has, as the religious jurists say, become important in this respect. Men of specialization or men of weight are not always religious jurists; rather, the position of jurists on many issues is no more than that of the common people. If the issue being investigated is one of health, for example, the men of weight will be doctors, and the rest of the people, well educated or not, will, on this issue, even if they possess the highest degrees, rank with the common people. The same is the situation if the problem is political, economic, military or otherwise.

If we want to cite examples, we can bring up many questions on which religious jurists reach decisions through personal individual judgment without referring to men of specialized learning. Their individual judgments differ and decisions conflict according to the conflict in their views. Perhaps the nearest example we can cite here is the dispute over which there has been a lengthy struggle among religious jurists for generations--that of determining the maximum period of pregnancy, which was recently resolved by men of weight or specialization, doctors. Religious jurists addressed themselves to these men and laws were codified in most Islamic countries in accordance with the conclusion medical opinion had reached, in spite of the discrepancy between that conclusion and the most prominent statements which had been in effect in a number of Islamic countries stemming from the individual judgments of religious jurists.

Many matters in various fields of life have been raised and are being raised on which jurists have had lengthy disputes in accordance with their own judgments. These are not among these jurists' special knowledge and, if they had been left to people with specialized knowledge and jurists had helped them, decisions would have been issued on them by consensus or by majority, the problem would have ended, and people would have been able to spare themselves from going back and forth to houses of jurists and weighing statements. Jurists would mention consensus considering that it was out of the question that it could come about--indeed, some scholars have ruled this categorically, on grounds that it is impossible to contact everyone who has weight or all the people in the nation in any era, as they believe. However, the model which the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah has offered in its pioneering experiment of government by the people has proved that arriving at the attainment of legal consensus in the Arab nation or the Islamic nation today has become easy and accessible, that one may rely on it in resolving all problems around which tempests of dispute have been or will be raised because of personal judgments in theory, that issue a unified verdict on them, and that one may discuss any problem raised then carry it to a group or consensus resolution. Perhaps this method will permit the era of personal individual judgment to end and the establishment of consensus judgment, that is, reliance on the third source of Islamic jurisprudence, to be established.

If the Islamic nation follows the path of the Jamahiriyah in forming basic conferences and then presents matters which require discussion and study to these conferences, and if each conference studies the matters which are presented to all conferences and issues recommendations concerning them on which the conference reached agreement, then these recommendations will all be made among them and the result will be either the attainment of agreement by the majority on a particular opinion (which will be the verdict of the majority, a hypothetical verdict stronger than the opinion of any individual deliberator in any case) or the attainment of agreement by all the basic conferences on a particular opinion, which will be the consensus decision which is desired by Islamic law--a consensus which jurists imagine and consider to be unattainable.

The fact is that besides being the most exemplary means for applying direct democracy and the best way to train all members of the people to exercise freedom, moral courage, a concern for all issues preoccupying citizens, and the spread of awareness through give and take, the system of basic conferences is also the most exemplary means for applying the concept of legal consensus in this era, because this method gives every member everywhere an opportunity to attend, listen and participate in the discussion of any problem raised for discussion in the desire to bring it to a sound decision. There is no doubt that the question--any question--may have a relationship to one aspect or another of the public interest in life, and therefore the greatest possible number of people should discuss it so that a referendum may be taken on all its aspects.

Since the basic conference is made up of all the residents of a branch or region, everyone with fields of specialization, and all educated people, including scholars of Islamic jurisprudence, are by the nature of the case part of the popular masses of the branch. After the problem, in all its weight and dimensions has been reviewed by the secretariat of the conference, people with specialized knowledge will come forward to analyze it, discuss it from all aspects and express sound views on it. Anyone in attendance who wishes to may participate in the discussion and jurists or scholars of Islamic jurisprudence must establish their presence through observations, directives and formulations so that the discussion will bring everyone to agreement on a general recommendation which will be accompanied by the general recommendations issued in other conferences. Then a conclusion will be derived from these recommendations and the verdict will be by consensus, if all conferences are agreed on it, or by the majority if the opinions of the majority are agreed on it.

There is no doubt that some religious scholars do not like this because they consider that they alone possess specialized knowledge and are men of weight, and because consensus is a legal judgment and legal judgments are issued only by religious jurists. In times past a group of such jurists tried to exclude even their colleagues, the scholars of fundamentals of jurisprudence and the scholars of rhetoric, from the subject, on grounds that their participation deprived them of the major portion of what they believed their specialized fields to be and stripped them of the most powerful weapon but they retained their status, though this was not the case, because religious jurists are a category of the people, have a scope of specialization which no one begrudges them, and are not prohibited from taking part in any subject set forth for discussion, but rather must attend and articulate religious aspects which might be lost on other people. Religious jurists also consider engineers, doctors, farmers and industrialists to be common people as far as matters of jurisprudence go and take the same view concerning issues which are those people's fields of specialization. However, this does not prevent them from having a necessary connection to all issues raised for the issuance of legal decisions, and thus their presence is necessary at all meetings and is effective in all cases. While the prophet--may God's blessings and peace be upon him--was directed by revelation and was the paragon of all fields of specialization, he would in many cases defer to others, as happened in the Badr offensive and the al-Ahzab offensive. He would gather together all his companions, with all their groups, present the problem to them in all its details, then tell them "Consult with me, people," and adopt the opinion of the majority even if the majority were opposed by people who he thought had a more correct opinion or accurate view. As happened in the Uhud offensive, he did not do this, did not procrastinate, did not hesitate and did not waver. All issues related to various aspects of life have specialists whose word on these issues is the most correct, whose knowledge is the most valid and whose opinion is the most accurate--indeed, there are issues and problems which must be presented to ordinary people for judgment and are not to be restricted to the opinions of specialists.



The 1 September revolution has achieved a brilliant success in innovating this method, which, in treating the problems of the masses, has no similar precedent, setting forth these problems in a manner whereby it is easy for all citizens without exception to attend, become informed, participate effectively and issue recommendations and decisions.

Today the jamahiriyah issues all its decisions in one of two ways: by consensus or by majority.

Were we to say, as some old-time religious jurists do, that the validity of consensus is part of the Islamic nation, then we would be saying that decisions have been, and will be, issued by consensus. Indeed, we would be saying that all opinions in the jamahiriyah will be issued by consensus. However, we are not of that view. We consider that a consensus will be lawful and correct only if the Islamic nation with all its groupings is unanimously agreed to it. It will not be feasible for the Islamic nation to be unanimous on a decision on any matter unless all the countries in this nation apply the notion of basic Islamic conferences and unless the various regimes in the Islamic world are convinced of the jamahiriyah's experiment of assigning the task of taking the initiative to rule to the people themselves. In reviewing the ruling on issues, the jamahiriyah has taken broad steps not only toward true democracy but also toward the sound situation which Islam calls for and the proper method for assuming power, since the holy Koran has placed this directly in the hands of the nation, the masses, and not in the hands of an individual or authority, "You were the best of nations brought forth to the people; command that which is good and prohibit that which is odious and believe in God." In the fact and truth of the matter, power does not go beyond commanding the good and prohibiting the odious. In imposing on the nation or the masses the responsibility for rule, the holy Koran did not content itself with that but, in another holy verse, specified the method whereby the masses were to exercise power, stating "And he ordered them to consult among themselves." Is there any more splendid and preferable way for performing consultation among all members of the nation than that of basic conferences?

I have said nothing new in stipulating here that this method is the soundest one, so far, for achieving the rule by consensus which religious jurists have labored greatly over but could not attain, since all that was mentioned was surrounded by doubt on every side, except for the consensus which has been established in the /holy/ texts, and most of which was inexplicit because provisions were established without it and it was not the requisite consensus we are talking about.

In order to remedy all their problems and make rulings on them which are valid in Islamic law, Moslems in their various countries must follow the same or nearly same path the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah has adopted through the basic conferences. If they do so, they will be performing a sublime service for Islam and their peoples, because the /holy/ texts are limited, some dealing with certain provisions with precise



specificity and others dealing with them flexibly, leaving most problems for people to deal with in accordance with the public interest after setting forth the general broad issues for them and drawing up broad outlines for them which they must observe. When the holy texts were finalized revelation was completed; since then, scholars with individual views have borne the banner of Islamic jurisprudence. Though the work they have performed was great, it was no more than individual opinions and personal points of view which could not take the place of the /holy/ text or take the place of consensus or make it dispensable; indeed, some of the opinions which were arrived at through individual judgment and personal interpretations have been the cause of division in the nation, and this division has sometimes led to hatreds and antagonisms which led to the establishment of meager petty religious states fighting over power in the name of religion, which helped weaken the nation in the face of the onslaught of imperialism.

However, there is no true measurement for degrees of individual judgment, or any specific entity to issue them, so many people who are not qualified to do so by the nature of their jobs but are qualified by the truth of their views and the soundness of their thinking, and are eminently qualified by their morality and principles, rise to the surface and are clad in the raiment of individual judgment then enter into religious struggle with the zeal of a combatant. Many people who deserve this degree of excellence are not recognized, but indeed there are people who are not recognized for knowledge in their lives, then violent wars are fought and after they die their writings are uncovered, perhaps after a long time, and it is recognized that they were among the greatest thinkers and they are perhaps given the title of imam.

The time has come for the Islamic nation to rely upon a stable source of Islamic jurisprudence, namely the source of consensus; according to our belief, consensus can come about only in this manner.

The organization of the Islamic nation with all its countries into basic branch conferences whose recommendations will all be accumulated within a secretariat general of the Islamic nation and compared, after which a decision will be issued either by majority or by unanimity, is the step which must be taken in order to arrive at a fixed source of Islamic jurisprudence. It is plain that jurists and scholars of Islamic law, whatever their degrees might be, must, just as all men of specialization must, attend these conferences, participate in them effectively, and hide none of the knowledge whose conveyance and disclosure is commanded of them. Whoever does not attend is responsible before God before he is responsible before himself or the masses, and no excuse for failing to attend will avail him as long as he knows that a matter is to be set forth so that a legal verdict may be issued on it.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah has chosen the system of basic conferences to study and deal with all its issues and problems and

it has attained complete success in this, although some elements have been hesitant and have straggled from the pioneering cavalcade. The masses, with all their groups, have come to discuss everything that is presented in the conferences with interest, awareness and an appreciation of popular responsibility. Before we conclude this chapter we must review the negative aspect of the concept, especially since we want to bring the concept of the basic conferences in the jamahiriyyah forth to the entire Islamic world, restricting these conferences in issuing organizational decrees to fixed legal consensus decisions.

Perhaps we can summarize these negative points or criticisms in the following points:

1. We cannot consider the recommendations which the basic conferences issue as consensus since we know through experience that many people do not attend these conferences and that those who do not attend do not take part in determining the decision. This is enough to keep the decision from being one of consensus.
2. Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence, who are the most important element in the matter, might not attend, or they might attend but not be given an opportunity to discuss. Thus recommendations will be issued deficiently, without explicit agreement on their part. This is enough to render the consensus invalid.
3. Generally, basic conferences are dominated by members of the conference secretariat and revolutionary committees and they direct them as they want, others being unable to command the situation and appear clearly before the masses. Thus recommendations are issued by specific directives which are the opinions held by the members of the conference and the revolutionary committees. A decision issued in this fashion cannot be considered a decision by consensus. Perhaps there are other observations of less importance than these. The answer to all these observations may be concentrated on:
  1. The first point: The failure of individuals, whatever their status, to attend basic conferences is not a negative aspect or drawback of the concept but is a negative aspect and drawback of those who straggle. As long as a citizen knows that a basic conference will be held, that specific issues will be raised, and that what is required is agreement in order that a legal decision may be attained, why should he not attend?

If we add to this that if an issue is raised on which the issuance of a legal judgment based on consensus is required, it is not permissible that people who are specialized and people who feel within themselves the ability to participate and benefit not attend. When scholars of Islamic law and people with specialized knowledge look at this issue from this standpoint, no one will fail to come, and anyone who does not come will not be pardoned. Scholars of Islamic law are themselves the first to be obligated

to attend because of the firm relationship between them and every issue raised for the adoption of decisions. All spirits must be divested of delusions of grandeur and personality worship and the conduct of certain independent elements who impart an atmosphere of boisterousness to the conferences, causing the embarrassment of some citizens, defaming them and making themselves custodians of the conference and the revolution, must be limited.

2. The second point: The experiment is still in its initial steps and some people's minds have not grasped it or understood it. Therefore they are not evincing full interest in it. These sluggish mentalities will understand and grasp the experiment and will be won over to it gradually within a reasonably short period and then a rush to attend and a competition to participate in discussion will occur and no one will not attend, because no one who takes pride in his dignity will ignore his rights or abandon them to other people to deal with.

3. The third point: The experiment of the basic conferences and the popular exercise of power, especially legislative power, is a new one for the people of the jamahiriya and has not yet been presented in any other country of the world. Therefore other countries need the support of aware leaders who are represented by the members of the secretariat and members of the revolutionary committees after an experiment has been conducted for a period which we do not consider will last long. The experiment will become established in the minds of all the people. The theory will prove its feasibility and effectiveness among the most negative people and everyone will become convinced that it is the only way, the way they must follow. Then the conferences will not be in need of leaders or the support of leaders because it is they who will lead; attendance will be rounded out, discussion will be guided, excitability will disappear and logic and genuineness will dominate. Then the decisions issued in the jamahiriya will perforce become a partial unanimity.

If there were people who acknowledged the authority of the consensus of the people of Medina, the consensus of the people of al-Kufah, or the consensus of the people of al-'Atrah among the religious jurists of old, a day will come very soon when the decisions in the jamahiriya will be issued in the name of consensus. While the Libyan people could not make their decisions, which were issued by consensus, binding on any other Arab or Islamic peoples, they could set before them the way in which to attain consensus and solve a problem whose solution has eluded them for 14 centuries for them. They have only to adopt the system of the basic conferences, ready-made as it is being applied here. Just as ruling regimes in Islamic Arab countries acknowledge that it is their people who possess the right to assume power and possess the right to legislate verdicts and laws, then a system will arise among them similar to the system of basic conferences, and the decisions issued in them will have the force of partial unanimity. If this system goes into effect among all Islamic peoples and is implemented by them, and the recommendations of all their conferences with

regard to a given decision are agreed upon, then they will truly have revived the most important source of legislation after the /holy/ texts. This is the third source of legislation, the source which the Islamic nation has lost because of doctrinal dispute, political antagonism and tribal fanaticism.

We believe that it is necessary that the era of individual judgments disappear and that the page of imams and men of individual judgment, the page which has dominated the Islamic world since the death of the prophet, on whom be God's peace and blessings, be turned, so that the rule of consensus, which is second in importance after the /holy/ text, may take its place.

If those who came before did not know the means for attaining consensus, here is almighty blessed God who has inspired this noble people and lighted the path for them, revealing to the Arab world and the Islamic world the platform they must follow. The competent authority has arisen: is there anyone to respond?

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CSO: 4802



## BRIEFS

**DEFECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM--**Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi conducted an examination into the air defense system the Soviets installed in Libya at a cost of more than \$1 billion and found that about 20 percent of the system was working and the rest was unable to function because of a lack of fuel and no maintenance. The colonel became agitated and requested contact with Vietnam to contract for 5,000 people to operate this system. /Text/  
/London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 16 Nov 79 p 12/

**EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE COUP--**Egyptian intelligence has obtained the complete plan of the new building the Libyan president Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi built as his residence, showing all the entrances, exits, rooms and contents of the house. The people who transmitted this information said that "al-Qadhafi's house" has become transparent and no longer has any secrets! They stress that there is a radical dispute between the colonel and his prime minister, 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud, now that Jallud has managed to build a sort of popularity for himself within the army. This gave al-Qadhafi warning to form popular committees in the armed forces consisting of officers loyal to him in order to reduce Jallud's position within the army. Commenting on a decree al-Qadhafi issued prohibiting the eating of garlic in Libya "because it is exorbitantly expensive and unbeneficial," the Cairo newspaper AL-AHRAM compared al-Qadhafi to the Fatimid al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, who prevented Egyptians from eating moloukheyya. Other decrees al-Qadhafi has issued include the allocation of 30 head of livestock to every owner of sheep, with the rest to be delivered to popular committees, and granting every person the right to buy just two shoes a year, with shoe purchases to be by coupon. AL-AHRAM said, in concluding its commentary, "History also remembers how al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah died." /Text/  
/London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 16 Nov 79 p 12/

**CAMPAIGN AGAINST PALESTINIANS--**The Libyan media have launched a violent campaign against the Palestine Liberation Organization as a consequence of its mediation to free the hostages detained in the American Embassy in Tehran. The political editor of the Libyan News Agency wrote a commentary stating "It is not the job of Palestinians to mediate in issues concerning Americans, who are the financiers and main supporters of the Zionist gangs." The agency editor described this mediation as "An infamous stain on the

forehead of the Palestinian revolution." Palestinian sources say that the real reason for the campaign is a dispute between Libya and FATH and that the Libyan government has not been content to freeze the \$15 million which FATH collected in Palestinian donations in Libya but has proceeded to transfer \$16 million to the Popular Front led by Dr George Habash! Palestinian sources have described this Libyan policy as being aimed at driving a wedge between Palestinian organizations on the one hand and the Palestinian revolution and the Iranian revolution on the other. /Text/ /London  
AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 16 Nov 79 p 12/ 11887

CSO: 4802

TIES TO WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS BY MOROCCAN JEWS CRITICIZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 19-25 Nov 79 p 27

[Article by AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI's correspondent in Morocco: "The Jewish Community Joins the 'World Jewish Congress,'" The second congress of the Moroccan Jewish community is a step toward incorporating the Moroccan Jews into the "World Jewish Congress" to defend the interests of Israel on the international scene\*]

[Text] The second congress of the Moroccan Jewish community, held recently in the city of Casablanca, emphasized the "loyalty of Moroccan Jews to King Hasan II and their desire to mobilize their resources in support of Moroccan policy in Western Sahara, particularly among American Jewish circles.

It was for this purpose that David Ammar, the secretary general of this [Jewish] community's council, announced that, in the near future, Jewish organizations would join the "World Jewish Congress" in order to "defend the legitimacy of our cause and the interests of our country on the international scene." He expressed his hope that the Moroccan government would agree to that.

It is certain that the Moroccan government will not object to this affiliation, and may even have encouraged it, as long as it serves the interests of its policy which aims at playing all [possible] cards, including the Jewish card, in order to obtain as much American support as possible for Morocco in order to win the Sahara war.

This congress has brought a few facts out into the open. For example, the Jewish community (30,000 persons) is being wooed by two main trends: the first one calls for the priority of belonging to the Moroccan homeland, on the basis of having a Jewish identity, and the second one supports the idea of [Jewish] community solidarity.

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\*Phrase "interests of Israel" does not appear in text below. Phrase "interests of our country" does appear in paragraph 1. Writer has, unwittingly or otherwise, misinterpreted the former.

This idea has been adopted by a group which considers itself presently to be a distinct community, although socially it has been integrated. This is attributable to the fact that its prominent elements have suspect foreign connections, and that some of them have previously been involved in financial scandals and bribes, together with [important] Moroccan figures, in addition to the active Zionist propaganda [which they have waged] in Morocco since the 40's.

But this does not particularly bother the Moroccan authorities, which regard this community's leaders—most of whom are doctors, businessmen, and representatives of foreign multinational corporations—as a link between themselves and foreign investors, especially Jews, who are able to revive the Moroccan economy, which is suffering a suffocating crisis because of expenditures for the Sahara war.

Furthermore the vicissitudes of Moroccan policy with regard to the Palestine Question encourage them to play a role in Moroccan political life, after they restricted their activities, during recent years, to the field of business. They know that most of the Jews who left Morocco for Israel in the 50's and 60's—close to 200,000—did not make fortunes and did not achieve [professional] qualifications, as did those who chose to stay behind in Morocco, and who were able to reach the highest government positions. The direction in the Ministry of Defense in 1965 was a Jew, and this is something that we rarely saw happening in Arab countries at that time.

If we go back to the first years of Moroccan independence, we find that Dr Leon Ben Zakine, a Jewish citizen, was the minister of communications...and the list is long.

But the Jewish problem in Morocco will remain an issue as long as the Jews who fall under [the influence of] Zionist propaganda consider themselves to be persecuted. And this is what causes them, in order to insure their own protection, to throw themselves into the lap of the ruling circles, which are confronting them with a difficult choice: either be loyal or pack your bags.

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CSO: 4402



# **RADICAL LEADER GIVES PRESS CONFERENCE IN SYRIA**

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 20 Nov 79 p 3

/Article by 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kafri: "The Ba'th Publishes Minutes of Conference with Secretary General of Sudanese National Democratic Front"/

/Text/ Mr Husayn 'Uthman Mansur, secretary general of the Sudanese National Democratic Front and the Democratic Federation Party in exile, held a press conference last Saturday, 17 November, attended by representatives of the press and the news services. A number of our brother members of the Sudanese National Front participated in the conference.

The questions we brought sought answers concerning the facts and events of the revolution of our armed Arab people in the Sudan. We also sought a political analysis of the status of the dictatorial regime in power and its relations with reaction, Zionism and imperialism.

Also al-Mumayri's claims on the solution to the problem of the southern Sudan and his stand on the Iranian revolution. Also the priorities of the struggle as set forth by the opposition National Democratic Front and the front's position on the subject of piping Nile water to the Zionist enemy.

In view of the importance of the statements Mr Mansur made at the conference, AL-BA'TH is publishing the full details of the press conference.

At the beginning of the conference, Mr Husayn Mansur said, "In the name of the Sudanese Arab people, in the name of the National Democratic Front, and in the name of the Sudanese Democratic Federal Party, the party of the majority throughout the history of the Sudanese struggle, I would sincerely like to thank the national leadership which has given us the opportunity to describe some of the sufferings of the Arab people in the Sudanese nation. I believe that it is a stroke of good luck that this conference is occurring while the Arab people in Syria--indeed the Arab people in every country--are hailing the triumphs of the corrective movement which is in reality to be considered a historic achievement from which the Arab people in every nation may benefit in their struggles to build Arab unity, freedom and socialism.

"I would like to speak briefly about al-Numayri's regime's stand on the domestic cause, his stand on the national cause, and then the regime's stand on international politics, and you may condemn and judge him after these stands /have been presented/.

#### The Domestic Cause and the Regime

"Concerning the domestic cause, the regime is dictatorial and tyrannical. It is the regime of a cruel sultan which has eliminated all freedoms, even the simplest human rights. The Sudanese people no longer enjoy any rights through which they can express their free will.

"Concentration camps and prisons which our Sudanese people have become familiar with in the era of the current second military dictatorship they did not know even in the days of imperialism. Our people have rejected this regime even though the regime managed to paint a false picture domestically to some Sudanese in its first declaration, giving the impression that it was raising progressive Arab slogans. Even some Arab and African brothers abroad were deceived by this regime.

"However, it was soon exposed and the progressive forces made efforts to reject the wavering of the regime and its partiality toward reactionary puppet forces in the Arab and African region. The regime became flabby, corruption spread, popular uprisings were declared, and the rejection movement passed from economic struggle to the stage of political struggle. Indeed, the stage of struggle reached 'the politicization of the rifle' and the effort was made to raise arms against the regime. Battles are now being waged by the Sudanese people against the regime which are quiet sometimes and heated at other times.

"The trade unions, federations and all existing bodies in the Sudan are challenging the /regime's/ domination, proclaiming unrelenting strikes and declaring that they are advancing today or tomorrow to renew and repeat the immortal October experience, the experience in which the unarmed Sudanese people proved with the tree branches with which they were armed that they could topple the dictatorial military regime at that time.

"Some traditional politicians have fancied, and some of the world press has fancied with them, that the struggle between the Sudanese people and the regime is one of 'livelihood' and economic crises. This is not true. The Sudanese people do not live by bread alone. They are a people who have had a grasp of their lengthy history and have learned from human experiences everywhere. They are a people calling for democracy, and history bears witness that while the Sudanese people lived in a state of relative prosperity in the context of the first military dictatorship they nonetheless revolted and rose up, rejected the first military dictatorship and declared that they wanted freedom and democracy, wanted human rights, wanted trade union rights, wanted rights by which they could express their will in a manner free from dominance, repression or obduracy.

"The fact is that if we take a quick look at this regime and evaluate it scientifically we will find that the class evaluation by this regime is in no way related to socialism because it is not related to a socialist people by any innate character. Even imperialism in its era was forced to establish public life on foundations from which it itself could benefit; at that time the railway workers' union had 48,000 workers.

"That was a large number as far as the Sudan went at that time and the same was the case with some government bureaus and agricultural departments. Imperialism even grew cotton on behalf of an imperialist country then handed the company's accounts over to the government after the company had grown rich. Thus the Sudanese workers and farmers clashed with the ruling regime in the days of imperialism, not just because it was in power but also because it was the employer. Therefore the economic struggle in the Sudan perforce shifted to a political struggle.

"al-Numayri's regime has succeeded in this brief period in creating a group of capitalists who have become millionaires. The regime has managed to create 20 millionaires, whereas on 25 May 1969 there were no Sudanese millionaires--indeed if one gathered together all the wealth of the rich on 25 May 1969 one would have not amassed 1 million.

"As far as a political evaluation of this regime goes, we state that it is the vile opportunistic puppet of the treacherous hostile trinity hostile to all peoples--the puppet of American imperialism, world Zionism and treasonous capitulationist Sadatism.

"Therefore we state that we find ourselves faced with an analysis of the position of the regime regarding the national question.

"In fact the regime came in raising national slogans but it was quickly unmasked and aligned itself with the imperialist camp and the group of reactionary countries in the Arab region.

"The Sudanese people have been able through history to specify their stand on the national cause in a unique manner. Since 1948 volunteers in their official uniforms, the uniforms of the Sudanese army, have taken part and fought on usurped Palestinian land. The Sudanese people's relationship to the Arab cause has remained firm, a relationship of thought and ideology, a relationship of goals and strategy, and no party in the Sudan, in spite of the presence of a few reactionary parties, has been able to ignore the Arab cause throughout history except insofar as it could preserve its position under the shadow of reaction.

"Our party has continued to call for a full relationship with Arab unity and with the slogans of freedom and socialism, not just as slogans but as a firm ideology; time has continued to show that no Arab people in any country of our great nation can but adopt this ideology, because it is the sole road to salvation.

## Nile Water for the Masses of the Nile

"At the Arab foreign ministers' conference held in Tunis, it happened that Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, in the course of the action plan he presented to the conference, demanded under the seventh subheading that the Sudan be requested to reject and repel the Egyptian regime's decision to supply 'Israel' with water from the Nile. The Sudanese National Democratic Front and the Federal Party issued a statement at that time condemning al-Sadat's arrogant attitude toward the rights of the people. The Nile does not belong to al-Sadat or to al-Numayri; rather, the Nile belongs to the Arab people living on the soil of the Nile Valley. We support the conclusion our comrade Khaddam reached and in the name of the Sudanese people delegate him to carry on this cause on our behalf and assert it to the coming Arab summit conference, especially since our Sudanese people have no representative at this conference and because the regime in the Sudan cannot claim that it represents our people, for it is lacking all powers and no longer can state that it represents the people of the Sudan (not that it ever could). When Ja'far al-Numayri and his government were silent about al-Sadat's statement, which condemned him, Ja'far al-Numayri himself requested donations from the world to solve the famine of the thirsty and drought-ridden people of the Sudan, and here he fell silent about the Nile water al-Sadat was trying to pipe to our Zionist enemy. al-Numayri's regime's failure to oppose al-Sadat is an aggression against our people's rights to the essentials of their existence, and it is not reasonable that our people, who reject the 'Israeli' presence on the land of Arabhood, should agree to be drought-ridden while Nile water is transferred to Israel.

"al-Sadat's 'initiative' and treasonous visit to the occupied Arab territories is a black spot in the history of the Arab struggle and is totally rejected. However, blacker and uglier than that has been Ja'far al-Numayri's support of al-Sadat, to the point where he even said that al-Sadat took the entire show away from him, blaming his ministers who did not allow him to go with al-Sadat on that historic trip. In fact, the regime is following behind al-Sadat in a loathesomely, opportunistic way, ignoring the sacred aspects of governance and the people in the Sudan. It has permitted Egyptian intelligence to be present just as it has prohibited the people even to breathe by themselves. After it had tightened the noose around the Sudanese people, who reject espionage, and spread espionage around everywhere, even in homes, al-Numayri and his gendarmes then asked the aid of the Egyptian regime and allowed its intelligence service to build a nest in many strategic locations and sites in the Sudan, in Wadi Sayyidna, where the military airport protecting Khartoum is situated, in the Shajarah-Ghardum camp, in the Jabal al-Awilya' camp, in the Flamingo Camp, and in eastern Sudan near the port, Port Sudan. Thus it is clear that the Egyptian regime's forces are surrounding Khartoum and taking over the Sudan's only port, Port Sudan.



## **An American Base in the Sudan**

"I am announcing no secrets when I say that a massive military base is today being built in the old port of Suwakin. This is the second port and was only used for pilgrims. Another Arab country is contributing to this American base in the name of the Red Sea Treaty and we assert that this treaty essentially is an imperialistic treaty which is absolutely not protecting the Sudan's territorial waters but will be a jumping-off spot for aggression against the territory of the Sudan and Arab lands.

"We know that contacts recently made by Maj Gen 'Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib, head of the State Security Agency in the Sudan, who returned last week from America, bringing with him agreements from America (a gift, not a loan, of \$350 million), with countless aid in the form of supply commodities, specifically sugar, flour and wheat. An Arab country contributed \$350 million in order to save the empty Sudanese treasury and \$128 million for the army. All this will go to salaries and none for production. Then there is another Arab country which has contributed the cost of oil to the Sudan for a period of 2 years. We, in the name of the Arab people in the Sudan, ask these two Arab countries to take their hands away from the collapsing regime. Any aid offered to that regime is in reality being offered in some way to 'Israel' and the parties to Camp David. We, and the whole world, know that the fall of al-Numayri will mean the fall of al-Sadat by necessity, that any important event in Egypt will have its rapid repercussion in the Sudan, and that any important event in the Sudan will have a powerful and also swift reaction in Egypt.

"The regime no longer has any connection to the Arab cause. Everything al-Sadat does al-Numayri does. The Egyptian foreign minister has become the main planner for the Sudanese minister of foreign affairs--indeed, the Sudanese armed forces have fallen under the mercy of the Egyptian regime's advisers. Even al-Numayri has become hemmed in by a large group of spies, headed by Muhammad Mahjub Sulayman, who occupies the position of al-Numayri's press counsellor. One should realize that this Sulayman was formerly a prison official--an officer.

## **The Regime and International Politics**

"We find that this puppet regime has become a mouthpiece for American imperialism in Africa. From the day al-Sadat set out his policy against the Soviet Union, al-Numayri set out his policy on the Soviet Union. Instead of winning over the countries of the socialist camp and refusing to cooperate with the imperialist countries revolving in America's orbit, we find that al-Numayri isolated the people in the Sudan from their traditional friends. al-Numayri proceeded to warn of the illusory danger that there was a Communist threat headed for the Sudan, sending for and bringing back all students from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe--those refusing being unable to come back to the Sudan. Indeed the Sudanese people lost their most important weapon, as a defense force for a massive country, the



air weapon, since most or all of its pilots had studied in the Soviet Union. What is important is that instead of preparing a replacement for Sudanese army weapons imported from the Soviet Union, he sold these weapons to an Arab entity. This entity manufactured and made spare parts out of these Sudanese weapons for those of its weapons which had been imported from the Soviet Union, thereby weakening the Sudanese army; thus the Sudan lost its force in international politics. The proof is too well known and obvious for us to repeat it--even at the Arab summit meeting in Tunis al-Sadat did not go and Ja'far al-Numayri did not go, just like Oman.

"We have seen that the regime must disappear because it has lost its status within the domestic and national cause and in international causes."

### **The Role of the Opposition**

"What is the opposition's role in bringing this regime down?

"The front opposed to this regime, and the opposition in the Sudan, have in fact become four-fold:

"The opposition loyal to the regime, which is represented by the puppet organization of the Moslem Brothers, who have become the strongest and loudest voice in Khartoum.

"Then there is the al-Ummah Party opposition, more appropriately Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's opposition. al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, since the Port Sudan meeting, when there was supposed to have been a reconciliation, has up to this day seemed confused. He is neither in opposition nor in support--he has become, as the Arabs say, 'like an ostrich, neither a bird nor a camel.' The Ansar have become bewildered over him and have split up. There are those who support him--the vanguard with financial interests in common with the regime--while most of the Ansar, the youths, are opposed to Sadiq's policy and are demanding revenge against the killers of the imam.

"After Sadiq, there is a third opposition. This was a serious opposition, but it so happened that some of its members fell into the trap of an Arab entity which knows how to infiltrate the ranks of liberation fronts (and nothing else), buying off weak spirits and fragmenting ranks. The result of this is the result al-Sadat has been working for.

"Therefore the revolutionary opposition has considered it appropriate to reconstitute the progressive Sudanese National Front with genuine revolutionary elements. These organizations are seven:

"The Democratic Federal Party.

"The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party.

"The modern Arab forces.

**"The al-Bajjah Conference, inhabitants of the eastern Sudan.**

**"The Sudanese Communist Party.**

**"The Organization of the Sons of the Southern Sudan.**

**"The organizations of the western sons of the Sudan.**

**"This front considers that there can be no peace, no negotiation and no participation whatsoever with the al-Numayri regime, whatever concessions the regime might offer it. It considers that the sole solution for getting rid of this regime is the politicization of the rifle, armed struggle, armed popular revolution, popular war.**

#### **The South and the Regime's Allegations**

**"The fact is, as far as the issue of the southern Sudan goes, that it is not a new one. Rather, it arose under the presence of imperialism and expanded in accordance with the imperialist planning set forth. The Sudan is an Arab country and its people are Arab; there is no doubt about that. However, for 70 years, more correctly since the 1924 revolution and the expulsion of the Egyptians from the Sudan, the English administration managed to split off the three southern governorates.**

**"The area of these governorates is approximately one-third that of the territory of the Sudan and their population is approximately one-third that of the Sudan. The southern region has come to be called the closed region, the objective behind that being to isolate our brothers. Nonetheless, continuous special relations continued after independence to be steadfast and multi-faceted. In spite of everything, the southerners continued to believe in the unity of Sudanese soil, which is Arab soil, and to believe in liberation and socialism.**

**"A number of attempts were made to resolve the issue of the south, but politicians looked at that through a political view remote from reality at times and erroneous at other times, especially in the days of Gen Ibrahim 'Abbud, 1958-64, when Maj Gen Hasan Bashir tried to burn the forests of the south with everything in them--a policy which we in the north condemn totally. Southerners in Khartoum University were among the strong elements which contributed to the outbreak of the October 1964 revolution, and revolutionary elements in the south continued to carry rifles and participate in bringing the regime down. They are still firing against the regime and participating in all opposition fronts which call for its collapse, as is clear from the announced makeup of the Sudanese National Democratic Front.**

**"The claim the regime is making, to the effect that there is no opposition in the south, is a claim which all the facts disavow, because the ministerial changes proclaimed officially every day and night, the suspicions and charges reaching officials in the south, the dead people and the military**

attacks cannot all be covered up. They are all obvious and are being carried in the international press. Opposition in the south exists and is fully connected to the opposition in the north. Do not be at all surprised if the south, or the eastern part of the west, demand a kind of autonomy with everyone respecting the unity of the Sudan and its territory.

### Struggle from within

"In fact we believe fully that the obvious revolutionary slogan is 'struggle from within.' Our military organizations within reflect the fact that the command exists there, and that the command which exists abroad is organized and cooperates with the command within. Whereas the Organization of Moslem Brothers dominated the Federation of Khartoum University--the number of seats is 40 and the brothers up to last year had all 40--elections were held in the university a month ago, the progressive front of the Federal Party and the Sudanese Communist Party entered in a joint list, and they managed to defeat the brothers, getting 25 out of the 40 seats while the southerners got four, so that the University of Khartoum, the most serious conscious podium in the Sudan, came into the hands of the front and the Sudanese opposition. Some members of the front's command cannot enter the Sudan at all and others can do so only secretly; they are playing their part with great effectiveness. What happened in the university is happening now in all workers' trade union federations, the Federation of Farmers, and the students' and workers' federations. Proof of that is the severity of the unrelenting strikes against the regime.

### The Eritrean Revolution and the Regime

"The Sudanese regime's strings are attached to American policy. It is truly painful that any Arab regime, no matter what its political levels are, should trade in a popular issue, like the Eritrean one. The regime in the Sudan is trying to put pressure on the Eritrean revolution, being lax with some of its detachments which are known for being agents and putting pressure on some detachments known for purity and a national reputation. We believe in our party and are preparing for the fact that the success of the Eritrean revolution will be inevitable and definite as soon as al-Numayri's regime falls, because we are anxious that there be a free Eritrean state on our eastern side, because it is the natural ally of the Sudanese people and is the strategic extension of the Sudan in the Red Sea waters. Therefore we stipulate that the revolutionary popular opposition's success in bringing down al-Numayri's regime will of necessity mean support for the Eritrean revolution, not with resolutions and not with support but with the Sudanese people and army, because the Eritrean revolution is part of the Sudanese revolution, which is part of the Arab revolution as a whole. We stress that the peaceful solution being offered to Ethiopia now will prompt al-Numayri's regime to present an armed solution in exchange, because we are convinced that a peaceful solution, or any negotiations, will be a waste of the Eritrean revolution's time and a squandering of its efforts, even though its current circumstances are somewhat difficult.

## The Front and the Liberation Forces

"As we have pointed out, the front is composed of a number of parties, including the Democratic Federal Party, which is essentially an Arab party believing since its establishment in unity, freedom and socialism. I can say that there is no great difference between our two parties. All that there is is that the Federal Party in the Sudan is an unorganized party without an ideology, while the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Syria has one. We are a spontaneous party believing in national positions against imperialism and capitalism and taking the side of liberation and socialism, and this has provided us with a broad mass base.

"In reality we consider and appreciate that the Sudanese Communist Party is the party of the working class in the Sudan. All the battles the Sudanese Communist Party has embarked on were most honestly national battles and the party was the first to stand up to al-Numayri. Hashim al-'Ata's uprising was the first armed uprising against al-Numayri. The Sudanese Communist Party was the first to raise arms against al-Numayri and the first men to ascend the martyrs' gallows were the head of the Communist Party, the martyr 'Abd-al-Qadir Mahjub, al-Shafi' Ahmad al-Shaykh, and Joseph Qarn.

"Most sorrowfully I say that reaction in the Sudan and the puppets have been able to sell the blood of these martyrs to a number of countries which are in disagreement over their policies, and some details of their policies, but are agreed in the Sudan over one thing, which is the Sudanese Communist Party. It is now in the Sudanese Communist Party's interests to stress, and it is stressing, the raising of slogans of democracy and demanding public freedoms. This is clear in its statement which was issued during the days of the 'reconciliation.' It was very alert and condemned the reconciliation, and we ourselves, the revolutionary vanguard of the Federal Party, condemned the reconciliation. We were in the right, along with the Sudanese Communist Party.

"In all the Sudanese parties, even ours, there is a right wing which refuses to cooperate with progressive wings. Fortunately this wing has been weakened. The participation of the Sudanese Communist Party in this front emphasizes that we are chasing the right from the party and chasing the right from the future of the Sudan. The Sudanese people have defined their position fully on the right and the left in the Sudan."

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CSO: 4802



PROGRESS MADE IN AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCIAL FISHING

Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 18 Nov 79 pp 33-34

[Excerpts] The ministry of agriculture and fisheries is endeavoring to increase production by adopting the following measures:

Increasing the number of model agricultural fields from 353 in 1976 to 886 in 1978.

Distributing improved seeds. The farmers received 18,425 kilograms of these last year, as compared with 5,394 kilograms in 1975. The government bears 50 percent of the cost of them as a grant to the farmer.

Distributing fertilizers. The quantity of fertilizers distributed last year was 2,559.306 tons, as compared with 1,789.1 tons in 1975. The government bears 25 percent of the costs of them.

Supplying water pumps to farmers. Last year, 463 pumps, valued at 226,555 riyals, were distributed by the ministry through 5-year loans.

Supplying insecticide sprayers. Last year, the ministry supplied 428 of these, valued at 13,924 riyals, to farmers. The government bears 50 percent of the cost of the sprayers.

The date processing plants in Nazwa and al-Rustaq increased their output from 391.4 tons to 562.4 tons. The revenues of these plants increased from 85,000 riyals in 1977 to 338,045 riyals in 1978.

Agricultural marketing cooperatives were introduced into the Bedouin areas, such as the villages of 'Izz in the district of Manah and Huraythah in the district of Adam. The number of cooperatives registered increased from 14 in 1977 to 20 in 1978. Also, a cooperative was formed in the capital.

An agricultural marketing center was set up in Ruwi, and its gross sales amounted to 105,306 riyals last year. Another center was set up in Salalah.

The cattle research center and the sheep and goat research center are conducting breeding experiments, and foreign poultry are being raised for egg production.

Work is in progress to build the al-Hajar veterinary center for al-Sib and Raysut, the central laboratory for diagnosing animal diseases, two clinics in 'Ibri, and a clinic in Sama'il.

The income from veterinary services amounted to 60,000 riyals in 1978, representing an increase of 45,000 riyals over 1977. There were 112,921 cases treated in 1978.

#### Projects to Be Opened During the National Festival

During the ninth national festival ceremonies, the agricultural region in Salalah, which cost 600,000 riyals, will be opened. This region comprises a central unit for animal raising, guidance and environment promotion services, crop protection services and protection teams, cooperative services, special agricultural services for providing seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides, a workshop for the repair and maintenance of agricultural tools and equipment, storage facilities for seeds, fertilizers, chemicals, and spare parts, tarpaulins for machinery and means of transportation, a model farm, and an agricultural marketing center.

The al-Hajar veterinary health center, which cost 368,632 riyals, will be opened in Raysut. It will comprise a veterinary clinic, a dissection room for dead animals, a diagnostic laboratory, an electrical furnace for disposing of dead animals, a pharmacy for keeping medicines, sera, and vaccines, animal enclosures, and dip baths.

The Dhofar branch veterinary clinic, which cost 80,400 riyals will be opened.

#### Fish Resources

The output of the Matrah fish resources exploitation project amounted to 632.55 tons last year, as compared with 534.2 tons in 1977. Its sales amounted to 2,569.3 tons, valued at 651,632 riyals.

In August 1979, the ministry adopted measures to establish a national Omani fish corporation, whose first meeting will take place next January or February. The corporation was registered on 25 September 1979 with a capital of one million riyals, with the provision that its shares are to be distributed as follows: 30 percent to the government, represented in the ministry of agriculture and fisheries; 10 percent to the fishermen, represented in the Fishermen's Incentive Fund; 30 percent to the founders; and 30 percent to general subscription.

From 1 January 1978 to 1 September 1979, the fund distributed 170 25-horsepower and 65 15-horsepower machines in the capital area and 45 25-horsepower and 30 15-horsepower machines in the Northern District. It also distributed 238 boats under loans which have been made available, and the government bears 25 percent of the cost of each boat as a grant to the fishermen.

During the ninth national festival, the ministry will open a fish resources promotion project in al-Buraymi. This project will comprise a cooling tank with a capacity of 200 tons, a freezing plant with an output of 20 tons per day, two refrigerators to keep fish for marketing in al-Buraymi and neighboring villages, a workshop for repairing the equipment, a refrigerator truck for distributing fish in the district, and dwellings for the officials and technicians who will administer and operate the project.

The Masandam project, on which work is in progress, will comprise a refrigeration warehouse with a capacity of 200 tons, an ice plant with an output of 15 tons per day, a completely equipped maritime workshop to serve the local fishermen, and dwellings for the officials and technicians who will administer and operate the project.

Work is in progress on the construction of a maritime workshop in Mirbat.

Work is in progress on the construction of a project for the exploitation of fish resources in Masirah, which will comprise an ice plant with an output of 30 tons per day, a freezing chamber with a capacity of 220 tons per day, a maritime workshop, and dwellings for the workers on the project.

CSO: 4802

TUNIS DAILY SCORES EXPLOITATION OF ISLAM FOR DARK DESIGNS

LD131013 Tunis L'ACTION in French 6 Dec 79 pp 1, 9 LD

[Editorial by Abdelhay Sghaier: "Islam: Vigilance Is Essential"]

[Text] In the current situation it is vital to resort to reason to separate the wheat from the chaff and void taking the wrong path.

There is ferment in many third world countries, especially some Muslim countries. The events taking place do not always look the same and do not all seem to have the same motives but, on analysis, the facts, in their objective state, cannot withstand comparison.

In politics there are no movements which arise from "spontaneous generation." As we approach the end of this century it is important to be able to distinguish the pure metal from the dross and the sound path from the pitfall. Today the road to hell is paved with good intentions and it is more dangerous than ever to abandon the substance for the shadow. The traps are layed and the Islamic countries, to mention just one example, are walking through a minefield.

It is true that the third world countries are still suffering grave injustices which have gradually assumed the nature of intolerable challenges. The colonial and racist phenomena, the arsenals of economic domination and exploitation at world level, the attempts at penetration and hegemony have exasperated people and legitimately outraged their consciences. The Palestinian tragedy caused by Zionist defiance, southern Africa's problems due to the defiance of the racist regimes, the maneuvers aimed at keeping the developing countries in an outrageous state of economic dependence have created areas of frustration and a state of insecurity which have encouraged two conflicting phenomena!

First, injustices, with their train of passionate reactions, have crystallized many forms of hatred which have sparked off acute tension and created explosive situations. The struggle against these injustices takes several forms, ranging from the demonstration of solidarity to armed resistance. In essence this is a noble phenomenon since the forces



which cause and sustain it are fighting for the triumph of a noble ideal. This is true of the Palestinian, Eritrean, Zimbabwean, South African and Namibian people who face an extremely degrading form of colonization and are subjected to a policy of destructive repression. The movement which emerges from this combat mobilizes energies and catalyzes fellow feeling and solidarity. Indeed the third world peoples are not insensitive to a struggle whose principles and motives they share since their struggle on the economic front is founded on the same principles of justice and fairer distribution of international responsibilities. This struggle is our struggle. We feel part of it on the level of principles and political practice.

The second phenomenon differs from the first in that it is to do with predominant forces whose ultimate objectives are not explained and frequently escape everyday perception but whose means of action are used to exploit, to their benefit and in their way, the tidal wave of peoples and states which have become aware of the need to break ties of dependence and subordination. Hence the many attempts to infiltrate movements having unquestionably noble aims. Hence also the maneuvers to deflect struggles for just causes from their courses and the appearance of certain pernicious forms of struggle whose extremism and violence constantly sow doubts and raise questions on the full details of a game which involves risks of an unprecedentedly serious nature.

Today the appearance of certain factions and small groups alleged to be revolutionary in their nature, objectives and methods is necessarily leading to the idea of using for secret ends ideology, religion and even things humanity has accepted as sacred values forming the price of freedom and life. However, those are merely screens. In each case there is usually a Trojan horse. Manipulating forces provide their agents with increasingly sophisticated means both in the sphere of propaganda and that of political agitation or military action.

Modern subversion is defined by the fact that it is inseparable from tendencies toward destabilization and hegemony because it is the preferred means of achieving those aims. Similarly it is essentially based on popular mobilization in the countries which form the targets of the new domination strategy. It is not always necessarily a question of using an iron pot to break an earthenware pot since means have been found of [apparent line drop] and hence enabling the strongest to reduce the weakest to impotence. Furthermore that explains the attacks sometimes made on countries which are democratic and sound in their political options, their successful model of development and the actions they are untiringly taking to contribute to the victory of just causes. The strategists of destabilization regard these countries as embarrassing witnesses--the few countries capable of contradicting their ideology and their designs.

At this point a crucial question arises: Where stands Islam in all this? Where are the values of progress, the principles of justice and attachment to the rules of international law which are undoubtedly among the soundest and most effective means of helping small and medium-sized nations to

succeed in eradicating injustice, preserving their sovereignty and insuring their approval [sourire; possibly misprint for survive: survival] in a world in which the need for development is now reflected in a frantic race in which nobody can afford to waste time and energy. Where in all this can we find the interests of the Islamic countries, the Arab countries, the African countries and the Third World countries whose solidarity is sorely tried if not challenged by secret forces receiving their orders from here or elsewhere?

It is to say the least aberrant for religion to be travestied to the point of being used as an instrument of regression whereas Islam is undoubtedly the religion of progress par excellence. It is no less cruel that it is being used as a means to trick people's consciences, create fanatical minds and to set them against the masses' deepest and most legitimate aspirations to strengthen their unity and consolidate their culture and personality in face of the devastating assault from subversive ideologies. If the aim is to fight peoples by themselves and because they have something more sacred in order to subjugate them, then beware of their power of resistance and of the antidotes they have accumulated against obscurantism and venture.

[LD131015] When you recall the heroic resistance, the finest and strongest resistance ever put up in this country, to save Islam when it was threatened with disintegration, as was the Tunisian character, by the colonial forces and their supporters and when you also realize that the same man, Bourguiba, and his party made the regeneration of the Arab-Islamic component of the nation one of the substrata of his liberation struggle, you see, on the other hand, the dangerous, reactionary and medieval shabbiness of those now portraying themselves as defenders of Islam in Tunisia, as if our religion were threatened here when it has never flourished so much.

The Bourguibian contribution to the spread of Islam freed from archaic and ossified traditions is a model for what every Muslim people should do to meet the challenge of the modern world and win progress without abandoning, releting or destroying anything. Without a considered and rational development a people will regress and die in a world in which the fight for survival must of necessity mobilize all the resources of reason.

In the singularly complicated and redoubtable game between opposing blocs the worst thing that can happen to a Third World country is to become a meek tool, a pawn on the board--in a word, to lose its independence. Indeed that is the principal danger as the century draws to a close.

There is only one way of averting the danger: Consolidate the front within your borders, bar the path to Sorcerer's apprentices, debunk the advocates of obscurantism, denounce the flagrant abuse now being made of a religion and a people's faith, disarm the submarines which, under the white flag of Islam, conceal the black designs of subversion and only aim to destroy the soundest and most precious achievement a nation has ever attained in its history both in its aspirations to progress and in the preservation of its personality and unity. We must stop the adventurers wherever they show themselves.

National independence has requirements which religion itself raises to the level of patriotic duty and to the sacred duty to defend your country against such Machiavelian designs.

Vigilance is essential for a people determined to maintain their stability and to continue their victorious march along the path of progress.

CSO: 4400

## WESTERN SAHARA

### CONSENSUS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION TO SAHARA PROBLEM REPORTED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 19-25 Nov 79 p 26

[Article by Shawqi al-Rayyis, AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI's correspondent in Madrid: "Everybody Is For a Dialogue, But the Problem Is...How?"]

[Text] All parties are convinced of the necessity of a political solution to the Western Sahara problem. But the obstacles are many and the spectre of internationalization is dominant.

Washington's decision to supply Morocco with weapons for its war in Western Sahara, the recent escalation of Morocco's attacks on the Polisario positions, plus Algeria's attitude toward Washington which could be described as moderate—these are indications that developments in the Sahara conflict are beginning to move in a direction which is the opposite of what it used to be. And there is more than one reason to believe that the probability of internationalization has become a serious one after the American decision, and fears of the repercussions of this internationalization in the domestic situations in Algeria and Morocco are what have paved the way for opening up the door of negotiations and gathering the parties concerned with the Sahara conflict around the conference table.

After Mauritania succeeded in breaking out of the circle of the Sahara conflict by ceding to the Polisario the part of Western Sahara that it obtained according to the Madrid agreement, and after the Mauritanian regime obtained the support of Algeria and most of the African countries without cutting ties with Morocco, its traditional ally, the parties concerned in the Sahara conflict began to seriously think that negotiation is the only possible solution for ending this conflict.

The parties directly concerned, that is, Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario, have stated time and time again that there is no substitute for a political solution for ending the war which is going on in the Sahara. The last of these statements was an invitation by King Hasan II to hold negotiations, starting with the conference that will soon be held in Monrovia under the supervision of the Organization of African Unity. But the motive for such statements differ according to the party who makes the statement.



As far as Morocco is concerned, the Sahara war serves the regime's interests on the domestic level, if only temporarily. But the continuation of this war, and Morocco's inability to conclude it, threatens Hasan II's regime which is facing a severe economic and social crisis. Besides this, the continual attacks made by the Polisario forces in the El Aaiun and Bu Craa areas are making it impossible to exploit the great mineral resources in that region.

Also a large number of African states have adopted a position which supports the Polisario in the Sahara issue, and this is threatening to increase Morocco's isolation from its normal African framework.

As far as Algeria is concerned, the Sahara war means moral, political, and, in particular, material and military support for the Polisario Front. This support, which has increased lately, has started to arouse discontent in some of Algeria's political circles and among groups of citizens who consider that the government is supposed to devote more attention to the numerous problems that Algerian society is suffering from. And they feel that the time has come to demonstrate some flexibility and moderation in the rigid attitude which [the government] has taken since the beginning of the Sahara conflict. As for the Polisario, its motives for accepting negotiations and an invitation to participate in them are, of course, completely different from those of Morocco and Algeria. On the one hand, its human resources are limited, and consequently a continuation of the war, and especially Morocco's starting to launch large-scale, concentrated attacks, in depth, against the Polisario positions, could lead, in the long run, to decimating the numerical existence of the Saharans in the area. On the other hand, the area that Mauritania ceded to the Polisario has no strategic or economic value in comparison with the area [of Western Sahara] that Morocco annexed.

Therefore negotiations will inevitably center around this latter area, which the Polisario hopes to obtain a part of. The motives, then, and the intentions are obvious. And there is a general agreement about the necessity to hold negotiations and to reach a political solution to the problem. Also, territorial backing has been prepared within the framework of the Organization of African Unity, and the international climate is favorable, especially after the moderate approach with which the Algerian press dealt with the talks held between the American advisor and Algerian officials during the recent celebrations in honor of the revolution's silver anniversary.

But the goal toward which the parties concerned with the Sahara conflict are now striving is the consolidation of their political and military positions before any negotiations begin. Perhaps this stage is the most acute one since it is noticeable that the three parties [concerned] have achieved tangible progress in this area.

Last month the Polisario was able to inflict bruising military strikes on the Moroccan forces in Western Sahara. Lately it has also obtained broad political support from the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Alliance Conference. Morocco, on its part, succeeded in persuading Washington to take an official decision to supply it with weapons and to commit itself in principle, and to a certain extent in practice, concerning the Sahara conflict. This American decision constitutes an important change in the position of Washington which, since the beginning of the conflict, has declined to recognize Morocco's sovereignty in Western Sahara, considering that Morocco's role is only administrative and the the UN's decisions should be implemented as a beginning for any solution to the Sahara conflict.

The first result of the American decision was that Morocco proceeded to launch a large-scale, concentrated attack on the Polisario positions. This was after Rabat, for a whole month, had been content to repel the Polisario attacks and proclaim the message of standing fast in the face of communist penetration on the African continent.

The main obstacle now is the creation of a suitable formula which could bring all the parties [concerned] to the negotiation tables. Morocco insists that the Polisario is nothing but a group of mercenaries and refuses to negotiate with them. Algeria refuses to participate in any discussions, considering that the issue is between Morocco and the Polisario, and that Algeria is not a party concerned in the issue.

The formula which appears to be feasible at the present time, even though it is weak in substance--a fact which exposes it to [the possibility of] disintegration if any obstacles or difficulties crop up--is the participation of the Polisario in an Algerian delegation which would enter into negotiations with Morocco and other countries or official organizations, on the basis Algeria is a country which borders Western Sahara and is not a country which is directly concerned in the conflict.

In any case, at the end of this month, in Monrovia, there will be a meeting of the "Committee of Wise Men," which originated in the Organization of African Unity. Liberia chairs this committee, which includes Mali, Nigeria, Guinea-Conakry, and Tanzania. Its first official task will be to create a framework, which is suitable and acceptance to all parties, for opening the door to negotiations concerning this issue, which has begun to be clouded by both the spectre of internationalization and the danger that matters will slip out of the hands of those that so far have been controlling them.

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